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Abstract 
Religion has an important place in Sudanese society, and it has been used as a means 
of political domination. British colonialism had favored and empowered the Sufi orders 
of the Mahddiyya and Marghaniyya, with the result that the heads and families of those 
orders became the hegemonic Sufi establishment who used Sufism as a power capacity 
tool of political domination in the Sudan. The Sudanese Islamic/Islamist Movement 
(SIM), which appeared with a different religious ideology from that of the Sufi 
establishment, wanted to impose its ideology on the Sudanese masses. As the elites in 
the Sudan were fractured, allowing the SIM to impose its ideology as a means of 
domination, the SIM forcibly seized state power through the June 30, 1989 military 
coup. This capture of state power gave Al-Turabi, the head and ideologue of the SIM, 
the capacity to impose the SIM’s radical ideology on the Sudanese masses. Thereafter, 
under Al-Turabi’s leadership from the Sudan, the SIM supported likeminded radical 
religious movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Those countries faced their own factional 
conflicts for state power, which provided a great opportunity to expand the SIM 
ideology. While imposing the SIM ideology in and out of the Sudan, the SIM faced a 
power conflict within its ranks. Al-Bashir, the head of the SIM’s military faction, used 
military power to oust Al-Turabi from state power, resulting in the palace coup of 1999. 
During that coup, most members of the SIM sided with Al-Bashir. The post-Al-Turabi 
regime is composed of competing factions of the SIM leaders and members who sided 
with Al-Bashir in the palace coup, and who hold sensitive positions within the regime. 
Therefore, so as not to be removed from state power, Al-Bashir is in a power relation 
with those factions. Thus, the Sudan’s continued support for radical Islamist 
movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup is a byproduct of power 
relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime. This byproduct of power relations is a tactic 
conducted by Al-Bashir to discourage the competing factions within the regime from 
removing him from state power. It demonstrates that under Al-Bashir’s leadership, the 
SIM expansionist ideology, to which the competing factions remain attached, has not 
been abandoned. 
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Introduction 
Like other Third World Countries, the Sudan had its national boundaries imposed on it 
by its colonial rulers (the British Empire), and its national institutions had been formed 
to aid the colonial ruler in governing its own interest in the country. Like other British 
domains in Africa, the state of the Sudan was a periphery used by the British Empire to 
supply its needs. Moreover, the British used local agents of both tribal and religious 
leaders to effectively control the country, as the Sudanese territory extended too far and 
was too large to effectively govern alone. 
With the withdrawal of the colonial rulers, the world had great expectations for the 
Sudan. The Sudan was one of the first countries in Africa to attain independence from 
its colonial rulers, in 1956. It was seen as a country that was moving towards a path of 
self-rule based on democratic principles. However, a closer look into the Sudanese 
politics reveals that independence was achieved by partisan politicians. For example, 
Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari1 was removed from office as a result of internal 
pressure from Sayyid2 Ali Al-Marghani, the patron of Al-Azhari’s National Unionist 
Party (NUP), because Al-Marghani made an alliance with a rival, the Umma party, to 
take power from Al-Azhari.  
As a result of the colonial rule, and before the Sudan gained its independence, there was 
a mutiny among south Sudanese soldiers stationed in south Sudan. The mutiny was a 
result of racial/ethnic fear of northern Sudanese domination. That fear, which started 
the first Sudanese civil war from 1955 to 1972, was a result of the British condominium 
policy that divided the Sudan into two administrative regions in order to prevent the 
development of another national Sudanese movement, such as the Mahdiyya 
movement, that could challenge British supremacy. With that administrative policy, the 
Sudan was divided into two zones of different languages and religions. More 
importantly, the British used northern Sudanese to fill administrative posts in the entire 
country. Consequently, southern Sudanese viewed the British withdrawal with worry, 
as they believed that the northern Sudanese, who were mostly Arabs and Muslims, 
 
1 Ismail Al-Azhari was the first prime minister of the country. Because he antagonized the Sufi establishment, the Sufi orders had 
removed him from the premiership and replaced by Abdallah Khalil. 
2 A Sayyid is term for the leader of a Sufi Order. 
2 
 
would dominate the southern Sudanese, who were mostly Africans and followers of 
traditional African religions (with a minority being from Christian-based religions). 
After the Sudan achieved independence, the country experienced a period of political 
instability and military coups. Sometimes the coups were supported by the politicized 
Sufi orders of Al-Marghaniyya and Al-Mahdiyya, who were the patrons of the leading 
parties apart from the communist party). Consequently, because the ineffective political 
institutions that the country had inherited from the colonial rulers could not unify the 
factionalized Sufi establishment, the Sudan was governed by military and authoritarian 
regimes. The civilian regimes were politically weak, as they were based on coalition 
governments formed of the two competing Sufi orders. 
With the military coup of June 30, 1989, the Sudanese people experienced a new form 
of control in the country through the imposition of a politicized Islamist ideology, that 
of the National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF carried out the June 30 military coup to 
prevent the abolition of the September laws, (the sharia laws, which they had instituted 
as part of the Al-Nimeiry’s regimethat they joined in the late 1970s), as they believed 
Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi would in fact abolish them in order to start peace 
negotiations with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).  
Once they were in power, the NIF wanted to enforce its religious paradigm (orthodox 
Sunni/Wahhabism) on the Sudanese people, who adhered mostly to popular Islam 
(Sufism). Additionally, the politicized Sufi orders (the Mahdist and the Marghanist) 
had hegemonic influence over the Sudanese masses to rule by consent.   Consequently, 
in order to impose their influence, the NIF had purged the bureaucracy and the armed 
forces and banned civil societies that were not under their control, replacing them with 
NIF personnel that infiltrated those groups for a long time. The NIF also confiscated all 
the property of the leaders of the Sufi orders, and arrested their leading supporters.  
The NIF regime also wanted to export its influence into nearby countries in the East 
African region by supporting radical Islamist movements in both Eritrea and Somalia. 
The motivation for supporting like-minded radical groups in those countries was that 
the NIF leaders admired the Iranian revolution of 1979, which had put in place a 
theocratic regime that was using every means possible to spread its revolution into the 
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Middle East region.3 Another possible motive was that the NIF wanted to challenge US 
influence in the region.  
Once the Sudan began supporting radical Islamist groups in East Africa, the US started 
to pressure the Sudan and isolate it from the international community by listing it in 
1993 as one of the countries that sponsored terrorism, and subsequently imposing 
embargos against it. Under the Clinton administration the US attacked a pharmaceutical 
factory, believing it was manufacturing chemical weapons for terrorists. 
There seemed to be a division within the new state elites between a military faction, led 
by Omar Al-Bashir, and a civilian faction, led by the NIF’s ideological father Hassan 
Al-Turabi. The factionalism resulted in the division of the Sudanese Islamic Movement 
(SIM).This division manifested itself in the palace coup in 1999, in which most of Al-
Turabi’s Islamists sided with Al-Bashir’s military faction and removed Al-Turabi from 
power in both the regime and the country. Al-Bashir’s faction proceeded to take over 
important power centers in the post-Turabi regime, in order to maintain and expand 
their power within the regime. Importantly, the palace coup showed that the 
movement’s ideology had become complementary to the interests of these factions 
within the post-Turabi regime. 
The removal of Al-Turabi from power resulted in the division of the SIM and illustrated 
how the Islamists under Al-Bashir’s rule are fractured in terms of interests. Some 
analysts and scholars have asserted that the Islamists under Al-Bashir have become 
pragmatist, sinceAl-Bashir’s regime ended the Sudanese second civil war, which 
started in 1983 and ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)of 2005. 
Moreover, analysts, scholars, and even the US were pleased with the Sudanese regime’s 
support of the US in post-9/11 counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, those same 
analysts and scholars have failed to explain why Al-Bashir’s regime continued to 
provide support for radical Islamists in both Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup 
of 1999.  
 
 
 
3 After the Iranian revolution of 1979, the new theocratic regime sought to spread its revolution in the region. The oil-rich Gulf 
countries therefore aided and sponsored the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq against the new Iranian regime. 
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Objective 
Using Michel Foucault’s power relations approach, this study aims to trace the power 
conflict within the Sudanese political system, dominated by the SIM ideology that led 
to the palace coup of 1999 against the SIM’s ideologue and to describe the impact of 
that change on Sudanese support for the radical Islamist factions in Eritrea and Somalia. 
The Research Problem and Research Question 
Since the palace coup of 1999, the post-Al-Turabi regime has created a paradox that 
scholars and analysts seem not to answer fully. While the post-Al-Turabi regime 
supported the US’s post-9/11 counterterrorism operations and ended the Sudanese 
second civil war by signing the CPA in 2005, at the same time it continued to provide 
support for radical Islamist groups in Somalia and Eritrea. These two contradictory 
behaviors raise the question of whether or not the regime is pragmatic in its foreign 
policy with respect to satisfying both the US and the international community. The main 
question for this research would be as follows: Why did Al-Bashir’s post-Al-Turabi 
regime continue its support for radical Islamic movements in East Africa after the 1999 
palace coup? The power struggle that resulted in the division of the SIM is regarded as 
the result of pragmatism on the part of the individuals who joined Al-Bashir’s military 
camp. According to that logic, the post-Al-Turabi regime should have stopped 
supporting radical Islamist groups. However, the support for these groups, and the 
radical Islamist rhetoric, continued. Additional sub-questions will guide the thesis: How 
powerful are the different factions in the post-Turabi regime? Is there a faction inside 
the regime whose support Al-Bashir tried to gain in order to continue his rule in the 
Sudan? How influential is that faction in controlling Sudanese foreign policy? 
Hypothesis 
Religion in the Sudan had always been politicized by the fractured elites as a tool of 
political domination. The power conflict within the factionalized Sufi establishment 
resulted in SIM’s wanting to impose its religious ideology by capturing the state and 
usingit as a means of political domination over Sudanese society. Importantly, once it 
had obtained the capacity to impose its ideology on the Sudanese society, the SIM 
worked to expand and impose its religious and ideological capacity outside of 
theSudanas well. The palace coup of 1999 showed that Al-Bashir was able to rely on 
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to help him remove Al-Turabi from state power. 
5 
 
However, the coup also showed that Al-Bashir’s post-Al-Turabi regime is based on an 
alliance with Al-Turabi’s previous supporters, who hold influential and sensitive 
positions within the regime. In other words, Al-Bashir is allied with former Al-Turabi 
loyalists who form the core of his regime. The hypothesis of this thesis isthat the post-
Al-Turabiregime continued to support radical Islamists in East Africa as a by-product 
of power relations. That by-product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi 
regime is a tactic by Al-Bashir to controlthe fractured elites that he heads, so they do 
not unite against him or remove him from state power.The hypothesis will be based on 
two guiding factors to explain why Al-Bashir’s post-Turabiregime continued its support 
for radical Islamist movements in East Africa: the regime’s internal vulnerability andits 
sponsorship of non-state radical groups. 
Methodology and Sources 
The thesis will employ a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis of how 
the internal factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime influenced the Sudan’s 
foreign policy to support radical Islamists in East Africa.  The Sudanese support for 
radical Islamists in both Somalia and Eritrea, by both the Turabi/NIF and the post-
Turabi regimes, willbe studied.  
Secondary sources, such as books, academic journal articles, and old intelligence 
reports, would be used to study Sudanese politics, the SIM, and the Sudanese support 
for radical Islamist movements before and after the split within the SIM. Interviews 
will be used to analyze the internal factors that led the SIM to be factionalized. Primary 
sources, such as recent news articles and recentintelligence and situational reports from 
research centers and think thanks will be used to further illustrate how the post-Al-
Turabi regime supported the radical Islamist movements in Somalia and Eritrea. 
Some books and reports from SIM insiders have used in the study. However, because 
these sources are from SIM and regime insiders who speak from their own interest, 
their contribution had been used with scrutiny, so as not to misguide the analysis of this 
study. 
Limitations 
An important limitation in this study is that scholars in both International Relations (IR) 
and International Security (IS) as have not used any theory or conceptual framework to 
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link a regime’s internal factionalism to its foreign policy. This may be because IR and 
IS have not utilized political economy to study such a case. Both IR and IS scholars 
have provided a theory of diversionary war, where a population’s discontent against a 
given regime causes regime leaders to go to war against other countries to divert that 
discontent. Nonetheless, such a theory bases its analysis on the centrality of the state 
and on a state using its military. In a country such the Sudan, power is not in the state 
institutions but in the hands of a few individuals. Importantly, in the current era military 
confrontation between states has been reduced greatly compared to states using proxy 
agents to settle their interest against each other. Moreover, even theories of states 
supporting proxy agents disregard the importance of a state’s ideology in the 
relationship between a principal (a state) and an agent (sponsored by that state). 
Another limitation is that the author of this study intended to visit the International 
University of Africa (previously African Islamic Center) to conduct interviews with its 
students, as that university is well known to radicalize its students.Unfortunately, 
because the Sudanese regime directly owns that university and because previously 
curious individuals were arrested, the intended interviews could not be done.  
The thesis has thus had to rely on the conceptual framework, selected literature, 
intelligence reports, and other recent reports and articles in order to bypass these 
limitations. The analysis from the collected literature has proven to be fruitful.  
Significance 
This study helps us to understand the post-Al-Turabi regime support for radical Islamist 
movements in Somalia and Eritrea in two ways. First, not much attention had been 
given to the study of the dynamic factional politics that have been influencing the post-
Turabi regime in the Sudan.Second, equally little attention had been given to the study 
of states with radical ideologies sponsoring radical movements with similar ideologies 
in East Africa, in comparison to studies on states sponsoring proxy wars, such as those 
between Sudan and Chad, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and others. This gap led to the 
development of this research in order to add to our understanding of Sudanese foreign 
policy in aiding radical Islamist groups in East Africa,which has been little studied 
previously. 
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Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter one will present the analytical gap in the theoretical literature and will illustrate 
how this study aims to fill that gap. First, a review of the theoretical literature will be 
presented. This literature had previously tried to explain how a country’s foreign policy 
is formulated, how leaders deal with certain groups within their regime, and why a 
country would support non-state actors to achieve its goals. The limitations of this 
literature will also be presented. Second, two alternative theories will be offered to 
address the question that this study aims to answer. Third, after selecting one of those 
two theories, the conceptual framework that will guide the analysis of the study will be 
presented. The chapter will conclude by explaining why both Somalia and Eritrea were 
selected as case studies for the Sudan’s role in supporting radical Islamist movements 
in East Africa. 
Chapter two will describe how religion has been constantly used as a political tool by 
the reigning powers in the Sudan to rule both the country and its people. First, the 
chapter will explain both why and how the British Empire politicized Sufi orders 
(Marghaniyya and the Mahdiyya) in the Sudan, and how these orders benefited 
politically from the British sponsorship. Second, the chapter will explain how the two 
Sufi groups came to dominate Sudanese politics, even after the independence of the 
Sudan. Third, the chapter will discuss how and why the SIM appeared in the Sudan, 
and the common interests and the struggles they had with the dominant parties and other 
flourishing movements in Sudan, infiltrating civil society, the state bureaucracy, and 
even the armed forces. Finally, the military coup of 1989 will be explained by 
illustrating how the NIF wanted both to maintain its influence in Sudanese politics and 
to attain power in the country.  
Chapter three will show how the NIF was imposing its religious ideology and how that 
changed after the palace coup of 1999, Secondly, the chapter will present why and how 
the NIF regime was so involved in supporting the radical Islamist groups in Somalia 
and Eritrea. Finally, the chapter will show the internal power struggle the new NIF elites 
faced, describe the cause of the power struggle,and explain why most of the Islamists 
(even the most loyal of Al-Turabi’s Islamists) joined Al-Bashir in removing Al-Turabi 
from power in 1999. 
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Chapter four will illustrate the power relations within the post-Turabi regime and the 
power configurations of the Islamists who sided with Al-Bashir to remove Al-Turabi 
from power. First, the chapter will describe the positions the fractured Islamists hold 
within the post-Al-Turabi regime. Second, the relative power of each faction will be 
evaluated. Third, the chapter will present the channels of support the regime maintains 
with the radical Islamist groups in Somalia and Eritrea. Finally, the chapter will present 
the relationship of the post-Al-Turabi regime with the radical Islamist movements in 
Somalia and Eritrea, to demonstrate that the regime is continuing its support for these 
movements in light of the regime’s pragmatism,as was described earlier. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to reveal the analytical gap in the existing literature and to 
explain how this study proposes to fill that gap. First, a review of the theoretical 
literature will be presented. This literature seeks to describe how a country’s foreign 
policy is formulated, how leaders deal with certain groups within their regime, and why 
a country would support non-state actors to achieve their goals. The limitations of this 
literature will also be discussed. Second, two alternative theories will be presented to 
address the question that this study aims to answer. Third, after selecting one of those 
two theories, the conceptual framework that will guide the analysis of the study will be 
presented. Fourth and last, the chapter will conclude by illustrating why both Somalia 
and Eritrea were selected as case studies for this thesis. 
A Theoretical Literature Review  
There is a body of literature that seeks to explain how a country’s foreign policy is 
made, how regime heads try to maintain their authority within their regimes, and why 
states support proxy agents rather than their own militaries to achieve their domestic 
and foreign goals. This section of the chapter will present a critical review of the 
theoretical literature that has tried to answer these questions. 
 
A great deal has been written on the role of agency in foreign policy. Foreign policy is 
made as a result of agency in the case when there are multiple actors with competing 
interests, and the policy of a country is a result of compromise among those competing 
actors and groups. Graham Allison’s “Governmental Politics Model” illustrates the 
importance of agency in the making of foreign policy.4The model asserts that leaders 
within the government are not monolithic, because they are competing players who do 
not focus on a single strategic issue but on many intra-national problems, and their 
interest are based on various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals; 
their decisions are determined by politics within the government.5The leaders hold 
positions in different departments within the government bureaucracies, and their 
positions within those respective departments shape their perceptions and interests 
 
4 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), 144–
184. 
5 Ibid., 144. 
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against other leaders to fight for what they believe is a sound policy.6 Problems are 
varied, not straightforward strategic issues; management of decisions is more important 
than steady-state choices; and carrying out a decision is more difficult than identifying 
a preferred solution.7 Theoretically speaking, the leader of the regime—the president—
might be a power broker; when a decision on foreign policy is made, however, the 
president needs to have consensus with his advisers and important senior leaders. 
Otherwise, the president’s policy might be ignored.8 Moreover, if no consensus is made 
on policy, opponents might take advantage of it.9 Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. 
Hermann further illustrate the complexity of the agency of foreign-policy making by 
describing the three different typologies of the ultimate decision unit: the predominant 
leader, the single group that relies on group think, and the multiple autonomous actors 
who need to work with each other.10 The ultimate decision unit is when one of those 
three actors is the authority on the decision, which cannot be reversed by the other 
actors.11According to their findings, single groups show the most extreme foreign 
policy behavior, followed by predominant leaders and then multiple autonomous 
actors.12 Importantly, they assert that when multiple autonomous actors fail to reach an 
agreement on any course of action, a “deadlock” happens, where no entity can act alone 
on behalf of a given regime.13  In order for this not to happen, there needs to be 
governing institutions, governing procedures, norms, and rules. The agency model does 
not include factionalism in the analysis. Where a group aims to attain power by 
removing other groups from the governing regime, the role of the state institutions is 
central to the theory, and the head of the regime will always need consensus. 
Importantly, the theory is based on positivism of classification system and a rationalism 
that rationalizes behavior in foreign policy, reducing the importance of ideology and 
allowing the interests of various actors to be achieved through politics, resulting in a 
foreign policy of compromise and agreement.  
 
 
6 Ibid., 144–145. 
7 Ibid., 146. 
8 Ibid., 144–184. 
9 Ibid., 144–184. 
10 Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry,” 
International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 361–387, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600518 (accessed March 2, 
2015). 
11 Ibid., 362. 
12 Ibid., 377–384. 
13 Ibid., 368. 
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There is limited literature with regard to factionalism within an authoritarian regime, 
where the head of the regime might be displaced by those factions. Among the closest 
to addressing the issue of how a sitting head of a regime might secure his position are 
Jessica Weeks’ theory and Brandon J. Kinne’s poliheuristic theory. Weeks utilized 
Fearon’s audience cost theory to assert that personalist regimes also face audience cost, 
like democratic regimes.14Her contention is based on how elites within the regime react 
towards their leader. She claims that in authoritarian political systems some leaders are 
linked by blood relations to the regime head, or have no power or social support base 
to replace the leader.15As it is politically costly to remove the leader (even if the leader 
is weak), the leader would be allowed to stay in power by the political elites in the 
regime.16That might be the reason why executive leaders of personalist regimes fill top 
posts with relatives and close associates, so as not to be removed by internal regime 
revolt.17However, it is also important for the regime's leader to have direct control over 
the security and intelligence agencies of the country to constantly monitor the other 
elites, in order to prevent a coordinated revolt against him.18Therefore, in such a regime 
the intelligence and security organs are monitored by a collective rather than by an 
individual incumbent leader, and the coordination dilemma between elites can be 
solved by simple communication.19Weeks asserts that there is no audience cost in 
personalist regimes, as the security organs are controlled by the regime’s head. 20 
Nonetheless, elites are tied to the leader too, and would not remove him.21To link 
authoritarian regimes to foreign policy, Kinne’s theory linked regime typology to 
foreign policy. His analysis uses poliheuristic theory along with different authoritarian 
regime classification typologies to determine the foreign policy of a given authoritarian 
regime.22 According to him, a personalist regime’s use of doctrines or ideology is 
merely transitory, to allow a leader to purse his strategic interest, and it in no way 
constrains his behavior.23Furthermore, Kinne asserts that a personalist leader faces both 
internal regime threats and external threats of removal, which depend less on specific 
 
14 Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization 62, no. 1 
(2008): 35–64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071874 (accessed April 26, 2014). 
15 Ibid., 41. 
16 Ibid., 41. 
17 Ibid., 42. 
18 Ibid., 40. 
19 Ibid., 41. 
20 Ibid., 46. 
21 Ibid., 47. 
22 Brandon J. Kinne, “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective,” International Studies Perspectives 
6, no. 1 (2005): 114–128, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x/epdf 
(accessed March 2, 2015). 
23 Ibid., 116. 
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relationships and more on the overall status of the leader among his peers.24The peers 
may include military leaders, rival factions, regional actors, or the mass public; 
therefore, a dictator’s appearance among his peers is a way for the leader to judge his 
chances of remaining in office.25That status develops from a personality cult.26 Such 
events as military victories or opposition against imperialist powers contribute to the 
status of the leader—even though there might be objective losses—and hence improve 
his chance of political survival. 27 Both Weeks’ and Kinne’s theories ignore the 
importance of power relations and ideology in stopping factions within a personalist 
regime and other authoritarian regimes from removing a sitting regime head. 
Importantly, the positivism and rationalization of their analysis dislocates an 
authoritarian regime head’s need for foreign policy to maintain his hold on power.  
A compelling literature that links a regime’s instability to interstate war is diversionary 
war theory. The literature of diversionary war started with Simmel’s sociological 
hypothesis of in-group cohesion as a result of fighting an out-group (a foreign 
enemy).28Accordingly, the theory postulates that leaders who want to stay in power will 
use war to divert a population’s discontent against the regime.29Amy Oakes uses this 
theory, along with the policy alternative approach of rational choice theory, to explain 
the underpinnings behind the Falklands war, where Argentina under the military junta 
invaded the islands, causing a war with Britain that it lost.30Oakes asserts that the 
motivation for the invasion was that the junta faced domestic unrest because of its 
economic and political policies, the government lacked the resources to either repress 
or appease the opposition by enacting reforms, and hence the regime selected the 
diversion of invading the Falklands to rally the masses to support the regime, 
unfortunately miscalculating the British response to the invasion.31 Nevertheless, she 
dismissed the importance of fragmentation of the military junta that might had caused 
the war by claiming that such an analysis would overlook the fact that elite division 
may be a result of domestic unrest, and that a united government will fear domestic 
 
24 Ibid., 120. 
25 Ibid., 120. 
26 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 133. 
27 Kinne, “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes,” 120. 
28 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. and trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1950). 
29 Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 259–288. 
30 Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,”Security Studies15, no. 3 (2006): 431–463, 
http://www.tandfonline.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410601028354 (accessed March 2, 2015). 
31 Ibid., 461–462. 
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unrest if it is sufficiently strong.32Consequently, her analysis is based on popular 
discontent against the regime, and ignores the importance of elite divisions in causing 
the war. 
Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani take a step further by combining their 
analysis of a rationalistic comparative institutional approach with a regime-typological 
reference to consolidating versus consolidated autocratic and democratic regimes. 
Importantly, they look at the propensity of each of these regimes to start an interstate 
war as a result of domestic pressures.33One of their claims is that a consolidating 
autocratic leader relies on the elite to maintain his rule, yet when there is elite dissension 
against him, he will use diversionary war to rally them behind him, as not all the elites 
might not be loyal to him: the military commanders might be loyal to the other elites 
and, importantly, the regime head might question the reliability of the internal security 
organs.34Pickering and Kisangani compare this situation to mature autocracy, where the 
leader does not need this kind of diversion, as he has already centralized power and has 
control over the security organs.35They also analyze consolidating and consolidated 
democracies. With their hypothesis testing and empirical findings, they found that 
consolidating autocrats will use diversionary war as a result of increasing elite unrest, 
while consolidated autocrats will not; however, they also find that, as elite unrest grows, 
the consolidating autocrat’s ability to create a diversion decreases.36 
Another comparative approach to understanding an authoritarian regime’s propensity 
for diversionary war is presented by Olga Chyzh, Brian Lai, and Sara McLaughlin 
Mitchell. They use a comparative approach similar to that of Pickering and Kisangani, 
but they empirically test the propensity of diversionary war in a variety of autocratic 
regimes. 37 They also used Slater’s two-dimensional typology of authoritarian 
institutions. 38  They find that military regimes use diversionary war more than 
frequently than party regimes, and that within despotic power types, infrastructural 
authoritarian institutions will influence the propensity to engage in diversion.39 This 
 
32 Ibid., 447–448. 
33 Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type 
and the Diversionary Hypothesis,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 23–44, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693623 
(accessed March 2, 2015).  
34 Ibid., 26. 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Ibid., 40. 
37 Olga Chyzh, Brian Lai, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Autocratic Regimes and Diversionary Uses of Force,” 1–46, 
http://www.saramitchell.org/clm.pdf (accessed March 14, 2015).  
38 Ibid., 9. 
39 Ibid., 24. 
14 
 
might explain why military regimes are more likely than party regimes to resort to 
diversion to legitimize their rule and for coup-proofing: party regimes have wider 
penetration within society than military regimes, which allows them greater control and 
surveillance over the population.40Importantly, party regimes use ideology as one 
method to legitimize their rule and mobilize popular support, while the military relies 
on their protection of the state as a basis of their legitimacy.41 
None of this literature proved to be helpful for this study. Its limitations stem from the 
positivism of its categorization of regimes and the rationalism of the behavior of those 
regimes in the face of domestic discontent. These earlier studies are inconclusive in 
regards to the role of factionalism in diversionary war, and do not indicate whether 
ideology might be a significant part of the diversion policy or not. Importantly, since 
the end of the Cold War, conventional warfare requiring direct use of national militaries 
has declined, while proxy warfare and insurgencies that rely on non-state actors have 
becomed predominate. Consequently, in this era states have used and continue to use 
non-state actors to achieve their objectives, even for diversionary purposes. 
The literature on delegation if  war to non-state actors is important in understating why 
states would support non-state actors to achieve their objectives, rather than resorting 
to direct conventional wars against rival countries. Idean Salehyan, Daniel Byman, and 
Sarah Kreps have contributed to the literature that explains the reasons behind this 
tactic. The three scholars use the principal–agent model to explain the rationale behind 
delegation. “Delegation of war” is the relationship that results from a state sponsoring 
non-state rebellious actors in other countries. Salehyan illustrated how sponsoring 
countries (the principals) delegate wars to non-state actors (the agents) as they shape 
the insurgency and exert control over the insurgents.42 Importantly, he asserts that it is 
politically and economically cheaper for a state to sponsor non-state actors than to use 
its own military to confront a rival country, and he presents the mechanisms that 
sponsoring states can use against their agents to keep the agents from shirking.43 One 
of the benefits of delegation is that the state sponsors avoid international condemnation, 
which might lead to the imposition of sanctions. Delegation can also help in intelligence 
 
40 Ibid., 10–12. 
41 Ibid., 9. 
42 Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (2010): 501, 
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gathering, and can provide a local face for the sponsoring state in the rival 
state.44Byman and Kreps apply the same premise of delegation to the case of states 
supporting terrorist groups.What stands out in their analysis from Salehyan’s approach 
is that they link delegation to a regime’s status within its own country. An important 
reason why a state would sponsor non-state groups is to reinforce its influence in its 
own state.45 For example, the Syrian delegation of Palestinian groups has been a way 
for the Assad regime to extend its influence at the domestic level.46Moreover, states 
would support proxy agents based on ideological inclinations, even if such proxy agents 
are weak.47 However, the agents may shirk against their principal, which might be 
dangerous.48For example, Syria supported a lot of Palestinian groups, but its lack of 
control over them caused an escalation with Israel, resulting in the Syrian defeat by 
Israel in the 1967 war.49 Nonetheless, delegation to non-state groups can be controlled 
by their principal through mechanisms such as monitoring and reporting behavior, 
which might sometimes lead to direct control of agents; careful screening and selection 
of proxy agents to minimize loss through shirking behavior; and sanctioning proxy 
agents by punishing them for negative outcomes and rewarding them for preferable 
outcomes.50 
On the other hand, the proxy agents face problems of their own. One of those problems 
is the unreliable resource stream, where they might run the risk of abandonment by their 
patrons.51For example, since the reconciliation agreement between the Sudan and 
Eritrea in 2005, the Sudan has heavily controlled or stopped Eritrean opposition to the 
operations of non-state groups in the Sudan.52In the end, proxy agents are used for 
political and military leverage by a sponsoring state against a rival state and will be 
abandoned when the sponsoring state has no more use for them. 
 
44 Ibid., 503–504. 
45 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal–Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored 
Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 4, 
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Although the principal–agent model provides a link between a regime’s foreign policy 
and its support for non-state actors to achieve its goals, the model has short comings as 
a result of its rationalistic and positivistic prism. It ignores the role of power relations 
within a regime and how that is related to a state supporting a non-state actor. Moreover, 
it ignores the importance of the centrality of a state and a state’s ideology in supporting 
movements with similar ideologies—for example, using weak examples of the Taliban 
supporting Al-Qaeda as a result of ideological affinity. This example ignores the fact 
that the Afghani state institutions had collapsed and that the country was ruled by 
multiple factions. Although one among many factions in the country had supported Al-
Qaeda, there was no official state support, and the question of ideology is reduced to an 
ideology of one faction among other Afghani factions. Byman and Kreps’ analysis had 
an academic bias as it did not define what a terrorist group is or illustrate how such a 
group is different from insurgency groups. Importantly, their analysis seems only to 
link such movements with authoritarian regimes, neglecting the fact that democratic 
regimes such as the US had supported similar movements in Latin America during the 
Cold War.  
The presented literature, had shown that the role of intra regime behaviour, in an 
authoritarian regime, in regards to foreign policy, is understudied.The detectable biases 
and limited analysis of the previous literature have led this study to present two theories 
that value the importance of factionalism and ideology in presenting all the elements 
needed to illustrate how power within the regime of a state causes that state to support 
non-state groups.  
Alternative Theories 
Using Marxist political economy analysis, Antonio Gramsci presents an interesting 
theory to explain how established elites who rule the state have hegemonic influence 
over the masses, even if the elites do not care for the welfare of their masses. According 
to Gramsci, hegemony is when the ruling status quo (the political elite or the state) 
obtains the consent of the masses to be ruled.53Accordingly, the masses are dominated 
through a cultural norm that the political elites establish through a cultural process 
constructed by their agents. One group of the agents of the elites are the organic 
 
53Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), 24. 
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intellectuals who are the thinking and organizing element of a particular social class; 
they are distinguished less by their profession than by their function of directing the 
ideas and aspirations of the class to which they belong.54Those intellectuals can be 
ecclesiastic intellectuals who hold a monopoly of a number of important services such 
as religious ideology.55They may be bound to a landed aristocracy with which it has an 
equal status judicially, with which it shares the exercise of feudal ownership of land 
and the use of state privileges connected to property.56Therefore, when a political party 
is formed its organic intellectuals are involved in the political and philosophical field 
and not just in the field of productive techniques.57However, the monopoly owned by 
those ecclesiastic intellectuals in the superstructure field was not obtained without a 
struggle or limitations, which brought about the birth of other categories, favored and 
enabled to expand by the growing strength of the power of the monarch, right up to 
absolutism.58Thus that influence and dominance of those intellectuals expanded with 
the power of a given centralized power of a monarchy at the time, which also meant 
that the dominance of those ecclesiastic intellectuals was subordinate to the power of 
that monarchy. Moreover, according to Gramsci, when political parties have control 
over a state, the government of the party or parties in power operates to disintegrate the 
other parties, to detach them from the broad masses and to obtain the support of non-
party individuals through populism.59 
Gramsci’s analysis also explains two ways in which the hegemonic power of the 
established political elites can be removed. First, established elites in a given state can 
be conquered and removed efficiently through a process of what he calls “War of 
Position,” in which a group struggles to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the 
traditional intellectuals by creating their own organic intellectuals.60 The purpose of 
this process is to carry out a war of position against the established elites through a 
gradual shift in the balance of social and cultural forces.61 The second way to remove 
the established elites is through the Soviet model of communism that was established 
and expanded through a “War of Movement,” which consists of momentary 
 
54 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), 1. 
55 Ibid., 7. 
56 Ibid., 7. 
57 Ibid., 15. 
58 Ibid., 7. 
59 Ibid., 227. 
60 Ibid., 10. 
61 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 53. 
18 
 
practicalities of political and economic struggle, such as economic collapse, war, or a 
political vacuum. 62 In studying the Sudan, although El-Effendi uses a historical-
descriptive approach and Abdel Wahid uses social movement theory, both of their 
systems draw upon Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and war of positions through 
organic intellectuals. El-Effendi explains how the SIM developed first among 
individuals from rural areas,63 who over the years had influenced the formation of a 
devoted Islamist educated middle class in contrast to the secular middle class. This 
devoted Islamist middle class later supported the movement throughout its existence. 
El-Effendi also highlights the satellite organizations that the SIM created to spread their 
religious ideology, such the Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance, the Youth 
Society for Construction, the Association of Southern Muslims, the Association of 
Sudanese Ulama, the Islamic Da’wa Organization (and its offshoot, the African Relief 
Agency), the Namariq Literary and Artist Society, and the Union of Muslim Literary 
Men.64 Abdel Wahid explains that when Al-Nimeiry’s regime allowed the SIM to join 
its ranks, hundreds of SIM members who were teachers, lawyers, and physicians 
became the wealthiest business people in the Sudan.65Moreover, within the SIM there 
were the intellectuals who had developed Al-Turabi’s cult of personality as a 
theoretician and leader; those intellectuals were Abdel Wahab El-Effendi, Mohammed 
Hamdi, and PhD holders such as Amin Hassan Omar, Al-Tigani Abdel Gadir, 
Muhammed Wagii Allah, Mohammed Haroon, as well as other educated individuals.66 
It is clear that the SIM tried to develop their intellectuals from the fractured middle 
class both before and after becoming part of Al-Nimeiry’s regime. 
Gramsci’s theory explains both how elites have established their hegemony and how to 
remove and replace this hegemony. Nonetheless, the analysis presents analytical 
problems, as it focuses too much on ideology and how it becomes hegemonic. First, 
Gramsci’s theory seems to accept the Weberian analysis of a state with given political 
authority and a legitimate right to use coercive force. However, although modern Sudan 
has its borders, both its political authority and its legitimate right to use coercive force 
within it have not been attained, as the country’s religious and cultural diversity have 
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prevented it from doing so. This explains why the Sudan has always faced armed 
rebellion in its peripheral regions. For example, before the independence of the Sudan 
in 1956, the Sudan faced its first civil war in 1955 in south Sudan as a result of 
racial/ethnic fear among south Sudanese soldiers. Second, Gramsci’s analysis focuses 
too much on ideology and disregards the importance of interest. This is because his 
analysis is based on the power of the elites of a modern state, in which they are unified 
and politically coherent group. However, in the case of the Sudan, even though the 
dominant political groups were under the influence of the Sufi leaders, some political 
leaders under the Sufi establishment were guided by their own interest. For instance, in 
1958 Abdallah Khalil, the prime minister of the Umma-Khatmi government, feared that 
he would be forced to relinquish his position, as there were contacts between the 
dominant political groups under the influence of the Sufi orders to form an alternative 
coalition government, therefore, he invited General Ibrahim Abboud, the head of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), to carry out a military coup against his own 
government.67 Third, Gramsci’s theory takes power for granted as a tool of the elites 
who control the state. Consequently, he does not define what power is, nor does he 
explain how power is projected in a relationship between fractured elites. Fourth and 
last, Gramsci’s theory stems from Marxist analysis of mobilizing the workers to counter 
the political elites in a modern industrial state. However, British colonialism of the 
Sudan had developed the landed elites, who held great political power. And because of 
British colonialism, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) which had great influence 
over students and workers, had developed as a nationalistic and anticolonial movement. 
For example, Abdel-Rahman Al-Mahdi’s loyalty to the Sudanese colonial government 
was recognized by the colonial state when he was given the title of “Sayyid of the 
Ansar” and received sizable economic concessions in terms of land rights, leases of 
irrigations schemes, facilities for mechanized irrigation and farming, loans, grants in 
aid, and contract works.68Meanwhile, the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation 
(SMNL), developed in 1946 to fight against British imperialism in the Sudan, later 
became the SCP.69Consequently, Gramsci’s theory does not explain how a counter-
hegemonic movement can appear and attain power when two very different social 
 
67 Tim Niblock, The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898–1985: Class and Power in Sudan (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1987), 217–218. 
68 Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan (London: Frank Cass, 
1978), 26. 
69 Niblock, The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 199. 
20 
 
forces appear and develop in the same time and continue to coexist. The same 
phenomenon is illustrated by the efforts of the SIM to develop their organic intellectuals 
from the middle class. The attempt failed because both the middle class and the elites 
in the Sudan were fractured, which explained why the SIM had to use its military 
faction to capture state power and then to use that power as a capacity to impose its 
own religious and political domination. 
Unlike Gramsci’s theoretical limitation, Michel Foucault’s theory power relations gives 
an insightful analysis of power as the theory explains how power is projected and 
between whom it is projected. As Foucault has presented a much more practical theory 
of power relationships, his theory does not fall into the same theoretical traps that 
Gramsci’s theory by assuming that any given modern state has a coherent and unified 
ruling elite, which is not the case in the developing world where the elites are fractured. 
Importantly, unlike Gramsci, who focused on ideological hegemony, Foucault’s theory 
of power relations takes into account the interest of the individuals and the subjects in 
the relationship. First, power is divided into two types: power as a “capacity,” meaning 
when coercion is used, and power as a relationship which is based on acting according 
to the actions of others.70 Accordingly, power relations are exercised, to an exceedingly 
important extent, through the production and exchange of signs, and they are scarcely 
separable from goal-directed activities that permit the exercise of power.71Moreover, 
Foucault asserts that power exists only when individuals exercise influence on other 
individuals’ behavior(s).72Second, to establish power relations, violence can be used to 
obtain the consent of the subjects, by those who want to project fear to others in order 
to establish their power/influence over them in the relationship. For example, Stalin 
established himself as the most fearsome and unchallenged leader in the USSR as he 
centralized power around himself during the Great Purge of 1936 to 1938, in which 
anyone he suspected of their loyalty to him within the Communist Party, the 
government, the Soviet Army leadership, or the people in general was detained, killed, 
or sent to labor camps. It is therefore clear that the establishing of power relations does 
not exclude the use of violence any more than it requires the obtaining of consent; 
however, there is no doubt that the exercise of power always requires one or the other, 
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often both at the same time.73Third, power relations are less a confrontation between 
two adversaries or their mutual engagement than a question of “government,” where 
each of the partners in the relationship must calculate the behavior of the other.74 
Consequently, a strategy to impose power and influence on the other requires an action 
that disarms the other in the relationship, or a confrontation that transforms the partners 
in the relationship into adversaries.75  Fourth and last, a power relationship can be 
analyzed by means of a system of differentiations, and by the types of objectives.76 
Along with other modes of analysis, these two can explain why a power relationship 
had developed and whether it will be confrontational or not. 
The Conceptual Framework 
The previous literature, and other theories such as realism, liberalism and their neo-
versions, did not explain how power is exercised, and that is because they assume power 
is achieved through a confrontational struggle between adversaries. The utility of the 
Foucualt’s theory explains how power is projected between adversaries in a 
relationship, where it is not confrontational.77That approach is useful as power in 
developing countries is not within the hands of state institutions, but in the hands of few 
individuals. Importantly, unlike developed states, where the elites are coherent, in the 
developing countries the elites are fractured, where power relations is exercised for a 
regime head to maintain state power. 
Mainstream theories and studies, do not explain the origins of power in non-western 
states that have been colonized, where the colonizers had the help of local 
agents.Nonetheless, Foucault’s power relations theory explains how to analyze power 
relations from the stand point of institutions, where one must study the origins of such 
institutions, that is to explain in sum power by power.78That will aid this study to 
explain how religion in the Sudan had been used as an institutional tool of political 
domination. And why Islamist groups such as the SIM used religion as a means to attain 
state power in the Sudan. 
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Previously presented theories and other theories, explain how power is based on 
confrontation, and therefore did not prescribe the strategies for adversaries in a 
relationship to attain power, especially before the occurance of a confrontation. 
Foucault’s approach describes the strategies that can be used by individuals exercising 
power on others in a relationship (power relations), where victory, which is power, is 
attained.  Accordingly, the first procedure to achieve victory is to designate the way in 
which a partner acts within the relationship, to have the advantage over others, and to 
deprive the opponent of the means of combat, to obtain victory.79Therefore, such 
methods, allow a vulnerable regime head to use an item such as a foreign policy where 
all, or most factions agree within a regime he heads, to disarm and therefore cannot 
remove him from state power.  
The use of positivism and rationalism in the previously presented literature, such as 
regime classifications or the rationalism of states supporting proxy agents limits the 
contribution of those studies for other areas.  For example, while the Sudanese Post Al-
Turabi regime is authoritarian in nature, it can neither be classified as only military 
regime, or a civilian regime or even a hybrid regime.That is because regime 
classification studies are too narrow in their analysis, and importantly, they do not aid 
in analyzing a regime such as the post-Al-Turabi regime foreign policy behavior.    
Because of the above reasons, this study will adopt Michel Foucault’s power relations 
as a theory and as a methodology, as it most accurately depicts how power is reflected 
among fractured elites who value their interest first and their ideology second. 
First, as power relations requires the subjects to have free will, the thesis will explain 
how religion in the Sudan was used as a tool of power relations by the British empire 
and their agents(politicized Sufi orders) to maintain power and influence over the 
masses. It will illustrate how a political religious group such as the SIM appeared in the 
Sudan and decided to impose their religious ideology on the country as a reaction to 
both the politicized Sufi orders and the leftist political groups in the Sudan. Second, 
since power relations do not exclude the use of violence any more than they require the 
obtaining of consent,80 the thesis will explain why the NIF wanted to spread their 
religious ideology in both Eritrea and Somalia and how the NIF supported like-minded 
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radical Islamists in both countries to accomplish this. Third, using power relations this 
thesis will describe how the NIF regime and the SIM became internally fractured, 
causing most of the Islamists in the movement to join Al-Bashir’s Islamist military 
faction and remove Al-Turabi from power in 1999. It will be shown that power relations 
influenced this action based on the system of differentiations and objectives.81 Fourth, 
the system of differentiations and objectives was solidified after the palace coup of 
1999 by the factions in the post-Al-Turabi regime who hold important power centers 
within the Post-Al-Turabi regime and who constantly struggle against each other to 
maintain and expand their influence at the cost of the other. Fifth and last, since Al-
Bashir heads the different factions in the post-Al-Turabi regime, he is vulnerable to 
being removed by them, as they hold key positions within the regime. Consequently, to 
prevent those factions from becoming strong enough to remove him from power, Al-
Bashir continued to support radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the 
palace coup of 1999 as a tactic to illustrate to the Islamists in his post-Al-Turabi regime 
that, the SIMs’ ideology, in its expansionist form is still being continued. 
Conclusion  
The limitations of the theoretical literature review uncover an intellectual gap in 
analyzing the post-Turabi regime's support for radical Islamist groups in East Africa 
after the palace coup of 1999. Previous analyses of the Sudan’s support for radical 
Islamist groups in East Africa lack a suitable theory to explain how the internal 
factionalism of Al-Bashir’s post-Turabi regime influenced the Sudan’s support for 
radical Islamists in East Africa.  However, using the conceptual framework presented 
in the preceding section, an insightful and in-depth analysis will explain the behavior 
of the post-Al-Turabi regime in supporting radical Islamist movements in Africa. 
 
The conceptual framework will allow this study to identify the factors that caused the 
development of radical Islamist movements in the Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, looking 
at the historical and socioeconomic factors that have contributed to this development.  
There are two reasons why Eritrea and Somalia had been selected as case studies for 
this study. First, as stated earlier, the NIF regime under Al-Turabi’s leadership 
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supported like-minded radical Islamists in both countries so as to expand their ideology 
in East Africa. Second, the NIF regime provided arms, financial and other forms of 
support for like-minded radical Islamists in those two countries. Consequently, with the 
palace coup replacing one Islamist faction with another, it is impossible that the post-
Al-Turabi regime removed all forms of support for the like-minded radical Islamists in 
Eritrea and Somalia.  
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Chapter Two 
Power Relations and Religion 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to explain how religion in the Sudan is synonymous with political 
power in the country.  First, the chapter will illustrate how religion had been used as a 
political tool by religious leaders to serve their interests. The chapter will explain how 
Sufism became the dominant Sunni form of religion in the Sudan, and why the British 
Empire made use of the Sudanese Sufi orders of the Khatmiyya and the Mahdiyya. It 
will show how those Sufi orders were politicized and how their use of religion and their 
fractured state influenced Sudanese politics even after independence. Second, the 
chapter will describe how a political Islamist group such as the SIM appeared in the 
Sudan, and what struggles and shared interests that group had with the politicized Sufi 
orders and the flourishing political movements in the country. It will explain why the 
NIF infiltrated civil societies, the state bureaucracies, and the national armed forces. 
Third and last, as the NIF wanted to maintain its influence in Sudanese politics and 
attain power in the country, the chapter will explain why the NIF organized the coup of 
June 30, 1989. 
Religion and Power: Islam and Islamic Creeds 
Sufism can be defined as an aspect of external wisdom.82It is the Muslim form of 
mysticism, as its goal is to pierce the opacity of this world to contemplate spiritual 
realities that lie beyond simple faith.83 Its goal is to develop the spiritual capabilities of 
an individual within the circumstances in which God has placed him or 
her.84Knowledge is transferred from one master to another within a particular Sufi 
order. Thus, through Jafar Sadiq, Musa Kazim, and Ali Rida, who are descendants of 
Ali Bin Abi Talib, a spiritual chain of leadership of the Sufi orders was organized to 
pass down their wisdom, as they acted as spiritual masters to the subsequent Sufi 
masters Bishr, Bistami, and Maruf Kahari.85This chain continues as each generation of 
Sufi masters initiates the next. Importantly, Sunni scholars and the majority of Sunnis 
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assert that Sufism is an integral part of Sunni Islam. It is regarded as the science of the 
heart, differing from fiqh, which is a matter of the intellect.86 
The institution of the tariqa is controlled solely by the head of the order, as he sets the 
rules and procedures of the order. Consequently, the head of the order has not just a 
religious role, but can also have a political role in controlling the behavior of his order’s 
disciples in order to follow the interest of his order or his own interest.  
Islam: Popular Islam Entering the Sudan and Consolidation of Two Orders 
Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, northern Sudan was dominated by the 
two kingdoms of the Funj, with its capital at Sinnar, and the Fur, with its region in west 
Sudan (Darfur).87 In the sixteenth century, the Funj kingdom converted to Islam, and 
Islamic holy men were welcomed into the kingdom. The holy men were adherents of 
Sufi orders, they had introduced Sufi Islam into the Sudan. 88  Sufism was loosely 
organized, and centered on holy men and their families. Also, the holy men taught law 
and theology, which showed that a Sufi leader was both leader and religious teacher at 
the same time.89The Sufi holy men acted as agents of the faith and were also considered 
to hold a beneficent force of divine origin, causing superabundance in the physical 
sphere and prosperity and happiness in the physical order.90That beneficent force was 
inheritable through succession of leadership in the Sufi order, which usually stayed 
within the family of the Sufi leader.91 
By the eighteenth century, established holy families began to rise. Their influence and 
that of their Sufi orders surpassed to a large extent the local fakihs, and the Sudanese 
tariqa became quite institutionalized.92 They also became more centralized, as part of 
a revivalist movement that climaxed during the mid-eighteenth century to the 
nineteenth century. The revivalist movement led to the development of neo-Sufism in 
the Sudan, where the blend of scholarly activities and the Sufi organization was able to 
produce a foundation of militancy that would become a major theme of Islam in the 
following century.93 One such group is the Sammaniyya Sufi order, which appeared 
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and developed in the Sudan beginning in the eighteenth century.94 The order developed 
a hierarchical structure that surpassed the local religious leaders.95 Muhammad Ahmad 
bin Aballah, the self-proclaimed Mahdi of the Sudan, was a Sufi sheikh of that order. 
Another Sufi order was the Idrisiyya order, started by Ahmed Ibn Idris, whose students 
were influential in the Sudan.96  One of his students was Muhammed Uthman Al-
Marghani, who founded his own Sufi order called Khatim Al-Turuq (‘The Seal of the 
Paths’), later known as Al-Khatmiyya or Al-Marghaniyya.97 
Islam became consolidated in the Sudan after the Turkish-Egyptian forces united and 
captured all Sudanese lands. From 1820 to 1880, Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha, 
the viceroy of Egypt, and his descendants until Khedive Ismail extended Egyptian 
control over what is known today as the two Sudans.98 Once the Turkish-Egyptian 
monarchy had established control over the Sudan, they introduced their own version of 
Sunni Islam. A centralized judiciary system, based on sharia courts and dealing 
primarily with personal affairs, was established under the auspices of a Qadiumum al-
Sudan, the chief of justice for the Sudan and lower courts at the provincial and district 
levels.99 
The colonial rule over the Sudan greatly influenced the ideological development of the 
Khatmiyya and the Mahdiyya orders with respect to independence. When Turkish-
Egyptian rule began in the Sudan, the Khatmiyya order cooperated with them.100The 
order acted as intermediaries between its followers and the administration, in such 
activities as collecting taxes, announcing decrees, and even surviving in the armed 
forces.101 The order did not advocate revolt against the foreign rulers, but worked from 
within the administration to obtain what it wanted. 102  The Mahddiyya order had 
challenged Turkish-Egyptian rule, which was imposing orthodox Sunni Islam. There 
was discontent with Turkish-Egyptian rule because of dislocation of economic policies, 
political inefficiency, and the growing slave trade from the south. 103Similarly, the 
prestige and power of the Sufi orders (except the Khatmiyya, which had close ties with 
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the Turkish-Egyptian rule) were being diminished, as the Egyptians replaced most of 
the fakihs (Sufi holy men) with ulama and made access to Egyptian education much 
easier for the Sudanese.104This threatened to replace the indigenous Sudanese Sufi 
education with Egypt’s Al-Azhar University in Cairo.105Importantly, some established 
Sufi orders such as the Sammaniyya were part of the revivalist movement, which 
allowed for militancy to develop in their orders. Therefore, when Muhammad Ahmad 
Ibn Abdallah, a sheikh of the Sammaniyya order, proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, the 
leaders of other Sufi orders united behind him because of his Sufi connections106 and 
to get rid of the Turkish-Egyptian rule and their ulama.107 
Due to the Turkish-Egyptian authorities’ favoritism to the Al-Khatmiyya order, 
factionalism had been created in the Sudan. When the Mahdiyya cause began to gain 
momentum and attracted supporters in Khatmiyya areas, the members of the Marghani 
family began to take measures against it.108 For example, Muhammad Uthman Al-
Marghani II used his headquarters in Kassala as a base to oppose Mahdism in eastern 
Sudan, and he traveled widely in the region to preach against Mahdism and to exhort 
the people to remain loyal to the government.109 
It should be clarified that both Al-Khatmiyya and Mahdiyya (Ansar) orders are not the 
only Sufi orders in the Sudan. However, because they had been politicized by colonial 
rule, and became part of the colonial establishment, and were politically dominant in 
post independence Sudan, they had been selected for the purpose of this study. Which 
is to show how religion is used as a tool of power relations. 
The Sufi Orders: Agents of British Imperialism and Their Influence on the 
Sudanese 
After the British under Lord Kitchener invaded the Sudan, the British understood that 
religion could be used to control the masses and sustain their rule over the Sudan. Lord 
Kitchener had instructed his officers to adopt a cautious attitude towards Islamic 
religion, advising them to be careful not to interfere with religious feelings and that the 
religion should be respected.110He also asked them to prevent the re-establishment of 
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private mosques, takias, zawiyas, and sheikh tombs, as they generally formed centers 
of fanaticism111 to prevent the reappearance of Mahdism or a similar Sufi political 
movement. As a result of understanding the importance of religion in the country, the 
authorities in the Sudan established the board of ulama in June 1901 to advise on all 
questions regarding Islam.112The board only represented orthodox Islam, as the British 
policy was to encourage Sunni orthodoxy in order to lessen the impact of Sufism, which 
was regarded as a potential force for the resurgence of Mahdism.113 Nonetheless, the 
chances of Sufism being replaced by orthodox Islam were very slim, as Sufism was the 
most practiced form of Sunni Islam in the country.114The destruction of the Mahdist 
state had allowed the resurgence of the multiple Sufi orders and creeds, which enhanced 
their position in the country.115 As the British lacked the necessary religious legitimacy, 
they monitored the activities of Sufi orders without much interference.116 Since the 
influence of the orthodox ulama was limited, the British sought the support of religious 
orders and tribes who rejected the Mahdiyya movement or had joined it reluctantly.117 
With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central powers 
against the Entente countries of Britain and France. In its role as the Islamic Caliphate, 
the Ottoman Empire declared jihad against the Entente countries.118 Therefore, the 
British tried to recruit the Sudanese Muslims, and it became important to remove 
Egyptian influence over the Sudan as Egypt in the future would gain its independence 
from British rule.119 Thus, the British had to rely on the support of the Sufi order leaders 
such as Sayyid Ali Marghani, the sayyid of the Khatmiyya order, and especially Sayyid 
AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar and the son of the Mahdi, as ex-
Mahdists were known to be numerous, and both anti-Egyptian and anti-Turkish.120 The 
British benefited from the efforts of Sayyid AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi, who toured Ansar 
strongholds where he preached to his followers that the Young Turks, the rulers of the 
Ottoman Empire were heretics and that the future of the Sudan would be best secured 
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by loyalty to Britain.121 Notably, once the Ottoman Empire declared a jihad against the 
Entente, all the leaders of the Sufi orders became recognized and gradually incorporated 
into the colonial establishment together with the other traditional leaders. 122 For 
example, in 1919 the Sufi leaders Ali Al-Marghani, Abdal-Rahman Al-Mahdi, and Al-
Sherif Yusif Al-Hindi headed the notables of the Sudanese delegation that traveled to 
London to congratulate the British monarch on Britain’s victory in the war.123 
After the end of World War I, the British used the Sufi orders to remove the influence 
of Egyptian nationalism in the Sudan, which challenged British rule. During the 1924 
revolt that was led by the White Flag League (WFL), an Egyptian inspired Sudanese 
nationalist movements against the British, both Ali Al-Marghani and Abdal-Rahman 
used their influence to prevent Egyptians from attracting a mass following among the 
Sudanese, as both of them despised the WFL.124 
The British support for the two Sufi orders of the Khatmiyya and the Ansar permitted 
and aided those orders to expand both their economic and political base, which had 
allowed them to influence politics in the Sudan. In return for supporting the British 
Empire, the Khatmiyya and Ansar chiefs were given material and moral awards that 
enhanced their social prestige, economic position, and political influence.125 
Under the British rule both Sufi orders were allowed to maintain and expand their 
influence. For example, the Khatmiyya order managed to regain its constituencies in 
northern and eastern Sudan126 and the Mahdist revival under Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi 
had its support from West Sudanese tribes.127Thus, through their economic wealth and 
their enhanced prestige both the Ali Al-Marghani and AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi were 
able to extend their influence and patronage to other influential social groups such as 
tribal chiefs, lesser local religious leaders, and eventually the intelligentsia and political 
parties. 128 The also supported media organizations, as well as social, cultural, and 
charity associations.129 
 
121 Ibid., 24. 
122 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 25. 
123 Abdal-Raḥīm,Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 99. 
124 Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 40. 
125 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 25. 
126Warburg,Islam, Nationalism and Communism, 28. 
127 P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day (Abingdon, Oxen: 
Routledge, 2014), 93. 
128 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 27. 
129 Ibid., 27. 
31 
 
Politicized Sufism: Power Relations of the Sufi Orders and Sudanese 
Nationalism 
During the post-1924 era, both Sufi order leaders had influence and dominance over 
the intelligentsia. This influence later led to the formation of the Sudanese Graduate 
Congress ((SGC)—a hegemonic national political organization), political parties that 
were influenced by the sayyids, and eventually the independence of the Sudan. 
Both of the sayyids attracted educated Sudanese into their ranks, which later led to the 
establishment of the SGC. AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi began in 1926 to establish wider 
contacts among educated Sudanese. 130 Al-Mahdi fostered the relationship with the 
Graduate Club in Omdurman, where Muhammed Ali Shawqi, who held the presidency 
of the club in the late 1920s and early 1930s, aided in recruiting prominent graduates 
to Al-Mahdi.131 Likewise, by declaring his support for Ahmad Sayyid Al-Fil and his 
group in 1932; Ali Al-Marghani drew a coterie of graduates around him and patronize 
their activities.132 Both the Abu Ruf and the Al-Fajr groups were part of a generation 
of graduates who were not active in the 1924 revolt and who were intent on learning 
from the mistakes of their elder graduates.133 Although, they had a progressive and 
critical views of their senior graduates and the establishment, they were part of the 
establishment, and most of the members had religious backgrounds in the established 
Sufi orders.134Therefore, in the graduates’ club elections, family links seemed to have 
great significance in determining how both the Al-Fajr and the Abu Ruf groups aligned 
themselves on the Shawqist–Filist division.135 Afterwards, both the Al-Fajr and Abu 
Ruf groups had established the SGC on February 12, 1938, 136  as an organization 
dedicated to the interests of Sudanese graduates that would later become a nationalist 
movement.137 
The importance of the SGC lies in its factionalism that had resulted from the Sufi 
leaders and their views on how to achieve Sudanese independence. These different 
tendencies later developed into the important parties in the Sudan, whose patrons had 
to be a heads of the Sufi orders. When the confrontationists, led by Al-Azhari and his 
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Ashiqqa group, won the 1943 congress elections for council and committee, Abdal 
Rahman Al-Mahdi withdrew his support for Al-Azhari and his group in favor of the 
moderates of Ibrahim Ahmed.138 Thus, Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa sought the support 
of Ali Marghani to retain their leadership position in the SGC.139Additionally, in 1943, 
Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa took a trip to Egypt to seek the removal of British power 
from the Sudan, where they received financial assistance and other forms of support.140 
After the 1945 SGC elections, which the Ashiqqa had won with the help of their alliance 
with Ali Marghani, merchants, and Egyptian support, the moderates resigned from their 
positions in the SGC to form their own parties.141 
The major parties in the Sudan developed between either the unionist camp, or the 
independence camp. The unionist parties except the Liberal Secessionist of the Ahrar 
all joined with Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa group to form the National Unionist Party 
(NUP) in 1952, while the Qawmiyyin Club, registered in 1944 and led by two members 
of Al-Fajr group, called for an independent Sudan; they integrated into the Umma Party 
in 1945.142 The patrons of the two parties were Ali Al-Marghani, the head of the 
Khatmiyya Sufi order, and Abdal-Rahman Al-Mahdi, the head of the Ansar Sufi group. 
The Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), that would later become the 
Sudanese communist party (SCP), had developed outside of the SGC. This movement 
appeared in 1946 as a result of socioeconomic conditions in the Sudan.143It had great 
influence in the Workers Affairs Association (1946), the Womens’ Association (1947), 
and the University College Student Union (1947).144 Later, from 1949 to 1956, under 
Abd al-Khaliq Mahjubs’ leadership, the SMNL focused on the anti-colonial struggle by 
mobilizing workers, peasants, and students.145 
Under the influence of the Sufi orders, both the NUP and the Umma parties played 
important roles that led to the establishment of the Sudan as an independent state. In 
the 1940s the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the status of the Sudan faced difficulties 
that ended in failure to reach an agreement for the future of the Sudan.146 As Britain 
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wanted to keep Egypt out of the Sudan, it had carried out several schemes of self-rule 
in the Sudan, where they proposed the participation of Sudanese moderates and their 
collaborators.147The first scheme was the Advisory Council, established in 1944, which 
the Umma party joined but the Ashiqqa and the other unionist parties turned 
down.148The second scheme was the creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1948. The 
Umma and a few tribal groups participated, but the Ashiqqa, the other unionist parties, 
and new groups in the nationalist movement refused.149 The failure of the Assembly to 
present itself as a legislative body capable of leading the country to independence 
encouraged its opponents to resume anti-colonial struggle under the umbrella of the 
United Front for the Liberation of the Sudan.150 Because of the collective efforts of the 
nationalist movements the British had relinquished their hold on the Sudan by signing 
the self-rule agreement on February 12, 1953.151 
In the 1953 parliamentarian elections the NUP won the majority of the votes, with 51 
out of 97 seats in the lower chamber, the Umma party won 22 seats, and the rest were 
divided among other parties and neutral candidates who later sided with other parties.152 
With Al-Azhari and his NUP winning the elections, the union of the Nile Valley 
between Egypt and the Sudan was not achieved for two reasons. First, unionism was 
seen as a means of removing British rule over the Sudan.153That developed from the 
disappointment of the 1924 revolts in which the Egyptian forces did not aid the WFL 
revolutionaries as promised. 154 Unionism also served the purpose of resisting and 
counteracting the rumored plans of the Ansar for the creation of a Mahdist monarchy 
in the Sudan.155 Second, on the opening of the parliament on March 1, 1954, the Ansar’s 
refusal to accept their defeat in the parliamentary elections clearly and violently 
demonstrated that they would not accept any form of association with Egypt and that 
the unity of the Sudan would be jeopardized unless the Sudan became independent.156 
The opening ceremony of the parliament was canceled, and the guests, including 
President Najib of Egypt, left Khartoum that day or the next.157Also, the NUP was 
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suffering from factionalism, as it was formed from various unionist groups.158 When 
the NUP assumed power its council of ministers was composed of all factions.159 
However, in less than a year the Khatmiyya faction felt marginalized by the Ashiqqa 
group that was led by Al-Azhari.160 Three ministers from the Khatmiyya faction made 
their grievances public and were sacked.161 They later formed their own Independence 
Republican Party, in January 1955, which had the blessings of Sayyid Ali-Marghani.162 
Al-Marghani regarded the union with Egypt as a way to remove the British from the 
Sudan and preventing Ansar from taking power.163Once it became clear that the British 
were leaving, and that the sayyid and his followers constituted only a small minority in 
the parliament, unionism with Egypt was no longer required.164Al-Marghani withdrew 
his support from the NUP in 1954 and made an agreement with Sayyid Abdal Rahman 
Al-Mahdi in October 1955.165 These factors led Al-Azhari to assert in April 1955 that 
he was in favor of independence. 166  On December 31, the parliament ratified the 
transitional constitution, where independence was formally declared as of January 1, 
1956.167 
Power Relations and the Sufi Orders after Independence: From the Late 1950s 
to the Late 1960s 
After Al-Azhari formed the national government in February 1956, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) was formed the following May with the blessings of Sayyid 
Ali Marghani. 168  The PDP was formed from three groups of ex-NUP Khatmiyya 
members of parliament, who for different reasons opposed Al-Azhari.169By the end of 
June of 1956, the PDP and the Umma party succeeded in forcing Al-Azhari’s 
resignation, and on July 5 an Umma–PDP coalition government was formed, headed 
by Abdallah Khalil.170 Since then, the Sufi leaders Ali Al-Marghani and Abdal Rahman 
Al-Mahdi were effectively controlling the Sudan. 
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The Sufi leaders benefited from being in control over the new state. The establishment 
used state resources to expand their class interest as businessmen and landlords, so that 
state power and public resources were manipulated for the service of the private 
sector.171Moreover, their government denied similar economic concessions to other 
groups, who continued to pay the colonial poll tax as well as agricultural and livestock 
taxes.172The government increased indirect taxation, a social security bill was rejected 
in the parliament, and loans were restricted to those with capital or guarantees of 
repayment. 173  The government thus maintained the structure of the colonial state 
apparatus and its repressive laws as a buffer against any social unrest from the lower 
classes. 174The establishment sought to engineer their return to power in the 1958 
elections through a favorable election law.175This law doubled the constituencies of the 
rural areas (sectarian strongholds), while the urban areas remained the same, resulting 
in the return of the coalition to power in the elections.176 
After winning power in the 1958 elections, the establishment faced divisions because 
of conflicting interests. The irrational and hurried expansion of the private pump 
schemes for cotton plantations embarked on by the government and the landowners had 
resulted in economic problems for the country. 177  The Umma party wanted to 
renegotiate with Egypt the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929, as the hurried pumping 
schemes had not taken the agreement into account.178 Therefore, resulting in several 
complicated and prolonged negotiations among the coalition partners, and the divisions 
within the coalition was further shown up by the Halayeb land dispute between Egypt 
and the Sudan.179For example, the Umma party was not pleased with the PDP silence 
over the matter, and the PDP was not happy with the hostility of the Umma party against 
Egypt.180 Because of the expansion of cotton plantations, there was plenty of cotton for 
sale at a time when there was no market for it because of low prices, the closure of the 
Suez Canal, and the refusal of the British to buy Sudanese cotton.181Cotton, the Sudans’ 
main export, had remained unsold for two years (1956–58), causing the country’s 
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balance of payments to drop to only about half a million pounds, therefore, the 
government taxed most consumer goods, causing unrest in the urban areas, where 
demonstrations and strikes were led by students and workers.182Also, the establishment 
was divided on the question of whether to accept US aid to counteract the economic 
crisis caused by their policies. The Umma party, the senior coalition member, opted for 
the US aid, while the PDP did not, because it was unpopular and would give political 
capital to the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the radical opposition.183Nevertheless, 
the government signed the US aid agreement in April 1958, and it was ratified in the 
Assembly. The US aid caused an estrangement between the partners in the coalition 
government, causing each partner to make contacts with the NUP to form an alternative 
government.184In either case, Abdallah Khalil would lose his premiership, therefore, on 
November 7, 1958, Khalil went to General Ibrahim Abboud, the head of the SAF, 
ordering him to launch a coup so Khalil could stay in power.185Abboud executed the 
coup on November 17, and took control over the state by forming the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF).186 
The SCAF takeover did not change politics in the Sudan, since the Sufi orders had close 
relations with the military establishment. Two days after the coup, Sayyid Abdal 
Rahman Al-Mahdi made a public announcement supporting the SCAF.187 This was 
because the military coup had been instigated by Khalil (an Umma prime minister), two 
members of the Umma were members of the council of ministers, and the regime’s 
initial strong man, General Ahmad Abdel Wahab, had been a known supporter of the 
Umma party.188 Afterwards, with the removal of General Abdel Wahab from the SCAF, 
Siddiq al-Mahdi, the son of Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi, wanted the role of the military 
to be limited in both time and extent.189 This led him to form the National Front (NF) 
in 1960, bringing together politicians who were committed to restoration of civilian 
rule. 190 Sayyid Ali Marghani supported the military coup, and became an active 
accomplice of the regime.191 When the NF declared its demand for return of civilian 
rule in 1960, the Khatmiyya establishment prepared a memorandum pledging its 
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allegiance to the military regime.192 The SCAF was removed from power through the 
October Revolution on November 15, 1964 because of the combined efforts of the 
professional groups who mobilized the urban workers and the intermediate 
strata.193Those groups formed the Professionals’ Front (PF).  
Once the transitional government was formed, the traditional establishment had 
problems with radical partners in the government, causing the establishment to retake 
power again until the May coup of 1969. On October 31, the new council of ministers 
was formed under the leadership of Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa. It was composed of 
seven members of the PF, two southerners, and one member from each of the United 
Parties Front (UPF), an alliance composed of the Umma, the PDP, the NUP, and the 
Islamic Charter Front (ICF).194 As the PF outnumbered the traditional establishment, 
and as members of the PF allied themselves with the communist party, the council had 
radical tendencies, a fact which was made clear by their policies. 195Among other 
progressive policies they set up a committee to prepare recommendations on the 
phasing out of native administration, and they set up an illegal-enrichment court to 
investigate charges of corruption and suspected economic deals. 196  There was a 
suspicion that the illegal-enrichment court would be used by the PF as an instrument to 
purge the civil service of rightist elements (the NUP, the PDP, and the Umma), not just 
corrupt individuals.197The greatest concern from the rightists was the PF proposal that 
50 percent of the seats of the new assembly be given to the workers’ and peasants’ 
representatives.198 It also became apparent that the PF was seeking a long-term role in 
the country’s policies, as branches of the PF were being established in different parts 
of the country and it seemed the PF would act as one unit in the forthcoming 
elections.199Therefore, the UPF campaigned against the domination of the PF in the 
government by demanding early elections, where the traditionalist followings of the 
establishment leaders were used to counter the transitional government’s support 
among the urban populace.200 Accordingly, on February 24, 1965 Sirr Al-Khatim Al-
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Khalifah formed a new government composed of the Umma, the NUP, the ICF, and the 
Southern Front, ending the radical experiment.201 
The Umma Party and the NUP won the April 1965 elections, because the elections were 
held only in north Sudan due to the state of insecurity in the south.202 Since then, until 
the military coup of May 1969, the Umma party always headed a coalition government.  
The Sudanese Islamic Movement: Their Origins and Development in the Sudan 
In 1928 Hassan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The 
organization established branches in other countries in the Middle East and had 
considerable influence in them. 
The nucleus of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) appeared in the early 1950s 
under the name of the Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Islamy (Islamic Liberation Movement 
[ILM]). Babkier Karrar and Muhammed Yousuf started the group because in the late 
1940s the Gordon Memorial College (later Khartoum University) was completely 
dominated by the communists.203 For example, in 1948 the communists won control 
over the student union, displacing the unionists who had traditionally dominated the 
college. 204  The communists, through the trade unions, also became prominent in 
opposition against the Legislative Assembly, leading strikes and demonstrations.205 
The goal of ILM the establishing of a new world order, based on Islam and transcending 
the East–West rivalry.206In order to establish a society and a state based on Islamic 
socialism, it was imperative to liberate the Sudan from colonialism.207 However, the 
ILM was attacked by the communists, who branded them as a terrorist Muslim 
Brotherhood group, causing the ILM to deny any affiliation with the MB, and to recruit 
members without mentioning the name of the Ikhwan (“Brothers”).208 
The group attracted a great number of their recruits from rural backgrounds. 
Communism and secularism in the Sudan grew mainly among the middle class, who 
were western-educated and had acquired western attitudes.209Rural students, with their 
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roots in traditional families and local cultures, reacted strongly against this tendency.210 
Islam was used in countering the communist movement. The early adherents of the 
Ikhwan spoke out against the moral laxity and their irreligiousness of their colleagues 
in secondary schools and colleges, such as neglect of prayers and widespread heavy 
drinking.211 
In November 1945, Jamal Al-Sanhouri and Salah Abdal-Sid, two members of the MB 
visited the Sudan, toured the country and gave lectures to promote their organization.212 
As a result, several loosely organized groups appeared and declared their affiliation to 
the Ikhwan.213In 1946, another official Ikhwan delegation was sent to the Sudan where 
they met with the existing groups, and toured the country to form new branches.214 The 
ILM started to contact other Ikhwan outside of the university.215 By the early 1950s, 
the dominant figure in these circles was Ali Talb-Allah.216 In November 1947, he 
received a letter from Hassan Al-Banna appointing him as general supervisor of the 
Ikhwan in the Sudan and a member of the MB’s constituent assembly.217In 1951 the 
Wafdist government in Egypt replaced Ibrahim AbdalHadi’s anti-Ikhwan cabinet.218 
The work of the Ikhwan in the Palestine war, and their guerrilla activities in the Canal 
Zone, caused affiliation to the Ikhwan to be a source of pride, so the ILM no longer 
denied its relationship to the Ikhwan.219 Al-Banna’s letters became an important part of 
the education of the Ikhwan members in the Sudan. 220  The Ikhwan and the ILM 
coordinated with each other in the colleges to carry out the task of the education and 
indoctrination of ordinary members, as the colleges were the centers of the Ikhwan 
activities; the majority of its followers were students, and the movement had not yet 
made much headway out of student circles yet.221 
Although the SIM was successful in counteracting the communists in the university 
settings, it suffered from factionalism, which resulted in centralizing the movement. In 
August 1953, Karrar engineered a party coup in which he reasserted the original 
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socialist line of the movement and rejected the name of the MB; by the end of that year, 
he deserted the movement in protest against the identification of the group with the MB 
parent in Egypt.222 Talb-Allah was kept in the dark about the proposed meeting to solve 
the factionalism, causing him to challenge its legitimacy and boycott it, since he 
considered himself the sole leader of the movement.223 In the Eid Congress conference 
it was decided that the official name of the movement would be Al-Ikhwan Al-
Muslimoon(the MB), representing a triumph for those who identified with the parent 
organization.224 Talb-Allah was removed from his leadership of the movement to please 
the dissidents.225 Consequently, Karrar and his group formed their own organization, 
Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, which adopted a radical program with socialist overtones.226At 
the same time, the pro-Egyptian group of Talb-Allah rejected the resolutions of the 
conference.227Talb-Allah requested the arbitration of the parent MB, so in 1952 and 
1955 the parent MB sent missions to resolve the leadership issue and the 
factionalism.228With the resignation of Muhammed Khair AbdalGadir as secretary of 
the movement’s executive body, tensions were reduced. 229  The new head of the 
movement, was Al-Rashid Al-Tahir, a Talb-Allah supporter who was known for his 
sympathy and ties with the parent MB.230 Thus the SIM became united and centralized 
under one single leader, allowing it to focus its efforts on Sudanese society.231 
Under Al-Tahir’s leadership, the SIM moved to expand its influence in Sudanese 
society. The SIM tried to increase its support among the educated class by founding its 
own newspaper in 1956, The Muslim Brotherhood, to carry its message to the 
public.232The newspaper played a significant role in introducing the MB ideology to 
the Sudanese educated class.233As the Sudanese MB was aware of its limited influence 
in Sudanese politics, the MB approached the Ansar and Khatmiyya parties to fulfill the 
MB’s main goal of establishing of an Islamic order in the Sudan through their Islamic 
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Front for the Constitution (IFC).234The IFC was composed of several different political 
and religious institutions and individuals, who joined together as a pressure group 
calling for an Islamic constitution in the Sudan.235Although, the SIM failed to impose 
an Islamic constitution, the IFC managed to pressure the two sayyids of the Sufi orders 
to issue a communiqué on February 20, 1957 announcing their support for an Islamic 
republic, and declaring the sharia to be the source of all legislation.236 The Sudanese 
MB continued to build its internal structures, adopting the Egyptian MB structure of 
usar (families).237Khartoum was divided into three usar councils: Omdurman, led by 
Sadiq Abdallah Abdel Magid; Khartoum North,led by Mohammed Yousif; and 
Khartoum, led by Omar Bakheit Al-Awad.238At the same time it tried to counteract the 
SCP influence among workers and trade unions by establishing the Workers 
Office.239However, it failed to influence the trade unions and the workers at this time 
because of the members’ elitist attitudes and their own lack of experience in working 
with those groups.240 The MB had begun to engage in international issues of Islamic 
concern.241In 1952, the MB used their newspaper to call Sudanese political figures to 
boycott the French embassy in support of the cause of the Algerian revolution.242 The 
MB sought the support of the military junta led by Abboud in 1958, as the military was 
at first under the control of the Sufi establishment.243The MB news outlet  supported 
the takeover and its regime.244 Nonetheless, the regime forced the MB news outlet to 
shut down like the rest of the press in the Sudan; and, the MB headquarters and other 
offices were ordered to shut down. 245 Al-Tahir understood that an uprising was 
impossible, because the establishment (the Khatmiyya and Ansar Sufi orders) had 
endorsed the regime and because the corruption and shortcomings of the establishment 
had not yet been exposed to the masses.246 Thus, Al-Tahir chose the military option, 
conspiring with officers of different political persuasions to remove the Abboud 
regime.247The coup of November 9, 1959 failed, and revealed a rift in the SIM, as the 
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attempt included communist elements and because Al-Tahir’s colleagues were not 
adequately informed about the coup attempt.248 
The Movement and Hassan Al-Turabi: From A Pressure Group to a Vanguard 
Political Movement 
The failure of the 1959 coup had resulted in transforming the SIM from a pressure 
group to a political group that aimed to impose its ideology on the society. Al-Turabi 
had convinced the MB leadership at the time of the need to topple the regime and to 
direct the movement’s members to work closely with other political groups as a united 
front to remove the regime.249The MB used their students in the Khartoum University 
Student Union (KUSU) to rally support against the junta regime.250 The SIM also 
started to enter Sudanese politics through its party. In 1964, as the MB had limited 
political influence in the country, it formed an umbrella organization called the Islamic 
Charter Front (ICF), which was composed of individuals and organizations who shared 
the MB’s interest in making an Islamic state; Al-Turabi was made its general 
secretary.251 
Through the ICF, the SIM participated alongside the establishment. For example, after 
the October Revolution, to counter the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), the Ikhwan 
helped form the United Parties Front (UPF) as a counterweight to the PF, which was 
dominated by the SCP.252 
When it the radical PF, influenced by the SCP, was going to dominate Sudanese politics 
after the transitional period, the ICF helped the establishment to remove the PF from 
power in Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah’s coalition government. Within two months, the 
MB activists got the signatures needed from the founding organizations of the PF and 
the UFP to remove the PF’s domination in the Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah government, 
causing Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah to form a new coalition government based on the 
parties of the Umma, the ICF, the NUP, and the Southern Front (a collection of southern 
Sudanese parties).253 
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In the 1960s the SIM and the ICF greatly aggressive in imposing their ideology on 
Sudanese society. The ICF was pushing for an Islamic constitution, and made an 
alliance with Sadiq Al-Mahdi (the eldest son of Sadiqq Al-Mahdi) to head the new 
coalition government, as he had a long-established relationship with the Ikhwan.254 
Their confidence in Al-Mahdi was rewarded when his government took measures that 
were demanded by the SIM, such as the forty-four-member constitutional commission 
that was tasked with preparing a draft constitution in 1967.255 The ICF got what it 
wanted from the commission, by putting intense public pressure on the representatives 
of the main parties whose legitimacy was mainly religious.256 Motions on the sharia 
law a basic source of legislation, that Sudan’s state religion is Islam, and that Arabic is 
the state language were passed, and a motion to ban organizations based on anti-
religious propaganda and atheism was upheld.257 Similarly, the ICF tried to reduce the 
power of the SCP, which still had great influence in the Sudan after the October 
revolution. Under Al-Turabi, the ICF became a mainstay of political activism and 
agitation, sometimes instigating violent campaigns against the SCP, on the campuses 
of universities and other institutes of higher education and elsewhere.258In 1965, the 
ICF led a major political mobilization named Thawart Rajab 259 that was violent 
religious campaigns and marches attacking the SCP.260It led to the dissolution of the 
SCP and the expulsion of its members from the parliament.261 
The ICF was expanding into important sectors of society to impose its own ideology 
and to remove the leftists (especially the SCP, who challenged the power of the 
movement). In February 1965, the SIM set up the Patriotic Trade Unionist Congress 
(PTUC) to gain the support of anti-communist workers to rival the Sudanese Workers 
Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF) that was dominated by the SCP.262Although the 
movement failed to take hold, in 1968 it set up the Patriotic Teachers Union (PTU), to 
counter the left and the SCP in the education sector.263The PTU was supported by the 
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establishment.264 Then, in October 1964, the SIM re-launched Al-Manar, a weekly 
magazine, and established the Patriotic Women’s Front (PWF), who’s declared goals 
were the formation of the believing individual, the development and education of 
women so as to give them greater social and political roles.265Similarly, in the mid-
1960s the movement launched a campaign to attract female students; the campaign 
brought modest results, but not much of a breakthrough, by the time of the May 1969 
coup.266 The SIM also founded the Patriotic Youth Organization (PYO) in 1965. It was 
broadly anti-communist.267It was active in the cultural field, putting on plays and 
festivals celebrating Islamic themes and Sudanese history. 268The PYO established 
relations with anti-communist international youth federations, and youth groups in 
Muslim countries, such as the Saudi youth groups led by Prince Muhammad Al-Faisal 
Al-Saud.269 
The Islamic Movement and the Nimeri Years (1969–1985) 
After Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry carried out his military coup of May 1969, the SIM 
lost the great success in imposing its ideology and influence that were gained during 
the Sufi establishments’ democracy. The SCP and leftist groups in the Sudan were 
behind the coup, in order to thwart the Islamists plan to make the Sudan an Islamic 
state.270 Babikir Awad Allah, who was the chief of justice in the 1960s, resigned from 
his position to reaffirm his protest against the unconstitutional banning of the SCP; he 
was also a presidential candidate for the left and a member of the RCC.271 The new 
regime outlawed all political parties and their arrested the leaders, but gave favorable 
treatment to the SCP, leftist groups, and Arab nationalist organizations.272 Sadiq Al-
Mahdi, who was at the time a close ally of the ICF was selected to lead the opposition 
group, which included other parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a 
Marghanist group that was led by Sherif Hussein Al-Hindi.273 Because of the ICF’s 
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oppositional activities, most of the ICF leadership (including Al-Turabi) were 
arrested.274 
The new regime moved to remove the power of the old religious establishment and their 
allies. In March 1970, Al-Nimeiry and his officers had a bloody confrontation against 
the old establishment that was led by Imam Al-Hadi-Al-Mahdi and their ICF in Aba 
Island, in which the resisters were crushed.275 By the end of March, the armed resistance 
to the regime was destroyed, Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi was killed near the Ethiopian border 
as he was trying to flee, prominent leaders of the ICF were killed, and the SIM was 
accused of playing a leading role in the insurgency.276 After the confrontation, the SIM 
and the Sufi orders established the National Front (NF) under the leadership of 
President Sherif Hussein Al-Hindi (DUP).277 The NF charter called for the creation of 
a democratic order with an Islamic orientation.278 Following the May coup, the ICF 
ceased to exist and the bulk of the opposition work was handled by the MB.279 In 1973, 
following the failure of their student-led protest, the MB and their NF allies instructed 
their members to join the students in the universities to create an uprising similar to the 
October Revolts. 280 This uprising failed, as the regime quickly crushed those 
demonstrations.281 
After the coup, the new regime moved to implement leftist-oriented policies. The SIM 
later had an impact on the regime structures and the country’s economy. The Five Year 
Plan (FYP; 1970–1975), was a transitional stabilization program that focused on 
capacity utilization. 282  The plan advocated a selective, gradual delinking of the 
economy from the world market via diversification of external economic relations, 
reduction of imports and superfluous consumption, an increase in the level of self-
sufficiency in food and manufactured mass-consumption goods, and increased 
emphasis on internal resource mobilization through budget surplus.283The plan’s aim 
was to increase the provision of basic needs in material products and social services.284 
Accordingly, in May 1970 the regime nationalized and confiscated all foreign and 
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nationally owned private banks, export/import firms, and a number of manufacturing 
enterprises.285 It should be clarified that the foreign trade and financial sectors played a 
large part in the Sudan’s post-colonial economy and were controlled by foreign 
companies and expatriate communities.286In May 1971 the regime established the 
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) as the sole political organization to lead the country.287 
The 1977 reconciliation between the regime and the old establishment and their SIM 
allies allowed the SIM to be part of the regime. There were several reasons that explain 
this turnaround. First, the communist members of the RCC, led by Major Hashem Al-
Atta, led a short-lived coup against Al-Nimeiry’s regime on July 19, 1971.288 Second, 
the rise of the SSU had created a personal cult around Al-Nimeiry, encouraged by his 
followers, who did not allow any kind of public deliberation without praise to Al-
Nimeiry.289 The individuals behind the system gained more influence after the Addis 
Ababa agreement that ended the first Sudanese civil war, where they encouraged Al-
Nimeiry to subdue the reactionary forces (the old establishment and Islamists) through 
the National Reconciliation of 1977.290Third, Al-Nimeiry made use of his alliance with 
the MB keep the university campuses across the country quiet.291 Finally, after the 
aborted communist coup in 1971, Al-Nimeiry changed the economic policies of the 
country from a leftist orientation to a more liberal one. Consequently, the Interim 
Action Plan that was implemented from November 1972, replacing the FYP, made no 
reference to capacity utilizations.292This and other liberal economic policies, especially 
the open-door policies of 1972–1976, encouraged student-led protest throughout the 
country against the regime. In May 1973, there was student-led protest against price 
increases announced by the government, where Al-Nimeiry was stunned by the level 
of opposition.293 
With the reconciliation of 1977, the SIM, under Al-Turabi’s leadership, became part of 
Al-Nimery regime. This allowed them to expand their political influence in Sudanese 
society. Importantly, it gave them enough social and military power to forcefully 
remove the establishment’s order, to impose their religious ideology on Sudanese 
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society, and to aid similar radical Islamist movements in East Africa later on. When 
SIM joined the regime, it acquired the freedom and political ability to rebuild the 
movement and to spread its religious ideology among the Sudanese masses. 294Al-
Turabi was appointed to several influential and important positions within the 
SSU.295The SIM also attained important ministerial and SSU appointments, with a 
strong presence in the National Assembly, regional assemblies, and various local levels 
of government.296 Thus, the movement became part of the regime and its influence 
continued to expand.  
As the SIM was under the surveillance of the Al-Nimeiry security forces, the movement 
made satellite organizations to be more efficient and resilient to regime crackdowns.297 
The most prominent of these organizations were the Society of Women Vanguards of 
Renaissance, the Youth Society for Construction, the Association of Southern Muslims, 
the Association of Sudanese Ulama, the Islamic Da’wa Organization(and its offshoot, 
the African Relief Agency),the Namariq Literary and Artist Society, and the Union of 
Muslim Literary Men.298 
The SIM started aggressive recruitment campaigns to increase its membership, 
especially among women and trade union members.299Al-Turabi’s writings played a 
great role in presenting the SIM as a liberal progressive Islamic movement; his writings 
about women’s role in society, arts and Islam, Shura, and the position of non-Muslims 
in Islamic societies provided the needed ideology to counter the considerable influence 
of the communists in the Sudan.300 
The SIM made use of Al-Nimery’s liberal economic policies. Following the 1980 
investment act, foreign and Sudanese joint-venture banks were allowed to operate in 
the country.301 In January 1980 three Islamic banks opened, funded mostly by Saudi 
capital, and Islamic banking started to expand further.302The Faisal Islamic Bank, 
whose patron was Prince Muhammad Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and had helped the movement 
 
294 Abdel Rahim Omer Mohi-Eldeen, Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Sira al-hawiaa wa al-hawaa: Fitnat al-Islameen fi al-Sultah Mein 
Muzakirat al-Ashrah ela Muzakairat al-Tafahum Maa Garang (Khartoum: Dar Kahil, 2012), 163. 
295 Abdel Wahid, The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan, 101. 
296 El-Effendi, Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, 115. 
297 Abdel Wahid, The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan, 101. 
298 El-Effendi, Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, 115. 
299 Abdel Wahab, The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan, 101. 
300 Ibid., 101–102. 
301Elnur, Contested Sudan, 51. 
302 Ibid., 51. 
48 
 
to accumulate great wealth.303Leading members of the SIM had dominated the upper 
administrative offices of the bank, creating a strong link between the bank and the 
movement.304The wealth generated from running these banks was used to expand the 
movement’s work around the country and to establish several Islamic non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) in the areas of education and health.305By the 
1980s the movement owned about 500 companies with a capital of more than 800 
million USD inside and outside of the Sudan.306SIM members became the wealthiest 
business people in the country; and SIM’s INGOs expanded to all of the Sudan, 
virtually replacing the government in providing education, social, and health services 
after drought and famine struck the country, especially in the Darfur region.307 
In the 1980s the movement took advantage of the black market and the declining 
economy. Thousands of Sudanese left the country to work in the Gulf countries as a 
result of the declining economy and constant harassment by Nimeiry’s security forces 
for opposition against the regime.308These expatriates earned more than 5 billion USD 
annually, which was channeled back to their families and friends through the black 
market that was controlled by the Islamic movement.309While the opposition and the 
communists left the Sudan for better employment, the movement’s professional cadres 
remained in the country, allowing the MB to control most of the workers’ unions and 
associations.310Simultaneously, the newly created Islamic enterprises and the relatively 
peaceful relationship between the SIM and the regime guaranteed the MB membership 
full access to employment and prosperity inside the Sudan.311 
After the reconciliation of 1977, the movement intensified its recruitment among the 
military.312A military organization of the most loyal members of the SIM was formed, 
answerable only to Al-Turabi, the supreme leader of the movement.313 Since 1955, the 
SIM infiltrated the military, recruiting a few members among the students of the 
military college.314Notable among the recruits were Bashier Mohammed Ali, Abdallah 
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Al-Tahir, Abdelrahman Farah, and Abdelrahman Swar Al-Dahab, all of whom later 
held important potions within the SAF.315 In particular, Swar Al-Dahab, who became 
Al-Nimeiry’s minister of defense, led a military coup against Al-Nimeiry as a result of 
the April 1985 intifada and afterwards headed the transitional government. After the 
1977 accord, the leaders of the SIM issued a directive to its members to apply to the 
military college. Hence, the movement infiltrated the army in large numbers; this raised 
no concerns, as the military intelligence services were mostly preoccupied with the 
activities of higher-ranking military officers.316Ultimately, the SIM started to contact 
officers in the SAF who were members of the movement, but discontinued its relations 
with the movement following the May 1969 coup. 317  The SIM also instructed its 
members to join the military intelligence services, as these services were used to screen 
the recruits’ backgrounds and affiliation. 318  By infiltrating the services the SIM 
increased its membership inside the military.319 
Al-Nimeiry’s September Laws (the sharia laws) of 1983 represented the movement’s 
greatest political success. The SIM supported Al-Nimeiry’s Islamic reforms, and 
hundreds of MB members were appointed to specially created Islamic courts that 
handled criminal and civil cases.320 The MB used these courts against their political 
opponents.321 Likewise, the SIM had used Al-Nimeiry’s Islamization process in the 
military to introduce special training sessions at the Africa Islamic Center in Khartoum. 
Selected officers would undergo indoctrination and training, and were then sent to the 
Gulf through a special network to cash some money and the SIM then arranged for their 
umra and pilgrimage.322 
The last years of the Al-Nimeiry regime were a honeymoon period for the SIM under 
Al-Turabi’s leadership. Despite their growing influence within the regime and the 
imposition of their ideology, the movement lost significant support from the masses. 
The ICF/NIF also lost the support of Al-Nimeiry as it became clear that the 
implementation of the September laws was counterproductive.323 Al-Nimeiry began to 
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distance himself from the September laws, paving the way to abolish it before his trip 
to the US in April 1985, and he arrested and jailed members of the movement, accusing 
them of attempting to remove the regime.324The SIM was not invited to the opposition 
meetings that planned the April 1985 uprising, as they were deemed 
untrustworthy.325However, the uprising against the regime succeeded through General 
Abdelrahman Swar Al-Dahab (a member of the SIM) leading a successful coup326and 
afterwards, establishing a one year caretaker government. 
The Movement’s Machiavellianism  
After the collapse of Al-Nimeiry’s regime, the SIM formed the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) party under Al-Turabi’s leadership in May 1985. The party was composed of the 
movement’s leaders, Sufi leaders, ulama, some tribal leaders, ex-army officers, youth 
and women members of the movement’s satellite organizations, and the main support 
of the SIM, the sharia lobby who awakened to Islamic identity, and who chose to 
associate themselves with the NIF because their previous links with the traditional 
associations had weakened or taken new form.327 The NIF used its gains that the SIM 
attained from being part of the Al-Nimeiry regime to dispense patronage, promote 
Quranic schools, establish health clinics, and build mosques, and its associations for 
students, teachers, and women had branches in every major town in the Sudan.328 The 
NIF ideology was that sharia must guide all matters of life and be the source of law and 
principles for the economy, the educational system, and social programs.329 
The April 1986 elections returned the old establishment to power in the Sudan, making 
the NIF an opposition force. Since its third-place finish did not allow it to impose its 
ideology on society, it challenged the establishment, especially in the case of the 
September laws. The party of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi did not gain the majority 
of the seats needed to impose his political will, allowing the NIF to contest his 
annulment of the September laws. During the constitutional conference that Al-Mahdi 
planned to use to formulate a new legal code to replace the September laws, the NIF 
declared that it would be blasphemous to annul them, forcing him to defend his plan to 
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modify them and to accept the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as part of the coalition 
government.330The NIF waged a fierce campaign against the government through both 
the parliament and its press network, and used its popular and economic muscles in the 
face of the paralyzed government.331 
When Al-Mahdi was re-elected as prime minister on April 28, 1988, he formed a 
coalition government that included the NIF, appointing Al-Turabi as attorney general 
and supporting an NIF candidate for speaker of the parliament.332With the NIF in the 
coalition government, Al-Mahdi’s government supported the sharia laws.333As, the 
DUP leaders became wary of Islamization, they were disturbed were disturbed by their 
marginalization in the government, and the governments’ hardline approach to the civil 
war. Thus, when Al-Mahdi capitulated to the NIF’s deadline to implement new Islamic 
laws, the DUP protested that the government could not be bound by that 
timetable.334Later, the DUP signed an agreement with the SPLM/A on the November 
16, 1988 that called for an end to the war, the freezing of the September laws, and the 
convening of a constitutional conference.335Both Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the NIF protested 
against such a move and outmaneuvered the initiative through the assembly, 
disappointing the DUP and prompting it to leave the government on December 28, 
1988. This gave the Umma and the NIF sole control over the government.336Yet, the 
NIF lost its power to force the government to impose its ideology when the military 
intervened. On February 20, 1989, the General Command of the Armed Forces sent a 
memorandum to Sadiq Al-Mahdi demanding him either to secure the required arms for 
the civil war or form a broad-based government.337 When Al-Mahdi formed such a 
government under the United National Front (UNF), the Umma–NIF government 
collapsed.338 Once the new government set out to remove the September laws, the NIF 
created disruptions. The NIF led demonstrations against the government from April to 
June of 1989, vowing that the protests would continue until sharia law was applied or 
the government was removed.339 However, Al-Mahdi initiated on the 29th of June 1989 
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a bill to suspend the September laws.340 By June 30th 1989, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir 
along with other military officers (all were members of the SIM), carried out a 
successful military coup against Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi. 
Conclusion 
Before the Turkish-Egyptian domination that unified Bilad Al-Sudan into one country, 
Sufism had great influence in the Sudan. It also took on a political dimension as Sufi 
orders became established and centralized around Sufi leaders and their families. Some 
heads of certain Sufi orders became agents of the Turkish-Egyptian rule, while others 
were disadvantaged and marginalized, allowing the Mahdiyya movement to develop 
and to gain momentum against Turkish-Egyptian rule and their privileged Sufi allies. 
After the British re-conquest, Sufism was further politicized by the colonial state as the 
leaders of the Sufi orders supported the British colonial regime(s). While aiding the 
colonial state, the heads of Sufi orders amassed even greater economic and political 
capital than before, which allowed them to establish dominance over Sudanese politics. 
This same political capital allowed the Sufi orders to become the ruling elite of the 
Sudan after independence. Nevertheless, there was a constant power conflict within the 
ruling Sufi establishment that resulted in constant economic-political and social crises, 
leading to constant military coups and military regimes. The division within the Sufi 
establishment allowed the SIM to use Islam as a means to political domination. This 
explains why at first the SIM worked with the Sufi orders to attain its interest in 
imposing its religion as a state ideology, and it also explains why, later on, the SIM 
worked with Al-Nimeiry’s regime to impose its ideology on the Sudanese masses from 
above. The SIM believed that it was being a counter hegemonic force by imposing its 
non-Sufi radical religious ideology in order to attain power. However, the SIM’s power 
as a capacity was curbed as the elites in the Sudan fractured, preventing the SIM from 
having a dominating influence. Consequently, the only way for the SIM to impose its 
religious ideology on Sudanese society was to capture state power forcibly.  
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Chapter Three 
Al-Turabi’s Umma:  Power as a Capacity 
Introduction 
Under Al-Turabi’s leadership the SIM captured state power, giving it the capacity to 
impose its religious ideology as a domination tool over Sudanese society. Also, Al-
Turabi wanted to export the SIM’s religious ideology into other countries. To do this, 
he aided like-minded radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Both of these 
countries faced social and political peculiarities that led the leadership of the SIM to 
believe they could spread their religious ideology and their “civilization project” into 
those countries. Later, while Al-Turabi had ideological power as a capacity over the 
state, and was exporting his ideology, a power conflict within the SIM appeared 
between Al-Turabi and Al-Bashir, the head of the SIM’s military faction. This power 
struggle led to the palace coup of 1999. Most members of the SIM had sided with Al-
Bashir in that coup, as factionalism and a power conflict had appeared within the SIM. 
The factionalism appeared while SIM leaders and members were capturing state power, 
through attaining sensitive positions within the military, security, and state 
bureaucracies to impose their “civilization project” in and out of the Sudan. Hence, 
when the power conflict within the SIM/National Islamic Front (NIF) regime appeared 
irreversible and uncontrollable, many of the SIM/NIF elites had their own interests to 
secure, and so they sided with the Islamist military faction in the palace coup. 
The Civilization Project from Above: Totalitarianism in the Sudan 
Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the SIM installed its members in influential 
government positions to implement its religious ideology on the Sudanese 
society.341Gilles Kepeldescribes the SIM’s ideological imposition after the military 
coup as “Islamization from the top.”342The SIM imposed its own understanding of 
sharia in the country, centralized political authority in its own favor, created security 
and military organizations to secure its regime’s survival, imposed its religious 
ideology on civil society, other religions, and traditional Sufi orders, controlled 
education in the country, and restricted press freedom. It created the Ministry of Social 
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Planning to help spread its civilization project throughout the entire country. 343  A 
number of the movement’s members who later became part of the ruling elite were part 
of the totalitarian process in Sudan: Ali Osman Mohammad Taha, Ghazi Salah Al-Din 
Atabani, Mustafa Osman, Omar Al-Bashir, Nafie Ali Nafie, Ali Karti, Abdel Raheem 
Hussein, Al-Tayeb Ibrahim, and Bakri Hassan Saleh. 344 As means of political 
domination, the SIM had used the state as a capacity to impose its radical religious 
ideology on the Sudanese masses. As ideologue of the SIM and the head of its political 
wing, the NIF, Al-Turabi was the de facto leader of the Sudan, while president Al-
Bashirwas a nominal figure who had to obey the commands of Al-Turabi, since the 
regime and the state were controlled by SIM members. 
In January 1991, Lieutenant-General Al-Bashir, then chairman of the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC), decreed the enactment of the Criminal Act law, based on 
sharia.345 This new act was the same criminal bill of 1988 that Al-Turabi drafted when 
he was minister of justice and attorney general in Al-Mahdi’s government.346The legal 
underpinnings for an Islamist political system were consolidated in April and May of 
that year, during the National Founding Conference for the political system.347 The 
National Charter for Political Action produced by this conference asserted that “our 
intellectual, spiritual and cultural values spring from our subservience to one God, and 
our belief that he is the sole authority in this world and the world after.”348Adherence 
to those principles “is the only guarantee for a religious society,” and jihad against 
internal and external threat is a religious obligation.349 Those principles were embodied 
in the 1999 penal code that restored amputations and flogging; crimes punishable by 
death included murder, apostasy from Islam, adultery, corruption, embezzlement, 
trafficking narcotics or black-market goods, disregarding currency regulations, and 
organizing strikes.350In October 1993, the NIF civilian government made a commitment 
to use Islam as an obligatory guiding religion for citizens.351The government rejected 
the concept of ahl al-dhimma, which granted Christians and Jews communal legal status 
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with specific obligations and separate communal courts. 352  For example, on each 
Friday, the Khartoum commissioner would close all public places and businesses, 
including shops owned by Christians and Jews, for midday Friday prayers.353The NIF 
regime imposed their radical ideology on women in particular. The Family Code of 
1991 enshrined the provisions for inheritance, divorce, and child custody, but limited 
women’s rights. The government imposed paternalistic restrictions such as forbidding 
women to travel abroad without a male companion,to ride alone in taxis, and etc or to 
work in offices along with men, and enabled the husband to decide if the woman could 
visit her parents, relatives, and female friends. These restrictions peaked in October 
1996, when Khartoum state separated men and women in public transportation, 
theatres, weddings, parties, and picnics, enjoined men not to look at members of the 
opposite sex, and forbade men from watching women playing sports. Likewise, the 
regime imposed the sharia laws on women in workplaces. For example, in January 
1990, the government dismissed several women from the diplomatic service by 
insinuating that they had loose morals.354 
The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)/NIF regime moved to secure its control 
over the Sudan with paramilitary organizations. To secure their foothold on power the 
RCC had formed the Internal Security-Security of the Revolution (IS-SOR).The IS-
SOR was under the command of Colonel and later Brigadier-General Bakri Hassan 
Saleh, was composed mainly of NIF members. 355The IS-SOR showed that it had 
independent authority by the use of extreme brutality.356 Its detention centers were 
known as “ghost houses,” where it used brutal torture.357 In later years, the role of the 
IS-SOR was divided into external and internal security agencies. In January 1995, Nafie 
Ali Nafie was appointed director of the Internal Security Organization (ISO),358and 
between 1993 and 1999,Qutbi Al-Mahdi was the head of the External Security 
Organization (ESO).359 
After taking power, the RCC fired 400 police officers and later pensioned off thousands 
more, and the NIF operated its own units: Revolutionary Security Guards (RSG), 
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Guardians of Morality and Advocates of Good (GMAG), and the People’s Police 
(PP).360 In 1989, the RSG was established to oversee all matters of security; they were 
well known for detaining political dissidents in the ghost houses. 361 According to 
Human Rights Watch/Africa, its torture techniques included immersing the head in cold 
water, hanging by the hand on the bars of the cell, burning with cigarette ends, electric 
shock, mock execution, rape, and pulling out fingernails.362 
The PP was formed as part of the 1991 Defense Act: their alleged purpose was to assist 
in case of natural disasters or foreign attacks.363However, their real purpose was to spy 
on their own neighborhoods and to report suspicious activities or infractions of the 
social laws, such as private parties held without permit from the authorities.364The PP 
received three months’ training, patrolled residential areas and markets to combat vice 
and enforce the public discipline law, and had wide latitude in defining moral offenses 
and imposing punishments.365By 1995, they manned 120 police stations in Khartoum, 
and guarded camps for displaced persons outside the capital.366 
Al-Turabi created the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) as an alternative to the SAF to 
carry out the mission of a comprehensive call for jihad and to protect the regime from 
any SAF coups and the rebellion in the south.367 The PDF recruits were from tribal 
militias, volunteers, recruits from the ranks of the Islamists, compulsorily conscripted 
students and civil servants, and forcibly drafted males between the ages of 18 and 30.368 
The recruits were given military training by instructors from the army and 
indoctrination from a group of Islamist ideologues headed by Ibrahim Al-Sanousi, a 
senior and close ally of Al-Turabi.369 After weeks of training they would be sent to war 
zones.370The PDF was accountable to an SAF brigadiergeneral, originally Brigadier 
Babiker Abdel-Mahmoud Hassan, and answerable directly to President Al-
Bashir.371Recruitment was managed by a hierarchy of civilian PDF coordinators at the 
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national, state, local, and community levels.372Ali Karti was the coordinating director 
of the PDF,373 making him a very powerful and influential NIF member within the 
regime and afterwards in the post-Al-Turabi regime.374 
To impose its ideology the National Islamic Front (NIF) further controlled the state by 
manipulating its governing structure. In January 1992, the RCC announced the 
establishment of an appointed 330-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
leaders of the major tribes were appointed to this assembly in order to co-opt them and 
to bolster its legitimacy. 375  The TNA was ineffective, as it was used merely to 
legitimize the RCC and to impose the NIF’s influence. Most government bills were 
passed without serious debate, and some members expressed concerns that drafts were 
introduced by NIF task forces without the knowledge of either the attorney general or 
the relevant TNA committee.376 
With the TNA lacking legitimacy and credibility, the new regime moved for elections 
of the National Assembly and the presidency, which were held March 6–17, 
1996.377According to constitutional decree number 13(24th of 1995),MPs were selected 
in a two-stage process. 125 members were chosen by the National Congress (NC), 
which the NIF stage-managed in January 1996 and for which Ghazi Atabani served as 
secretary general.378The manipulation of the election process was in favor of the NIF, 
as Al-Turabi was elected as the speaker of the National Assembly, and Al-Bashir 
became the president of the Sudan.379Additionally, the regime applied a federal system 
that was based on the NIF’s Sudan Charter.380 This system gave the central government 
the authority over national defense, security, foreign policy, nationality, and similar 
areas, also, Khartoum controlled the judiciary and legal codes, the financial system, 
economic planning, natural resources, and education.381 
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The NIF regime restricted freedom, and controlled the educational system as a way to 
impose its ideology on Sudanese society from above. As the RCC failed to stop 
independent trade unions from protesting against the regime, the NIF/RCC decided to 
control the behavior of those unions and even installed NIF members in them. The RCC 
dissolved the bar association and detained ten of its leaders, who had protested against 
the removal of judges, the dissolution of unions, and the establishment of military 
tribunals, also the government then formed its own bar association, that endorsed the 
Islamic laws.382  In March 1993, the NIF cadres won the bar association elections 
despite urgent appeals to the high court to cancel the elections.383 
The regime imposed its religious ideology on the Christians and their institutions. The 
government removed hundreds of Christians from civil service and the judiciary, and 
the Christians faced mounting social and legal discrimination; for example, Christian 
civil servants had to be trained in the PDF even though its ideology promoted jihad and 
disparaged Christianity. 384  The government relocated squatters from the capital to 
remote sites, blocking churches from assisting the people and operating schools in those 
new locations, while Islamic agencies opened Arabic-language schools and provided 
social aid, through which they encouraged conversions to Islam.385 After the Peaceful 
Coexistence Conference of April 1993 and the religious dialogues of 1994, which were 
designed to persuade foreign clergy and scholars that the government did not 
discriminate against non-Muslims, the government enacted the Organization of 
Voluntary Work Act in 1994 to transform churches into NGOs, to abolish the churches’ 
autonomy and bring them under the state’s control.386The churches challenged this 
move; the government delayed its enactment and the churches’ status remained in 
limbo.387 
The regime further imposed its religious ideology by allowing NIF charitable 
associations such as the Islamic Da’wa Organization (IDO) and the African Islamic 
Relief Agency (AIRA), to expand since their proselytizing activities advanced the 
NIF’s religious goals.388 Between 1990 and 1993, the regime confiscated the properties, 
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financial assets of both the Marghani and Mahdi families, and dissolved their respective 
Sufi orders.389Although the regime tried to clamp down on the Ansar Al-Sunna Al-
Muhammadiyya tariqa, Al-Bashir had allowed the order to resume its activities in 
November 1994, because he realized that the NIF’s attack on such a group would 
damage the regime’s credibility among pious Muslims.390 
The NIF government also used the educational system to impose its religious ideology 
on the youth of the country. The new regime purged the Ministry of Education, replaced 
administrators and educators with NIF adherents, banned the elected faculty unions in 
the universities, and Islamized the curriculum, and allowedNIF-controlled student 
unions in the universities to continue its function because they supported the regime.391 
To secure the power of the regime and impose its religious ideology, the government 
moved to control the media and information in the country. It controlled and channeled 
information in the newspapers, radio, and television, and the RCC quickly banned the 
journalists’ union, restricted the import of foreign newspapers, closed newspapers 
affiliated with political parties, and shut down nearly all independent newspapers.392 
Even NIF newspapers were closed if they were critical of the regime; for instance, Al-
Sudan Al-Duwali, was banned on April 4, 1994, its printing presses were confiscated, 
and two of its editors were arrested along with Urawh.393Additionally, the government 
harassed foreign correspondents and banned the import of satellite dishes.394 
The regime took steps to purge the civil services and fill them with NIF individuals. 
Relying on the power of the second constitutional order, the regime entrusted this task 
to Lieutenant Colonel Al-Tayeb Mohamed Khair, then the cabinet affairs minister.395In 
slightly more than four years, 73,640 people were laid off from various state organs and 
departments.396 
The Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) developed the ministry of social planning to 
restructure Sudanese society towards accepting its radical religious ideology, by 
Islamizing it through its grand project of “Al-Mashru Al-Hadari” (‘Civilization 
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Project’).397 The concept cannot be defined, except to describe it as the use of state 
power to socially transform a society. According to an interview conducted with Al-
Turabi in March 1993 by the London-based magazine Impact International, the plan of 
his regime was “to Islamise public life—civil, business, police, military, economy and 
culture in all dimensions, and when I say ‘Islamise’ I mean not only in forms, according 
to Islamic Sharia, but also in attitude and in disposition…Madinah is our model.”398The 
Civilization Project’s core ideas were set out in the “Al-Dawa Al-
Shamla”(‘Comprehensive Call’) that peaked between 1992 and 1996,but whose 
principles informed official Islamization policies before and after that period.399There 
is no single definition for Comprehensive Call, as it was molded to fit different 
situations.400In the Nuba Mountains it was associated with jihad, while northern Sudan 
it was a component of ‘Islamic social planning’.401 
Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Al-Turabi’s NIF deputy, was an important player in 
imposing and implementing the Civilization Project in Sudan.402He established the 
ministry of Social Planning, and under him, the ministry developed the concepts of 
comprehensive da’wa and Islamic inqilab(literally ‘coup,’ but often used to refer to 
total social transformation), in accordance with the NIF interpretation of the sharia.403 
The ministry gave Taha a great deal of power. He was the overseer of the internal affairs 
of the entire regime, during which time the totalitarian policy of the regime established 
its roots.404The ministry was like a mini-cabinet: it had five junior portfolios covering 
the areas of welfare, youth, sports, religious endowments, and zakat.405Under Taha’s 
tenure the ministry established the Department of Da’wa and the comprehensive Da’wa 
Funds Association; the latter brought together most of jihadist(radical Islamist) and 
da’wa organizations active in the Sudan, both parastatals and NGOs.406Thereafter, the 
activities of Islamic agencies expanded.407 The regime created a hybrid collection of 
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charitable companies, which enjoyed exemptions from business taxes and customs 
duties because of their contribution to the jihad effort in the south.408For example, any 
company could qualify as a charitable organization and become eligible to receive 
government concessions on taxes and duties worth millions if it made a one-time 
donation of 5000 USD to the PDF.409In a very short time, the jihad business was turned 
into a corporation with registered offshore NGOs; in addition to bankrolling the jihad 
and the comprehensive-religious-call enterprises, these NGOs were licensed to conduct 
business.410They formed a funding alternative by raising money in the Gulf, which the 
cash-strapped government encouraged.411In addition, the zakat that was collected by 
the state became a source of support for the local jihad in the south and in the Nuba 
Mountains.412Thus, Ali Osman Taha had control over the internal affairs and the 
organizational structure of local jihad, while Al-Turabi took charge of the global 
jihad.413 
The Civilization Project: Expansion of the Islamists’Umma 
Under the unquestioned leadership of Al-Turabi, the SIM used the powers of the 
captured state to impose its radical religious ideology on the Sudanese masses as a tool 
of political domination. It also sought to export its radical religious ideology into other 
countries in the region. In late April 1992, Al-Turabi delivered a speech before the 
Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, London, 
England, in which he defined his Muslim world view.414He said that the greatest 
prejudice to Muslim unity was the introduction of nation states, with nationalist 
ideology, state boundaries, sovereign authority, and “paramount national interest.” 
Decolonization and independence had only solidified the power of nationalism at the 
expense the Muslim community, the Dar Al-Islam. Although the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) had derived from the spirit of pan-Islamism, it had “turned 
out to be politically impotent, and totally unrepresentative of the true spirit of the 
community that animates the Muslim people. The Gulf War that did more than anything 
else to arouse the Muslim masses and gave impetus to the international manifestation 
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of pan-Islam. . . . Charitable, missionary, scholarly, and mystic orders of international 
dimensions are proliferating among Muslims.” Islamic banks, insurance organizations, 
and business enterpriseswere “operating multi-nationally.” The ease of travel made 
possible the diffusion of information to revive Islam throughout the Muslim world: 
“people are in general are associating more and more, indirectly through the media or 
directly through travels and reunions.” And from this web of Islamist interests there 
was emerging a “popular khilafat drive,”the faith by which the Muslim world’s 
“ultimate ideal” could be achieved.415 
Al-Turabi’s lecture confirmed, that, like other radical Islamists, he and the leaders of 
the SIM did not recognize state borders and wanted to resurrect the umma caliphate 
from the Sudan. He saw the Muslim world as an integral whole, and had positioned 
Sudan as a leader of radical Islam.416He was trying to turn Islam’s lack of a theory of 
nationalism to his advantage, by pretending that it had instead a theory of 
internationalism or, to be precise, international revolution.417 Having been so successful 
in imposing sharia and jihadism in the Sudan, the SIM believed that its ideology could 
be exported to other countries in the region. Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, both 
local and global jihad were developed by a quasi-official entity named the Arab and 
Islamic Bureau (AIB). 418  The AIB included the other main Islamist political and 
security leaders, such as Taha, Nafie Ali Nafie, Al-Tayyib Ibrahim, Mahjoub Al-
Khalifa, and Qutbi Al-Mahdi.419 In the 1990s the SIM used the Sudan as their base for 
spreading their ideology by coordinating with other like-minded Islamist groups, using 
the SIM’s/the regime’s civil organizations to impose their civilization project in the 
targeted countries, providing safe havens to radical Islamists in the Sudan, and 
providing training and arms to radical Islamists. Possibly the SIM learned from its own 
experience that radical movements like theirs cannot, on their own, remove the 
established elites in their countries to become the new state elites; hence, the like-
minded Islamists in other countries had to be supported by the SIM and its state power 
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in order to succeed. After capturing state power, Al-Turabi duly mobilized his cadres 
to set up alternative structures for international Islamism.420 
Under Al-Turabi, the SIM opened a front to impose its radical ideology outside of the 
Sudan using the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC). The appearance of the 
PAIC was a response to the first Gulf War (August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991) as 
well as an attempt to develop an alternative to the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC).421The conference was the culmination of a quarter century of study, 
political activity, and international travels by Al-Turabi, during which he met with 
Islamists throughout the Muslim world where his rhetoric and ability were 
acknowledged in that exclusive fraternity.422The organization was a gathering of radical 
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, individuals who would later 
form Al-Qaeda, and Islamist from other regions of the world. Iran, whose foreign policy 
included establishing Shia Islam in Africa, gave 100 million USD to encourage Al-
Turabi’s belief in the unity of Islam by supporting the conference as a bond between 
Sunni and Shia Islam.423There were also numerous individual patrons, such as like-
minded Saudis including Osama Bin Laden, who had begun to invest in the 
Sudan.424The PAIC established a permanent secretariat in the Sudan with Al-Turabi as 
its secretary general and Al-Sanousi as deputy secretary general,the latter also retaining 
his post of directing indoctrination for the Sudanese PDF.425 With the success of the 
Iran–Iraq negotiations in lifting a decade-old blockade against Iraq, the PAIC had 
become a major institution in the Muslim world.426 Radical Islamist organizations such 
as Jama’at Al-Islami of Pakistan and India,Hizb-i-Islami and Jamiat-i Islami of 
Afghanistan, and Hizb-ul Mujahidin of Kashmir, joined it, providing assistance to and 
working closely with Islamists from Egypt, Hezbollah, the Islamic Salvation Front in 
Algeria, and the NIF in the Sudan.427The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) was 
a member of the PIAC.428In 1992, Al-Turabi established Somalia’s Al-Itihaad Al-
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Islamiya (AIAI). 429  Because of Al-Turabi’s leadership in the PAIC, and his 
contribution in creating the AIAI, the AIAI was also a member of the PAIC. 
Radical Islamism in East Africa 
Under Al-Turabi’s guidance, the SIM was exporting its ideology into East Africa, using 
the Sudan to support likeminded radical Islamist movements. African leaders were 
aware that the PAIC was promoting Islamic outreach (da’wa) south of the 
Sahara.430The “civilization project” of Al-Turabi, devoted to the spread of Islamist 
ideology to Africa, accompanied byseminars and conferences for the “Islamization of 
Africa south of the Sahara,” had caused widespread worry.431Like the Iranian regime 
wanting to export its religious ideology to other countries in the Middle East, the SIM 
wanted to export its Wahhabi radical religious ideology into East Africa by supporting 
similar radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. 
To explain why and how the SIM was supporting the EIJM and the AIAI (along with 
other Islamists), this section of the chapter will describe how these organizations 
appeared in their respective countries as a result of peculiar social-political situations. 
It will explain the importance and the influence of religion in Eritrea and Somalia, 
similar to the Sudan, and the way in which religion was politicized in both of these 
countries. 
Two things linked the SIM to other like-minded radical Islamist movements in Eritrea 
and Somalia. First, in terms of ideology, all three movements wanted to impose a 
“civilization project” in their own countries, disregarding the established borders. 
Second, the SIM provided practical support for the radical Islamists movements in 
Eritrea and Somalia.  
In Somalia, this was an effect of the radicalization of political Islam and clan-based 
civil war, while in Eritrea, the situation was a competition between various insurgencies 
to liberate and shape the Eritrean state according to their competing ideologies. In both 
cases, the goal of the competing groups was the capture of state power. Therefore, the 
situations in both countries gave the opportunity for the SIM to use the EIJM and AIAI 
to export and impose its radical religious ideology of its “civilization project”. This 
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section will explain how the SIM helped each of these like-minded radical Islamist 
movements, ideologically and practically. 
In Somalia, the SIM used its NGOs, Sudanese government NGOs, and the Sudanese 
state to provided direct military training and arms and direct coordination to AIAI. In 
the case of the EIJM,which was formed from radical Islamists groups based in the 
Sudan, the Sudan allowed EIJM to recruit from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan, and 
to use Sudanese borders to attack the Eritrean state. The Sudan provided them with 
weapons and training, and even coordinated with them on attacks against Eritrea. 
However, it should be added that the SIM also supported the Marxist Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF), but this seemed to be more of a tactical alliance against the 
Ethiopian communist regime that sheltered and supported the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Nonetheless, after Eritrea became independent 
the SIM again supported the EIJM to spread its radical ideology in to Eritrea, causing 
a rupture of diplomacy between the two countries and leading Eritrea to support 
Sudanese opposition groups against the Sudanese SIM/NIF regime. 
Somalia: History and Political Islam 
Somalia stands at the tip of the Horn of Africa, and directly faces the Gulf of Aden and 
Yemen to the north. Ethnically and culturally the Somali people belong to the Hamitic 
group.432The primary division in the Somali nation is between the Samale and the 
Sab.433The Samale make up the bulk of the population of the Somali Republic.434 They 
are subdivided into the clan-families of the Dir,Isaq, Hawiye, and Darod, all of whom 
are pastoral nomads and physically distributed all across the land.435The Sab tribes are 
less numerous, less widely distributed, and contain only two major divisions, the Digil 
and Rahanweyn clans.436 Their mode of production is pastoral-cultivation.437From the 
beginnings of Islam, the religion found its way into Somalia. There is a strong belief 
that the ancestor of the Somalis is a descendant of the household of Prophet 
Muhammad, so that all Somalis belong to the Hashemite stock of the Qurayshi 
clan.438In Somalia, it is hard to separate Sufism and orthodox Islam, as local Sufism 
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displays some specifically Somali features. 439 Among Sufis, as among Somalis 
generally, genealogy is important.440However, clans have more power than religious 
orders. At the local level, Sufi lodges are affiliated with tribes, from which they acquire 
land and members and towards which they recognize an obligation.441 Consequently, 
these Sufi sheiks are not normally political leaders, and only in exceptional 
circumstances do they assume political power.442The Sufi orders in Somalia are the 
Qadiriya,which was the first one established and which remained dominant throughout 
the colonial era with a strong missionary orientation, and the Salahiya and Ahmadiya 
orders, which were established in the nineteenth century.443 
Unlike the Sudan and Eritrea, the colonial powers of British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland did not collaborate with Sufi orders; however, the influence of political 
Islam was evident after Somalia’s independence.444 The colonial powers were hostile 
to any attempt to give any type of Islam a political voice, and developed measures to 
prevent political Islam from gaining visibility and social recognition.445 However, it 
was rather difficult for the Europeans to put an end to the endless reorganization of 
political Islam within civil society.446Moreover, during the decolonization period, when 
the colonizers were encouraging liberal democracies through secular parties, political 
Islam was prevalent. For instance, among the founders of the Somali Youth League, 
which was a nationalist party, were two religious figures: AbdulKader Sekhawe Din 
and Hajji Muhammad Hussain (president of the party from 1957 to 1958).447 From its 
independence on July 1, 1960 until October 1969, Somalia was ruled by civilian 
governments; though not fully democratic, the system was semi-competitive.448The 
elections and the continuous debate on the writing of the Somali language were under 
Islamic scrutiny.449In the 1969 elections, the role of the religious leaders was not 
specific, as everyone was campaigning among his kinsmen, and it would have been 
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difficult to claim that any Islamic trend was represented in the parliament, though some 
MPs were known to be more religious than others.450 
Although the October 1969 military coup resulted in the removal of political Islam from 
influence in state power, the junta regime, along with outside factors, furthered political 
Islam and radicalized it. The Barre regime wanted to impose scientific socialism on a 
society that was not fully urbanized, causing the radicalization of the political Islamists. 
In 1972, the regime decided that the Latin alphabet should be used in the writing of the 
Somali language, which was a blow to Islamism.451 In 1975, the regime introduced a 
family code that provided for equal inheritance rights for women and men.452Religious 
men found this law provocative and reacted accordingly, resulting in the execution of 
ten religious men and the complete prohibition of political parties.453Therefore, the 
organization of Islamic opposition took place within the Somali diaspora abroad.454In 
February 1974, Somalia became a member of the Arab League in order to gain 
increased international aid and support against Ethiopia’s growing strength.455This 
encouraged the influence of radical political Islam, because grants and scholarships 
from the Arab League helped increase the number of Somali students trained in foreign 
religious institutions, not only in the still quiet Sudan, but also at Al-Azhar and in Saudi 
Arabia where political Islamic trends were developing.456The Somali defeat in the 
Ogaden war of 1977–1978 against Ethiopia, along with other factors, further 
contributed to the radicalization of political Islamism. The Iranian revolution of 1979 
also significantly fostered the development of political Islam in the region,457and in the 
1980s there was mass labor immigration from Somalia to the gulf.458  Continuous 
crisesat homecontributed to the prolonging the stay of immigrants in host countries, so 
that young people attended schools managed by Islamic charities and organizations that 
did not teach the separation of religion and state.459For example, in 1967 the African 
Islamic Center, now known as the International University of Africa, opened in the 
Sudan to provide training in Arabic and Islamic studies to young African 
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students.460The decline of communism opened a chance for political Islam in the 
region.461 The next step was to develop an Islamic state,a development that was helped 
by funding from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf States, and the diasporic umma.462 
Additionally, because of the repressive nature of the Siad Barre regime, many 
intellectuals and cadres were jailedin the 1980s and, like their predecessors, were 
denied any reading materials except for the Quran and the tafsir books.463Thus, both 
endogenous and exogenous factors contributed to the development and the 
advancement of radicalized political Islamists in Somalia.  
Islamist movements in Somalia showed a desire to establish a unique form of Islamic 
regime in Somalia.464 The differences between the movements were mainly doctrinal: 
Traditionalist, Reformists, Modernists, Salafis, Jihadists, and others. 465 Other 
distinctions between the groups were based on differences of leadership, dominant clan 
affiliation, and sectorial interests.466There are three categories of Islamic movements in 
Somalia: Political Islamism, Missionary Islamism, and Jihadi Islamism. 467  Jihadi 
Islamism is based on a commitment to violence and armed resistance against what is 
perceived as the continuing onslaught of the enemies of Islam.468Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya 
(AIAI) is an example of a Jihadi Islamist group.469 
Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) wanted to 
capitalize on the collapse of the state of Somalia (which collapsed in 1991) as this would 
help the SIM to spread its radical ideology outside of the Sudan. To achieve the SIM’s 
ideological goals in Somalia the SIM had used its NGOs, the Sudanese government 
organizations, to provide food and material support and to establish jihadist groups. The 
first goal of the Sudanese charities in Somalia was to destabilize other foreign charities, 
including the Islamic Da’wa Organization (IDO), Mercy International, the African 
Islamic Relief Agency (IARA), the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), 
and the Muwafaq Foundation.470This was part of a strategy to eliminate western NGOs 
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operating in Somalia in order to insure that the work of the Islamic relief agencies was 
not disturbed.471 
The Sudanese government used its Council for International People’s Friendship 
(CIPF) to extend financial aid to Somalia, and other Sudanese organizations, including 
the Sudan Peace and Development foundation and the National Youth Organization 
Association, were active in Somalia as early as 1992.472 In 1992–1993 the Sudanese 
government sent 100,000 tons of food aid to Somalia and supposedly provided 
scholarships for 10,000 Somali students.473 
In 1992, Al-Turabi established AIAI, an umbrella organization of several radical 
Islamist groups, which was the main and direct platform for the funneling Sudanese 
influence into Somalia.474AIAI believed that the only way to liberate Somalia from the 
corruption, oppression, and tribalism that had characterized Siad Barre’s regime was to 
adopt political Islam. 475 AIAI armed itself and established organizational rules to 
differentiate between sympathizers and full members, and thereby exercised effective 
organizational discipline, including confidentiality of its internal discussions. 476 Its 
strategy for taking power by violence was one of its major differences with other 
Islamists groups. Another difference was that it recruited urban and semi-educated 
youth, while other groups were giving priority to nomads.477To a large extent AIAI was 
the only group that set up a national or at least a regional strategy and tried to organize 
its activities all over Somalia, as well as in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.478 These 
activities were under Al-Turabi’s express guidance.479Mohammed Othman, the leader 
of AIAI, was based in London, and dealt mainly with informational and propaganda-
related activities, while the fighting was done by the local commanders in Somalia, who 
received instructions directly from Sudan and Iran.480AIAI was also used by the SIM 
to obtain relief supplies in order to secure its growing influence in Somalia. For 
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example, when aid shipments arrived at Merca port in late 1992, AIAI guarded them 
from being looted.481 
AIAI needed economic power to impose religious doctrine in Somalia, which is why it 
set up itsown economic base. Because of the clan-based wars, AIAI could not manage 
to maintain control over its economic bases. Since Mogadishu was too unstable and 
violent, and any armed Islamic group could be seen as a direct competitor to the other 
more important factions (and therefore crushed), in late 1991 AIAI militias moved 
themselves to major coastal cities in the south: Kismaayo, Baraawe, Merca and even 
Boosasso in Puntland.482The AIAI strategy was to take control over them and use the 
resulting funds to increase its manpower and to fund socially-oriented projects, 
including mosques, schools, and the like, which they could then control.483 However, 
their control over ports such as Kimaaayo was destroyed when the forces of General 
Aidid and Siad Barre confronted each other in the region in the spring of 1991.484 They 
refused to allow AIAI to manage the port, resulting in a bloody confrontation that 
splintered AIAI forces.485Also, in Boosaaso in the late summer of 1992, militias led by 
the most secularist leader of the northeastern region, Colonel Ahmed Abdullahi Yousef, 
attacked AIAI forces and defeated them.486 
With the defeat of AIAI, the Sudan became directly involved in the Somali theatre to 
aid the SIM’s like-minded Islamist allies, in order to rescue the SIM’s civilization 
project in Somalia. In August 1992, following the defeat in Boosasso, a delegation of 
experts headed by Rahim Safawi, the deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards (IRG), and Ali Othman Taha from the Sudan arrived in Merca, Somalia to 
investigate the military and other needs of AIAI,together with the latter’s commanders, 
and prepared plans for the improvement of AIAI’s operational skills.487 
Since the fall of 1992, weaponry was supplied and training camps were set up inside 
Somaliland, and in the Ogaden inside Ethiopian territory.488The SIM was ideologically 
hostile towards the US-led UN mission to Somalia, believing that the mission would 
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have ended its ability to impose its ideology in Somalia. For the radical Islamists and 
the Sudanese regime, the UN intervention was believed to be a precursor to a 
“humanitarian military intervention” in Sudan.489 Indeed, some western relief agencies 
were calling for such an intervention in Sudan because of the humanitarian 
consequences of factional fighting in south Sudan. 490 Importantly, the intervention 
spurred great interest in Somalia and its neighbors (especially Kenya) on the part of 
both Sudan and Al-Qaeda, as it looked to them as though, having defeated Iraq in the 
first Gulf War, the US was now turning its attention to the Horn of Africa.491 Following 
the landing of the US marines in Somalia, a joint Sudanese–Iranian decision was made 
to initiate a struggle against the US presence, on the bases of the Sudan allies in Somalia 
and the terror infrastructure established in the country prior to the arrival of US 
forces.492In early summer 1993, both the Sudanese and the Iranian preparations for their 
campaign in Somalia were complete. Islamic terror cells started to attack UN forces in 
neighborhoods that were controlled by Aidid, and the Sudan had escalated the situation 
with propaganda asserting that the UN mission in Somalia was part of a US plan to 
control the Horn of Africa.493 In September 1993, the Sudan ordered AIAI to join in 
fighting the US, and an AIAI spokesman announced from Iran that his organization had 
prepared a series of attacks against UN forces in Somalia.494What had allowed the SIM 
to achieve its secondary goal of removing the US from Somalia and the region so that 
it could enforce its religious ideology was the US decision to take action against Aidid’s 
forces. The US force was ordered to capture two of Aidid’s aides on October 3–4, 1993 
in Mogadishu; however, the task force was ambushed by Somali and Islamic 
fighters.495The main assault force was composed of AIAI fighters and Afghani jihadists 
who used 23-mm anti-aircraft artillery and RPG7s to shoot down the American 
helicopters.496Adid’s forces played the secondary role of isolating the battle area and 
instigating riots of unarmed civilians against the US force, making the rescue mission 
more cumbersome.497 As a result of the heavy American losses and traumatic film 
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footage of mutilated American bodies, US public opinion forced President Clinton to 
end US task force activities in Somalia.498 
Eritrea: History and Political Islam 
Eritrea is a country in the horn of Africa. It shares borders with the Sudan in the west, 
Ethiopia in the south, and Djibouti in the southeast, and both its northeastern and eastern 
coastlines are on the Red Sea, overlooking Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The ethnicities in 
the country include Tigrinya, Tigre, Saho, Hedareb, Afar, Bilen, Rashaida, Kunama, 
and Nara. 
As in the Sudan and Somalia, Islam has an important place in Eritrean society.499Due 
to the country’s proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, followers of Prophet Mohammed 
sought refuge there from the Aksumite emperor when they were being persecuted in 
Mecca in the seventh century.500Eritrea501 was therefore among the first countries in 
Africa to convert to Islam. In the sixteenth century, under Imam Ahmed Gran, the 
religion became an established part of Eritrean society.502In the nineteenth century, 
reformers changed some of the local Islamic practices and founded the first Islamic 
schools and courts in the country.503 
Historically, Eritreans have followed different Islamic schools of thought over time.504 
Sufism was also influential in spreading Islam in the country. Like the Sudan, Sufism 
had an important place in Eritrea, and power was eventually consolidated in the hands 
of influential Sufi orders. The impact of the Sufi orders was an important catalyst for 
religious expansion and dynamism, aiming at the revitalization of older Eritrean Sufi 
orders such as the Qadiriya and the Shadhiliyya.505The Ad Shaykh holy family and the 
Marghaniyya Sufi order were also prominent in the country.506 
Islam as a religion was supported in its development by both Italian and British 
colonialism in a way that later led to political Islam. The Italian “Muslim policy” in 
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Eritrea was based on the colonial officials subsidizing and promoting Islamic religious 
activities and facilities to solidify government rule, under which Ibrahim al-
Mukhtarultimately came to fill the position of mufti.507 Al-Mukhtar served as the first 
head of Eritrea’s Islamic court, and with the help of supporters, he had solidified his 
authority over what had been a largely decentralized community of clerics. 508 
Moreover, although he disdained both Sufism and Wahhabism, he was patient with 
them until he was able to take advantage of British colonialism to introduce new Islamic 
schools, appoint religious leaders to communities, and attempt to centralize orthodox 
Islam in the country.509 
Both Italian (including the fascist regime) and British colonialism encouraged the 
advancement of political Islam in the country. The British encouraged the development 
of political Islam, as unionism between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not encouraged. With 
the blessing of the British administration, Asmara’s leading pro-independence Muslim 
leaders convened an initial meeting at Keren in early December 1946 at the invitation 
of Sayyid Muhammad Abu Bakr Al-Marghani. 510  The Muslim League (ML) was 
founded; Al-Marghani became its president and Ibrahim Sultan its secretary 
general.511Although the League leaders were later careful to avoid being labeled a 
purely “Islamic” organization, the founding conference illustrated that activists sought 
to build upon their basic strengths as a political outlet for Eritrean Muslims.512 The 
League was one of the important political Islam movements that called for 
independence. Other political Islamist movements also developed, such as the National 
Muslim Party of Massawa (NMPM), founded by Mohamed Umar Qadi in 1947, and 
the Muslim League of the Western Province, organized by Ali Muhammad Musa 
Rad’ay.513 
Political Islam became radicalized because of various factors. First, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution on December 2, 1950 placing Eritrea as an “autonomous 
unit” under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. Under Haile Selassie’s rule, 
Eritreans Muslims were persecuted. Ethiopia transgressed the freedom of expression 
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that Eritreans had enjoyed in the 1940s: it persecuted and incarcerated Eritrean Muslim 
nationalist activists, banned the ML’s Arabic-language Sawt Al-Rabita newspaper, and 
imprisoned the members of its editorial board in 1954.514Ethiopia also imposed other 
measures that affected the Muslimidentity in Eritrea. From the second half of the 1950s 
onwards there was discrimination against Eritrean Muslims in the fields of 
employment, business, political freedoms, education, and religion, which gradually led 
to their treatment as quasi-foreigners or second-class citizens at best.515The growing 
maltreatment and marginalization of Eritrea’s Muslims under the federation pushed 
many into exile, mostly to Egypt and the Sudan.516Therefore, the Eritrean diaspora had 
founded the first national movement, the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), in the 
Sudan in 1958.517In the same year, in Cairo, Egypt, Muhamad Sa’idNawd founded the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),a secular-based organization that advocated for 
western-style democracy.518The ELF had an Arabist orientation, as the organization 
was founded in the heyday of Nasser and Arab nationalism. This explains why the ELF 
sought to build up support for its cause in the Arab world and drew its ideological and 
organizational inspiration in its early years from the Algerian nationalist movement, the 
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).519 
During the Ethiopian emperor Selassie’s rule, from 1964 to 1974, Eritrea was annexed 
and repression against Muslims was intensified. For example, qadis were appointed as 
a reward for their allegiance to the government, and Muslim school curricula were 
abolished altogether. 520 Ethiopian forces were given a free hand in quelling the 
separatists; the period was characterized by harsh and ruthless military repression in the 
Eritrean countryside, resulting in the shattering of Muslim communal vitality.521This 
caused a large number of Eritrean Muslims (especially from the lowlands) to flee the 
country, mainly to the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries of the Middle 
East.522When the Ethiopian communist regime came to power, the situation for the 
Eritreans became worse. Like Al-Nimeiry in the Sudan and Siad Barre in Somalia, the 
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Derg regime of Ethiopia introduced important social reforms in their country.523 The 
Marxist and socialist ideals that influenced those efforts did not allow for political 
pluralism.524 
During the Derg regime, under the dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the situation 
only worsened this state of affairs, as greater force was used against various liberation 
movements, including the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which was 
officially formed in 1977.525Political instability and poor economic conditions in the 
region encouraged migration; in Eritrea and Ethiopia, most of the migrants came from 
the Muslim community.526About one and half million of the Eritrean population moved 
to the Sudan, where Kassla became the main center for Eritrean political activity.527 
Like their Somali and Sudanese counterparts, they also traveled to the Gulf countries, 
encountering the same education system and charity organizations. Throughout the 
1980s some Eritrean refugees in Sudan were exposed to Wahhabi and Salafi influences 
in Sudanese schools.528 Two Islamist movements articulating radical discourses, the 
National Islamic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea (NIFLE) and the Islamic Vanguard, 
were created in 1982.529Those organizations bonded together with another group to 
form the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) in late 1988, closely coinciding with 
the National Islamic Front’s seizure of power in the Sudan in the summer of 
1989.530The aim of the group was to remove the Asmara government and establish an 
Islamic state.531 
After the military coup of June 30, 1989 in the Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF) 
hoped to extend its ideology into other countries. When Eritrea achieved its 
independence from Ethiopia in 1991, it seemed like a good candidate. Eritrea was then 
in the process of constructing a nation-state. Importantly, the lowlands of Eritrea, 
bordering the Sudan, are dominated by Muslims. After the EPLF defeated the Ethiopian 
army, there were other Eritrean factions, mainly from the lowland Muslim constituency, 
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who were squeezed out of the ensuing political process, which was dominated by the 
EPLF.532 Shortly after the 1989 coup, the Sudanese Islamists had armed some of the 
more Islamist-oriented Eritrean factions, but soon discovered that they only had the 
capacity to harass the EPLF and not the Ethiopian government.533 After liberation, 
discontent resurfaced in the Eritrean lowlands. 534  The government failed to make 
headway among the communities because their leaders were not given political space, 
and most of those who joined the government and the party had been placed into 
marginal positions. 535 With the fragmentation of command in the Sudan and 
overconfidence of foreign decision-making, Sudanese support for the Islamist 
organizations in Eritrea was resurrected.536Beginning in 1993 an insurgency in Eritrea’s 
lowlands was gathering strength; among the groups involved in the insurgency were 
guerrilla Islamists, including Arab Afghans. 537 In May 1993, the Sudanese 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had provided generous funds for the EIJM, 
who were active among the Eritrean refugee camps in the Sudan and whose leadership 
was working to overthrow the Eritrean government.538In December 1993, the EIJM 
initiated well-planned assaults from base camps in the Sudan 539 shortly after the 
conclusion of the second PAIC conference in Khartoum, where Muslims from Eritrea 
had a substantial delegation.540The Sudan was forcefully recruiting Eritrean refugees 
and training them in PDF camps, and planted anti-personal mines along the heavily 
traveled roads that crossed the frontier into Eritrea.541The EJIM, which was a member 
of the PIAC, was critical of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the 
ruling party in Eritrea, which they considered too secular.542 
The SIM’s Unholy Alliance with the EPLF: Machiavellianism Again 
The determination of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) to expand their 
“civilization project” into Eritrea after independence explains why the Sudanese regime 
disregarded their alliance (tactical at first) with the EPLF, thathad a secularist and 
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Marxist-Leninist ideology.At the time, the NIF was also trying to impose their radical 
religious ideological project in South Sudan by battling the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a secular-based opposition movement that was 
toying with Marxist-Leninist ideology at the time. The SPLM/A was being supported 
by the Ethiopian Mengistu Haile Mariam Marxist regime. Beginning in May 1983, 
when the Bor mutineers fled to Ethiopia, they received support from the Ethiopian 
regime in the form of training camps, arms, intelligence, and radio facilities.543Mariam 
intervened directly in the leadership of the SPLM/A, insisting that the chosen leader 
should be loyal to him, sympathetic to his socialist ideology, and above all opposed to 
southern secessionism.544The Ethiopian support for the SPLM/A was responsible for 
the fact that the Ethiopian opposition movements and the EPLF fused Sudanese 
territory as their rear bases.545 In October 1989, the SPLM/A launched its Kurmuk II 
operations in the Sudan.546These consisted of SPLA troops backed by an unprecedented 
level of Ethiopian artillery support, andEthiopian forces themselves were poised to 
cross the border to support the SPLA offensive to capture Damazin, the provisional 
capital of the Al-Gezira region in the Sudan.547That city is also the site of the dam that 
provides water for the region and electricity for Khartoum.548Consequently, if the area 
were captured the new regime would fall. 549 It already had little support in the 
international community because it was arresting elected politicians, trade unionists, 
journalists, and lawyers.550The NIF’s post-coup dismissals from the SAF also reduced 
the SAF’s military competence.551What saved the regime was its alliance with the 
EPLF, which led a counteroffensive by its crack commando brigade.552On January 1, 
1990, that elite group launched a mechanized assault from Sudanese territory with 
coordination with the SAF, causing the defeat of the SPLA forces, capturing SPLA 
headquarters at Asosa, defeating Ethiopiangarrison forces in Asosa, and going deep into 
western Ethiopia.553 The NIF returned the favor by providing additional facilities to the 
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EPLF.554Access to the Sudan was important to the EPLF to obtain relief supplies and 
fuel supplies (some of the latter were provided by the Sudanese).555When the NIF 
regime first took power, they had supported Islamist-oriented Eritrean factions such as 
the EIJM.556However, they quickly realized that those factions had the capacity to 
harass the EPLF but not the Ethiopian government.557Moreover, realism had dictated 
that the Khartoum regime support the EPLF, especially after the Asosa operations.558 
Consequently, from 1990 to 1992, security cooperation between the EPLF and the 
Sudan was extremely good, and President Isseyas of Eritreaemployed Sudanese 
security officers.559 After the liberation of Eritrea in May 1991, the EPLF demanded 
the closure of the offices of the Eritrean opposition forces in the Sudan.560Civilian and 
intelligence departments of the Sudan collaborated with the EPLF authorities in hunting 
down, arresting, and kidnapping members of the Eritrean opposition.561In early January 
1992, the EPLF launched a military attack on the opposition forces in western 
Eritrea.562According to the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-
RC), Sudanese government forces gave support to the EPLF in the offensive563 as the 
Sudanese forces crossed the border into Eritrea and attacked the oppositional forces 
including the Eritrean Jihad movement.564 By mid-1993, since there were excellent 
relations between the EPLF regime and the NIF regime, the NIF government pressured 
the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) to make a rapprochement with the EPLF 
regime, with the result that the EIJM was split into two groups.565It was announced on 
August 25, 1993 that the military wing of the EIJM had dismissed its political bureau, 
headed by Sheikh Mohamed Arafa.566 
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The End of the Islamists Civil–Military Alliance: Power Conflict within the SIM 
Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the NIF regime was imposing its radical religious 
ideology through its totalitarianism and imposition of Al-Mashru Al-Hadari in the 
Sudan. It was also utilizing the civil war and clan unrest in Somalia, and the 
factionalized independence struggle of Eritrea, to impose its Al-Mashru Al-Hadari 
outside of the Sudan. By using civil society organizations, the SIM aided like-minded 
radical Islamists who had been educated and trained in the Sudan. The Sudan was able 
to provide a center of radicalization and training for these movements in East Africa 
because the PAIC had provided the necessary coordination. However, Al-Turabi’s 
leadership of the “civilization project” in the Sudan and externally was now 
dispensable, because most of the members of the SIM had become pragmatic and 
wanted to maintain their own personal power in the Sudan. The Sudanese bureaucracies 
had changed the mentality of the leading SIM members, Sudanese oil had lessened the 
dependency of the regime leaders on Islamic banking, Islamic relief agencies, and the 
like, and the SIM was not able to subordinate its own military faction, led by Al-Bashir. 
Al-Turabi had seriously antagonized Al-Bashir, causing a power conflict, within the 
SIM that ended the duality of rule in the Sudan.  
When the SIM members first infiltrated the bureaucracies in the Sudan, their purpose 
had been to impose their radical ideology. After the 1989 coup, when they were 
appointed to head and staff those same bureaucracies, the very nature of the job turned 
them into more pragmatic Islamists. Before this, they had never understood the 
effective power of state bureaucracy and its ability to shape reality at will on the basis 
of its monopoly over sources of knowledge.567Any bureaucratic stratum, which is 
composed of government officials, salaried employees, and professionals, has a long 
history and chain of memory, including memories of past experiences with different 
dictatorial regimes.568Because of this institutional memory and solidarity, taming this 
bureaucratic stratum has never been easy.569 This sector had been characterized by the 
exercise of delegated authority, 570making it a major mover of Sudanese politics behind 
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the scenes.571 Their position, potentially at the center of power and knowledge,572 
enabled them to define themselves as playing a dual role.573 One of these roles is as 
occupants of executive positions in the bureaucracy who were involved in the decision-
making process of running their ministries and departments and the day-to-day running 
of the country.574As the state apparatus expanded, and as the career bureaucrats began 
to discover that in order for the Islamist political appointees to remain in office with 
any degree of success they had to rely on the bureaucrats’ specialized knowledge, the 
bureaucracy was also given a second role, which was to control and utilize their access 
to knowledge and information in order to counter, reduce, or neutralize the 
Islamists.575As leaders and members of the SIM became part of the state bureaucracies, 
they thus had to become more pragmatic to secure their decision-making power. 
In February 1995, there were significant cabinet changes in the NIF government. Ali 
Taha was appointed minister of foreign affairs, Ghazi Salah Al-Din Atabani was made 
state minister of foreign affairs, and Dr.Mustafa Osman Ismail, the interim secretary 
general of the PAIC, became chairman of the Sudanese People’s Committee for the 
Defense of Sudanese.576Ismail had previously been the secretary general of the Council 
for International People’s Friendship (CIPF).577The appointment of the two leading 
members of the SIM in the foreign ministry produced speculation that Al-Turabi had 
been confronted by a schism within the NIF.578 
Since 1992, Taha had become more closely associated with Al-Bashir and his military 
colleagues of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), perhaps in order to remain 
in his position as minister of social planning, as he had no other choice.579Taha began 
distancing himself from Al-Turabi and moving closer to Al-Bashir and his RCC 
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colleagues; for example, he denounced the kidnapping of Carlos the Jackal, a 
Venezuelan leftist, which had been arranged by Al-Turabi.580 
In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak on June 27, 1995 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, there were massive student-led demonstrations in the Sudan 
that threatened the regime.581 Al-Bashir was disturbed that the security agencies did not 
anticipate those riots and that they used savage reprisals to end them.582Therefore, a 
reorganization of the security and intelligence apparatus was made. Interior Minister 
Al-Tayib was replaced by Bakri Hassan Salah and shunted to the Ministry of Labour 
and Administrative Reform; Nafie Ali Nafie was replaced in favor of Brigadier General 
Muhammed Mustafa Al-Dibi, a confidant of Al-Bashir; and General Dhahawi, state 
minister at the presidency, was replaced by Brigadier Al-Hadi Abdallah Hassan.583 
Control of the intelligence apparatus was returned from the Islamists to the 
military. 584 The appointments of Taha and Ghazi Atabani to important ministerial 
positions made them pragmatic in their relationship with Al-Turabi’s leadership, as they 
had become part of the bureaucracy that was running the country. And when certain 
Islamists were removed from decision-making positions, losing their power in the 
institutions they had been running, they certainly became more pragmatic as a result. 
This may possibly have led them to join the military faction in the 1999 palace coup to 
regain their former power and influence in decision-making circles. 
The change in the fortunes of the SIM was the driving force behind making SIM 
members become pragmatic in their ideology in order to maintain their own interest of 
having power in the Sudan. As stated earlier, the SIM relied greatly on the support from 
Islamic banking and their NGOs. That is why, when they captured the state, they 
imposed their banking system and supported their businesses under NGO names and 
charities. Once the NIF controlled the state, their economic empowerment became 
complete and the boundaries between public, private, and the party were entirely 
blurred.585The hanging of a carefully selected group of three innocent young people in 
1990 marked the start of a well-orchestrated process of using the state as a major tool 
for economic empowerment, using that state terrorism to intimidate rival elite 
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factions.586The Bank Act of 1991 effectively put the nation’s entire supply of liquid 
money in the hands of the government, driving most of the old elite out of business.587 
This allowed the state to erode the capacity of the old elite and assist the rising Islamic 
one. The new privatized state lacked no resources, from the selling of public enterprises, 
the issuing of import/export licenses, and the granting of tax exemptions, to undeclared 
bids for selling state-owned land real estate.588The strategy was successful in replacing 
the old elites or marginalizing them.589 Meanwhile, the lower and middle strata of urban 
entrepreneurs expanded to the extent that at least one-third of the 4,000 firms and 
commercial establishments registered during 1984–1994 were owned by the Islamists 
and their sympathizers.590 
The SIM NGOs were important sources of financial aid to the SIM. The most important 
factor in the state’s privatization and the ruling party’s economic empowerment was 
the import tax exemptions for the Islamic NGOs.591 The mushrooming of the Islamic 
relief organizations led by NIF members during the 1990s was instrumental in financing 
the party, first, through zakat and sympathizer funds from abroad, and second, through 
windfall profits accruing from local sale of customs-exempt goods.592The drains of 
these unjustifiable exemptions were huge.593In 1996 the minister of finance complained 
that exemptions had reached unsuitable levels, claiming half of the government’s 
expected revenue.594 
When oil began to be pumped out of Sudanese land, the military Islamists and the soon-
to-be-pragmatic Islamists became economically and politically independent of the 
economic power of the SIM. Oil wealth emboldened Al-Bashir to marginalize Al-
Turabi, and gave surviving members of the RCC a degree of freedom of action 
internationally that they did not have previously.595 In August 1999, at Port Al-Bashir, 
the oil terminal fifteen miles south of Port Sudan, President Al-Bashir presided over the 
opening ceremony for oil exports from the Sudan.596The port had a storage capacity of 
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two million barrels, which was expected to increase to 3.2 million, while the billion-
dollar pipeline would be expanded to 450,000 bpd in four to seven years.597The Sudan 
became a major oil producer and a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).598Oil certainly encouraged the SIM members of the regime to 
become pragmatic, since it gave them a source of economic power other than reliance 
on Islamic banking, the so called tax-exempted NGOs, and other financial 
organizations. 
Even though both SIM civilian and military factions had the same interest in imposing 
the ideology of the SIM, they clashed over who should have a more direct role in 
governing, managing the country, and imposing the SIM ideology. The relations 
between the two factions were shaky, which eventually caused the military faction to 
lead the palace coup of 1999, resulting in a division within the SIM. Abdel Rahim Omer 
Mohi-Eldeen, who is a member of the SIM movement and who served in the post-
Turabi regime after the division of the SIM, has used his insider’s connections and to 
interview senior figures in the SIM, most of whom represent the core of the post-Al-
Turabi regime (Nafie Ali Nafie, Taha, minister of defense General Abdel Raheem 
Hussein, etc.) and to write about the SIM, its division, and what happened to it 
afterwards.599Mohi-Eldeen’s book must be read with caution, as he is still a member of 
the movement and a member of the regime. Besides, those who were interviewed are 
unlikely to give the whole reason why they all joined Al-Bashir in his palace coup in 
1999; they will not expose their desire for power at the cost of abandoning their 
godfather Al-Turabi. Nevertheless, the interviews he conducted are important as they 
reveal what the interviewees believed was happening to the movement before and after 
the military coup of June 30, 1989. Each interview is followed by a content analysis of 
it, which is informative as long as one considers the interviewees’ point of view. The 
interviews will be relied upon in this section of the thesis to analyze the factors that 
contributed to the factionalism of the SIM after 1989 coup, the factors that led the SIM’s 
military faction to the 1999 coup against Al-Turabi, and the reasons that most of the 
SIM, including Al-Turabi’s closest and most loyal followers, joined the military faction 
in that palace coup. 
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After the 1989 coup, Al-Turabi and other SIM leaders were not able to subordinate the 
SIM’s military faction under their civilian authority. This ultimately explains why most 
of the civilian Islamists, along with the military faction of the SIM, removed Al-Turabi 
through the 1999 coup. After the military takeover in 1989, Al-Turabi ruled the Sudan 
directly, and he believed that Al-Bashir, Zubair Mohamed Salih,and other SIM military 
officials would not disobey orders and would be easily replaced if they did not fulfill 
their purpose towards the SIM.600However, Al-Bashir, who was an ambitious member 
of the SIM, adopted a mentality that favored the military’s point of view and eventually 
led him to perform his duties out of obligation rather than devotion.601 It also seemed 
that Zubair, who was second in command in the RCC, believed that Al-Turabi wanted 
power; he told Al-Bashir: “Your people (the SIM) want to rule the country, and if we 
are not careful with them, we ought to give them the rule and return back to the 
army.” 602 Accordingly, the SIM’s military faction, under Al-Bashir’s command, 
suspected Al-Turabi and his SIM civilians of wanting power exclusively for 
themselves. Al-Bashir wanted to keep his position in the military and to stay as head of 
state in the Sudan, but he suspected that Al-Turabi and the civilians in the SIM wanted 
to remove him after he and his military faction captured the state. On October 16, 1993, 
the RCC dissolved itself, on the condition that Al-Bashir become the president of the 
Islamic Republic of the Sudan.603His justification for becoming president but not 
retiring from the military was that remaining in the military would aid in securing the 
revolution after the RCC was dissolved, and he did in fact use his military base later 
on.604However, after dissolving the RCC, Al-Bashir became civilian president and 
therefore did not retain the RCC’s power to issue decrees, declare war, impose a state 
of emergency, and abolish state legislatures, as those powers were transferred to the 
RCC-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA).605 
When Al-Bashir became a civilian president, he sought to concentrate power in the 
hands of his allies in the SIM’s military faction, as he mistrusted both Al-Turabi and 
the SIM civilian leadership. During his presidency, the other RCC military official was 
Zubair, who became his vice president. 606 After the assassination attempt against 
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President Mubarak, Al-Bashir removed the minister of interior, Al-Tayib Khair, 
making him minister of public service; he reassigned both Nafie Ali Nafie, who had 
been director of foreign security, and presidential security adviser Brigadier General 
Faith Urwah, since they were both implicated in the Mubarak assassination attempt; 
and he elevated two former RCC members, Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih to minister of 
interior and Brigadier Salah al-Din Karrar to the presidential council.607 Al-Bashir at 
the time lacked the power to remove Nafie Ali Nafie, Urwah, and Khair altogether, as 
they were protected by Al-Turabi and could activate loyal security forces against 
him.608 However, as previously noted, after the student-led protests in 1995, Al-Bashir 
managed to bring in his military allies to lead the government and remove the heads of 
security that he feared. 
Once he was assured that his military allies were in control in the government, Al-
Bashir’s support for Al-Turabi’s internationalism changed. In late 1989, Osama Bin 
Laden, who had early discussions with Al-Turabi about investing in the Sudan, 
established his Wadi Al-Aqiq holding company in Khartoum, and in 1991 he moved 
from Saudi Arabia, where he was under house arrest, to the Sudan.609 Some of Bin 
Laden’s agricultural investments in the Sudan were suspected to be training camps 
under the protection of Al-Turabi and the SIM/NIF regime.610 Bin Laden was able to 
rebuild his Al-Qaeda in the Sudan by bringing to the Sudan his most important 
associates among the Arab Afghan leaders, including members of Islamic Jihad and 
other militant radical Islamists.611As is well known, the NIF/SIM regime strongly 
supported Al-Qaeda. For example, it granted Al-Qaeda members passports, visas, and 
other consular documents, which allowed them to legally bypass certain security levels 
on the pretense of diplomatic immunity, easing their ability to travel across the 
globe.612As the Sudan was being isolated by the international community, and the 
regime was not popular within the country, Al-Bashir’s inner circle, composed mostly 
of the military heads of security, became convinced by 1996 that Bin Laden and his Al-
Qaeda were an unnecessary liability. 613 This was particularly true after the failed 
Mubarak assassination, because rumors were spreading in Khartoum that Al-Qaeda was 
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planning to assassinate Sadiq Al-Mahdi.614 This antagonized Al-Mahdi’s followers, 
who represented a threat to the survival of the regime.615Thus, Al-Bashir proposed to 
the Saudi authorities to extradite Bin Laden.616That failed, because the Saudis feared 
domestic repercussions. 617  Al-Bashir then asked the Saudi authorities to act as 
intermediaries to facilitate the delivery of Bin Laden to the US.618To forestall a scandal 
that would have damaged his image, his political career, the PAIC, and his position as 
secretary general of the NIF, Al-Turabi contacted the Sudanese ambassador in 
Afghanistan, Atiya Badawi, a former Arab-Afghan fighter, to facilitate Bin Laden’s 
return to Afghanistan.619 
After putting his military allies in power, Al-Bashir wanted to have control over the 
political system. According to Mohi-Eldeen’s interview with general Abdel Raheem 
Hussein, who was a member of the SIM military faction, a friend of Al-Bashir, and 
minister of defense at the time, Hussein asserted that “Al-Bashir was not happy with 
the political system of the National Congress (NC), as it did not give him much or any 
powers, because all powers were concentrated in the hands of the NC’s secretary 
general.”620Hussein further stated that this is why the “memorandum of ten” later 
appeared, as members of the SIM were not happy with that governing system and had 
given Al-Bashir powers to lead the country by virtue of his presence and leadership 
within the NC.621This memorandum was a document signed by ten leading members of 
the SIM, calling for reducing the power within the NCP of Al-Turabi, who was its 
secretary general and for transferring those powers to the chairman of the party, 
President Al-Bashir. 622 The death of vice president Zubair on February 12, 1998 
encouraged Al-Bashir to expand his power even further, since he was suspicious of Al-
Turabi and the SIM civilian leadership. After the death of Zubair, Al-Turabi went to 
Al-Bashir with a list of candidates from the SIM to take the position of vice president; 
one of the names was Al-Turabi himself.623According to Yas Omar Al-Imam, who was 
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a senior member of the SIM, Al-Bashir was angry when he saw Al-Turabi’s name on 
the list, because Al-Bashir had previously dissolved the RCC and Al-Turabi had tried 
to get Al-Bashir to retire from the SAF.624Hussein, who had talked with Al-Bashir about 
the nomination list, asserted that when Al-Bashir saw the list, he informed Al-Turabi 
that he himself could not be president above Al-Turabi.625 Al-Bashir also stated that if 
he had to choose from among the others in the list, he would select Ali Osman Taha, as 
he was compatible with Al-Bashir in terms of age and had better relations with him than 
with Ali al-Haj, and because Ali Taha himself was the leader of the group that organized 
the June 30 takeover.626 Upon the death of Zubair and 25 senior officials in a plane 
crash on March 8, 1998, Al-Bashir announced the appointment of 15 new ministers and 
four new presidential advisers; Ali Osman Taha was vice president and 16 NIF 
members became ministers.627Later, on March 28, 1998, the National Assembly passed 
a draft of a constitution that made sharia law the source of legislation and significantly 
increased the power of the presidency.628 After a referendum, that constitution was 
signed into law on June 30, 1998.629 As a result, Al-Bashir gained considerable power 
and influence in the Sudan.  
Al-Turabi realized he needed to maintain control over Al-Bashir and his military allies, 
who were gaining power and influence. Al-Turabi relied on his capacity of ideological 
and political influence over the state and the SIM to reassert his power over the SIM’s 
military faction. His political maneuvering caused the appearance of the “memorandum 
of ten” and increased the power of Al-Bashir and his military. In December 1998,Al-
Bashir signed into law the Political Association Act that supposedly restored Sudan to 
a multi-party system, which had been banned since July1989: a political party was not 
permitted to organize under the guise of a political alliance (tawali al-sayast).630The 
Political Association Act was inspired by Al-Turabi in November 1998, when he urged 
many former Sudanese parties to become involved in the political process.631Al-Turabi 
was determined to seize control of the political system and sought to reorganize the NIF 
into the National Congress Party (NCP), including its leadership office and leadership 
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council.632The latter was at the time under the control of Al-Bashir, who ratified all 
nominations for vice presidents, ministers, and senior officials before their names were 
submitted to the National Assembly for pro forma approval.633After Al-Turabi became 
the secretary general of the NCP, he dissolved both the leadership office and the 
leadership council and replaced it with a 60-member leadership authority loyal to 
him,634 making him very powerful and reducing Al-Bashir to near impotence.635At the 
December 10, 1998 meeting of the Majlis al-Shura of the NCP, ten of the NCP leaders 
surprised the meeting with a memorandum that stressed the lack of responsibility and 
consensus within the NCP, and the overwhelming power of the NCP’s secretary general 
over the party and the country.636The signatories of the memorandum included one from 
the old guard, one from the military, and another from a second generation of the 
movement.637The full list included Sayyid Al-Khatieb, Ghazi Atabani, Ahmed Ali 
Imam, Ahmed Torien, Bakri Hassan Salah, Ibrahim Ahmed Umar, Bahaa al-Din 
Hanafie, Mutrif Sadiq, Nafie Ali Nafie, and Usman Khalid Modawi.638  When Al-
Turabi realized his authority within the SIM was being challenged by Al-Bashir and 
others, he moved to reduce the power of the president and to concentrate power directly 
in himself as speaker of parliament.639 For example, in December 1999, as speaker of 
the parliament, he proposed legislation that would allow direct elections of state 
governors, which would have reduced Al-Bashir’s authority to select them. He also 
tried to push through a constitutional amendment that would permit a two-thirds vote 
to depose a president.640Consequently, Al-Bashir had to rely on his base of power of 
the military, particularly the officer corps, which he had cultivated during his ten years 
as president.641The senior officers had never trusted Al-Turabi or Ali Osman Taha and 
were determined not to permit the PDF to supersede the authority of the SAF.642 This 
strategy led to the palace coup of 1999. Also, it should be noted that when Al-Bashir 
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wanted to remove Al-Turabi from power, he got the support of most members of the 
Council of Forty, which was the SIM’s central committee, which Al-Turabi chaired. 
On December 12, 1999, two days before the national assembly was to vote on curbing 
the powers of the presidency, soldiers and tanks surrounded the legislative 
building.643Al-Bashir dismissed Al-Turabi as speaker and dissolved the Assembly, and 
announced both a state of emergency and new elections for the national assembly in 
December 2000.644 
Al-Turabi had sought to contain the factionalism within the SIM that was directed 
against him by using the political and ideological capacity he held within the state and 
the SIM. Strangely, he disregarded the fact that Al-Bashir and his faction had the 
military as their source of power; Sudanese history has shown that the military 
institution is the most important power broker in Sudanese politics. Al-Turabi’s 
underestimation of Al-Bashir and the power of his military faction stemmed from his 
belief that he had unchallenged authority over them as the head of the SIM, and he 
seemed to think he could contain Al-Bashir’s insubordination by reasserting his power 
over him. Unfortunately, it seemed Al-Turabi had disregarded the fact that the SIM’s 
military faction had adopted a military mentality of not wanting to share state power, 
or have civilian leadership controlling it.  
Conclusion 
The SIM had a different religious ideology than that of the dominant Sudanese Sufi 
orders. This is why it seized state power through a military coup; it understood that it 
could not otherwise dislocate and replace the hegemonic influence of the Sufi 
establishment. After the military coup, the SIM imposed its radical ideology on the 
Sudanese society. Since this ideology had an international dimension of wanting to 
establish the umma caliphate, the SIM leaders used their base (the Sudan) to support 
like-minded radical Islamists in Somalia and Eritrea, having learned from its own 
experience that the only way their ideology could be imposed on a society is through 
having state power as a capacity. At this time, both Somalia and Eritrea had suffered 
internal crises that caused various actors to compete for state power giving the SIM the 
opportunity to influence the situations in those countries by supporting radical Islamist 
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movements. However, because of competing interests within the SIM, it suffered from 
an internal power conflict that led to the palace coup of 1999, which later led to the 
development of the post-Al-Turabi regime based on an alliance headed by Al-Bashir. 
Within the post-Al-Turabi regime, different competing factions have attained various 
sensitive positions, which threatens Al-Bashir’s rule over the regime and the country. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, Al-Bashir’s continued support for radical Islamist 
movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup is a by-product of power 
relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime. 
 
  
91 
 
Chapter Four 
The Post-Al-Turabi Regime: Al-Bashir and Power Relations 
Introduction 
The removal of Al-Turabi ended his ideological power capacity over the Sudanese state 
and society. The palace coup of 1999 resulted in the hasty foundation of a new regime 
that lacked an ideological base, and proved that the post-Al-Turabi regime was founded 
on competing factions that Al-Bashir now presides over. Those factions compete 
against each other for power and influence over the regime and the state, threatening to 
remove Al-Bashir from state power. Likewise, Al-Bashir is in power relations with 
those factions to rule the country, as they hold sensitive positions within the state. 
Understanding that those factions still have an attachment to their radical religious 
ideology and its expansionism, Al-Bashir continued the Sudan’s support for the radical 
Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Thus, the current Sudanese support for the 
radical Islamist movements is a by-product of the internal power relations within the 
post-Turabi regime. This situation has been used by Al-Bashir to maintain his authority 
over those competing factions, or to neutralize their ability to remove him from state 
power. 
Establishment of the post-Al-Turabi Regime: The Second Islamist Republic  
The removal of Al-Turabi from state power in December 1999 did not guarantee Al-
Bashir and his allies a hold on the new state power they had gained. They moved 
quickly to remove Al-Turabi’s remaining power points in the government, the party, 
and the international arena. With the removal of Al-Turabi’s influence, Al-Bashir 
headed a second Islamistrepublic (and then a third republic,after the secession of South 
Sudan) thatwas based on alliances between the civilian, security, and military factions 
of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM)’s faction in power. Al-Bashir watches 
carefully over these alliances to maintain his rule. 
In January 2000, Al-Bashir replaced nine ministers close to Al-Turabi, but retained 
several of his former protégés, including Ali Taha, who had made a transition from a 
determined Islamist to a pragmatic Islamist politician; Taha remained the first vice 
92 
 
president. 645 Al-Bashir alsoreduced Al-Turabi’s family business interests, and 
terminated the government’s flow of funds that had subsidized the PAIC, whose 
buildings were seized on February 10.646  Between May and July 2000, Al-Bashir 
removed Al-Turabi from power in the National Congress Party (NCP) by accusing him 
of wanting to instigate another military coup. He dissolved the leadership authority, and 
led a meeting with the Majlis Al-Shura on July that removed Al-Turabi from his 
position as secretary general of the NCP.647 In response, Al-Turabi formed his own 
party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), from the dissidents of the NCP,648and used 
the PNC’s newspaper, Rai Al-Shaab, to publish political denunciations of Al-Bashir 
and his government.649 Thus the SIM was divided into a faction outside of state power 
and factions who have a hold on state power. 
To regain state power,Al-Turabi allied himself with the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), an enemy of the SIM. This damaged his image as an 
Islamist leader and strengthened the Islamist faction who held state power. In February 
2001, Al-Turabi signed a memorandum of understanding with Garang, the leader of the 
SPLM/A, to end the civil war, which was a serious mistake because it meant that the 
famous Islamist suddenly became an ally of the SPLM/A insurgency,which was viewed 
as treason. He was arrested on February 21, 2001, jailed, later placed under house arrest, 
and was threatened with criminal charges for communicating with the 
enemy.650General Abdel Rahim Hussien explained the regime’s excuse for jailing Al-
Turabi. In his interview with Mohi-Eldeen, Hussein asserted that they had jailed Al-
Turabi to save him from himself, to save the country he had built, and to save his 
ideology and what he had worked for.651That interview revealed that although the SIM 
ideology had become of secondary importance to the state Islamists, still the radical 
ideology and the “civilization project”were important for their self legitimization for 
holding state power. 
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The second Islamist republic has concentrated all powers in the hands of Al-Bashir, 
who completely manages the narrow ruling clique.652 At the same time the NCP has 
become the party of the state.The ruling elite behind the second republic that makes up 
the core group of the clique can be divided into three distinct categories of Islamists, 
although certain people have overlapping affiliations: senior party bureaucrats, security 
personnel, and the military Islamists.The senior party leaders category is composed of 
Ali Osman Taha,Ibrahim Ahmed Umar, Usman Khalid Modawi,MahdiIbrahim,Ali 
Osman Yasin, and the group of physicians that Sudanese satire depicts as Médecins 
Sans Frontières,including Ghazi Atabani, Magzoub Al-Khalifa(who died in a car 
accident in 2005), and Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail.653The security category is composed 
of Nafie Ali Nafie,Qutbi Al-Mahdi, Hasan Dahawi, Salah Gosh, Ali Karti, Abdel 
Rahim Hussein,Al-Tayeb Ibrahim, and Bakri Hassan Saleh.654The military category is 
composed of Al-Bashir, Abdel Rahim Hussein,Al-TayebIbrahim,Bakri Hassan Salah, 
and Al-Hadi Abdalla.655 These three groups together formed the pinnacle of power in 
the Sudan as they freed themselves, the party, and the state from all vestiges of Al-
Turabi’s control and his troublesome way of conducting politics.Competition and feuds 
among those groups have been brewing,within the first group in particular. The 
competition has created its own dynamics, turning the transition to the second republic 
into a sort of domination without leadership, and turning Al-Bashir into a political entity 
who manages those groups.To strengthen their positions, each member of these groups 
continued to build around himself a smaller clique with total loyalty based on familyor 
tribal relationship.Another aspect of the continuity of the process is to be found in the 
strategy employed by the Islamist regime within the first and second republics to 
appoint governors, senior employees, and even tribal leaders as a way of extending their 
power, empowering a class of Islamist elites through whom the regime could control 
all aspects of life.This explains why the choice of regional governor was one of the 
biggest battles that Al-Turabi and his supporters fought with those who unseated him.656 
The three groups who form the post-Al-Turabi regime are working together because of 
their insecurity about losing state power, which encourages the different factions in the 
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regime to challenge each other to secure their own power and influence within the post-
Al-Turabi regime. Al-Bashir has never been known for his vision or leadership, and the 
groups he manages and oversees have not promised to restructure the regime or to 
implement any serious democratic changes; instead, the transition to the second 
republic seem to have taken a different route.The regime is firmly linked to the element 
of fear,both as an expression of a deeper feeling of insecurity and as a tool of 
survival.Therefore, even though the groups are divided by their personal ambitions, fear 
remains the cement that keeps them together in the post-Al-Turabi regime.As a strategy 
of divide and rule, the regime started separate negotiations with different opposition 
groups to make those groups complicitwith the regime, or to recycle the political 
process into a new form of power relations through which the regime would emerge 
victorious.Moreover, the regime continues to exercise new forms of intimidation and 
ways of inducing fear, using the state to extend or cut back rewards for those who have 
been opposing it.For example, the regime had given the national security forces a wide 
range of powers such as detention, investigation, surveillance, and access to the private 
homes and communications of the citizens, or the control and the use of court system 
to deal with special cases.657As a result, the regime is effectively based on “limited 
liberalizing authoritarianism,”and those developments indicate a decline of the Islamist 
project and its regime, leading to the disintegration of the regime, on the one hand, and 
the regime’s attemptsat transition and consolidation, on the other hand. 658  In his 
inaugurationspeech on February 12, 2001, Al-Bashir declared that the objective of the 
regime is to establish a strong government.659According to him, a government might 
pre-empt and constrain what are seen as growing challenges to the regime in the form 
of alternative centers of power.Therefore, the leaders of the regime are persuaded by 
their own logic that they will be able to fix their government without risking 
disintegration, and an authoritarian approach is thus planned and pursued as the ruling 
objective of the regime.660 
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The Recycling of Radical Islamism 
After military coup of June 30, 1989, the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) was 
exporting and imposing its radical religious ideology of the “civilization project” into 
East Africa, using the Sudan as its base and its NGOs to aid like-minded radical Islamist 
movements. In this way, the SIM was making use of the peculiar situations in Somalia 
and Eritrea. As has already been discussed, many of the SIM influential leaders, who 
were also members of Al-Turabi regime, coordinated and supported the expansionist 
efforts. What is common to most of the SIM leaders who joined Al-Bashir in the palace 
coup of 1999, and who formed their own power centers in the post-Al-Turabi regime, 
is their previous support for expanding the SIM’s ideology, the “civilization project,” 
outside of the Sudan.  
To maintain his hold on those powerful competing factions, Al-Bashir had to appeal to 
their ideological inclination of radical religious expansionism that was part of the SIM 
ideology, as this is an important part of their self-legitimization. Hence, Al-Bashir 
continued to support the radical Islamist movements in East Africa, to show that he had 
not abandoned the “civilization project” after the 1999 coup. His support for radical 
Islamist movements also gives him control over the competing factions within the post-
Turabi regime and discourages them from trying to remove him from state power. 
Importantly, when Al-Bashir feels his power is threatened, he uses such paramilitary 
groups to reinforce his power. For example, in the West Africa, in December 2005, 
Chadian rebels supported by the Sudan, attacked the Chadian capital the attack was 
intended by the Sudan to cut of Chadian support for Darfurian rebels, especially the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).661It should be noted, that the leader of the JEM, 
is a follower of Al-Turabi662 Therefore, when an Islamists faction such as the the JEM 
leadership, that used to be part of the Al-Turabi’s NIF regime threatens Al-Bashir 
power, he will use paramilitary groups to reinforce his power. 
In Eritrea, the Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) politically 
and diplomatically, providing it with shelter and weapons, allowing it to form a political 
party in the Sudan, allowing that party to oppose the Eritrean ruling regime, and 
allowing the EIJM to carry out attacks on Eritrea. Even after normalizing relations with 
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Eritrea, the post-Al-Turabi regime allowed the EIJM and its political arm to continue 
operating from their office in the Sudan. In Somalia, the Sudan continued to support 
AIAI, when it was an important part of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), 
by several means: using diplomacy to aid it to continue its expanding influence and 
control over Somalia; disapproving any intervention in Somalia; not sending Sudanese 
troops as part of peace missions after the Ethiopian intervention; trying to reconcile the 
different factions of the SCIC; and strongly supporting the faction of the SCIC that 
gained internationally recognized state authority through humanitarian aid, financial 
aid, and other forms of support. Furthermore, the Sudan supported President Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud’sSomali government, which is composed of a radical faction of the 
Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) that took control over the Somali 
government through internationally recognized elections. The Sudan gave strong 
support to the Somali government, by helping it obtain financial aid, providing financial 
support of its own, providing training support for the Somali National Armed Forces 
(SNAF), and providing scholarships to Somalis to study at educational institutions in 
the Sudan known for religiously radicalizing its students, as a component of the 
“civilization project” that the Sudan had pursued during Al-Turabi’s regime.  
Some regime leaders who had previously supported the radical Islamist movements in 
Eritrea and Somalia during the NIF regime days were also involved in the continued 
Sudanese support for the radical Islamist movements in their capacity as leaders within 
the post-Al-Turabi regime. 
The radical Islamist movements in East Africa have followed two different paths. In 
Eritrea, they became factionalized by internal power struggles, causing the 
disintegration of the Eritrean Islam Jihad Movement (EIJM) into several competing 
radical Islamist factions with same goals and interests. In Somalia, AIAI reappeared 
more powerful than before in the form of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts 
(SCIC), having become factionalized by foreign powers into two competing groups, 
one with state power and the other without. Likewise, the Somali Islax Muslim 
Brotherhood (SIMB), which is integrated into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
(EMB), was also supported by the Sudan as it became factionalized. The Sudan had 
strongly supported the radical faction of the SIMB that had obtained internationally 
recognized government power. In both cases, the radical Islamist groups have the same 
goals and interests. The support of the post-Al-Turabi regime for those factions is not 
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to expand the goal of the SIM, but to help Al-Bashir to maintain his influence and power 
over the competing SIM factions in the post-Turabi regime.  
What links the competing factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime to the Sudan’s 
continued support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia is the 
ideological inclination to impose the “civilization project” in those countries. Al-Bashir 
inherited the Eritrean and Somali that Al-Turabi had supported before, which made it 
easy for him to continue investing in the “civilization project.”  
There are four reasons why, the factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime is 
directly linked to Al-Turabi, and they illustrate how Al-Bashir’s continued support for 
the civilization project should be understood more as a by product of the regime’s 
internal power relations, and not as power politics. First, the post-Al-Turabi regime had 
fractured the opposition against it through making separate agreements with each 
opposition group. In 2005, the Sudan had signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) with the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A), and 
signed a deal with the National Democratic Allaince (NDA). And in 2006, the Sudan 
had signed the Easertern Front Agreement (EF) with the armed eastern Sudanese 
oppositionthe Beja Congress.663Second, the Sudan had improved its relations with 
Eritrea, which used to support both the SPLM/A and the NDA against the NIF and the 
post-Al-Turabi regime. In 2006 both Sudan and Eritrea had restored diplomatic 
relations with one another.664The improved relations with Eritrea, gives no reason for 
Eritrea to support Sudanese opposition groups again. Third, within the post-Al-Turabi 
regime therestill seem to be factions to be influenced by Al-Turabi. For example, Ghazi 
Atabani, who was a  leading a reformist faction within the post-Al-Turabi regime, was 
removed from his job as presidential advisor for communicating and having meetings 
with Al-Turabi in an effort to reconcile the two SIM factions. 665 Finally, as was 
previously illustrated with the case of the JEMs’ rebellion in Darfur, that shows Al-
Turabi influence, through his followers within the regime, can challenge and remove 
Al-Bashirs’ hold on state power. 
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The two case studies will illustrate the Sudan’s support for those movements in East 
Africa, before and after the 1999 palace coup against Al-Turabi in the Sudan. They will 
show that Al-Bashir’s continued support for radical Islamist movement in Eritrea and 
Somalia is not geared towards expanding his influence in East Africa, but towards 
controlling the competing factions within his own government. This explains why Al-
Bashir’s support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia is less 
ideologically confrontational and intense than Al-Turabi’s support had been. 
Eritrea: The Multiplicity of the Radical Islamist Movement 
As explained in the previous chapter, the EIJM was supported and aided by the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) of the Turabi regime in the Sudan after the Asosaoperations. Those 
operations allowed the NIF regime to safeguard its control over the Sudan state against 
the communist Ethiopian regime intervention. The Asosa operations were a 
counteroffensive led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) from the Sudan 
and coordinated by the Sudanese Armed Forces. They resulted in the defeat of the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (which was supported by 
the Ethiopian communist regime), the capture of the SPLM/A’s headquarters at Asosa, 
and the defeat of the Ethiopian forces garrisoned at Asosa. It allowed the EPLF forces 
to go deep into western Ethiopia.666 
Afterward Eritrea gained its independence, the SIM/ NIF regime, to spread its radical 
ideology into Eritrea, it aided the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement(EIJM),Nafie Ali 
Nafie, the head of the internal security agency in the Sudan at that time, was responsible 
for the military training of such groups.667  According to an interview with a non-
commissioned Sudanese officer who defected in 1996, weapons were imported into the 
Sudan from China or Iran, where the Sudanese ministry of defense would hand them to 
Bin Laden’s representatives for use in training the EIJM and other Islamists in guerrilla 
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warfare.668Moreover, the NIF regime allowed the EIJM to use the Sudan as a base to 
coordinate its activities. In late 1994, the EIJM held its second general conference in 
Khartoum, where it pledged to expand and continue its jihad until achieving victory or 
martyrdom.669Afterwards, the EIJM launched cross-border attacks into Eritrea, during 
which the Eritrean forces killed half a dozen of its soldiers, including at least two from 
other countries. 670 Thus, the Eritrean regime decided to terminate its diplomatic 
relations with the Sudan in 1995 when it openly called for the overthrow of the NIF 
regime in the Sudan; later Eritrea hosted the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) and gave it the former Sudanese embassy as headquarters.671 The NDA was an 
alliance of Sudanese political and armed opposition groups who sought to remove the 
NIF regime from power. It was composed of the SPLM/A, the communist party, the 
Mahdiyya and Marghaniyya Sufi orders, and other oppositional groups. With Eritrea 
supporting the NDA, the Sudan stepped up its support for the EIJM.672Inan interview 
with the EIJM in early 1998, Abul Bara Hassan Salman, the second in command to 
Khalid Muhammad Amerof the EIJM, presented the objectives of the EIJM: liberating 
the region from Christian–Jewish control through armed struggle, engaging in regional 
diplomacy, and replacing the Eritrean regime with an Islamic one.673 
The NIF/Al-Turabi regime supported the various factions and even tried to reunify them 
with similar factions of the EIJM to aid in spreading the radical Islamist ideology in 
Eritrea. At its third conference, in Khartoum in 1998, shortly after the outbreak of the 
Eritrean–Ethiopian war and after Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya had focused the global spotlight on the Sudan, the EIJM changed its name 
to the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement (EISM) in an effort to defuse the increasing 
hostility from the international media.674 The conference renewed the EISM’s call for 
jihad and the EISM continued to carry out its attacks against Eritrea, seeking to 
capitalize on the dissatisfaction with the secular Eritrean regime and the perception that 
the government was controlled by Christian Tigrinya-speakers, who dominated the 
economy in most of western, Muslim-dominated Eritrea.675 
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There is a historical context behind thatradical religious declaration. The EISM’s main 
base of support was among the Tigre population of Gash Barka, the region that borders 
Ethiopia’s Tigray province and the Sudanese border.This area suffered greatly during 
the war of independence and the Eritrean–Ethiopian border war of 1998–
2000.676During the period of independence, thousands of its residents abandoned the 
region for safe haven in the Sudan or became internally displaced.677Consequently, the 
EISM drew its main support from Eritrean Muslim refugees in the Sudan. 678 
Intentionally or otherwise, the Sudan under the NIF managed to unify the different 
factions of the EIJM.In March 1999, in the Sudan, representatives of ten Eritrean 
opposition groups formed the Alliance ofEritrean National Force (AENF), under the 
leadership of Abdullah Idriss, to overthrow the government of President 
IsaiyasAferworki. Both the Eritrean Popular Congress (EPC) and the EIJM are 
members of the AENF.679Those two groups were previously part of the EIJM,which 
split into competing factions in 1993; the EPC was the military faction of the EIJM.680In 
2003, the EIJM/EISM changed its name to the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement 
(EIRM),681 which was headed by Khalil Mohammed Amer.682In 2008, a new faction of 
the EIJM, the Eritrean Islamic Congress, appeared.Itwas led by Abul Bara Hassan 
Salman, who previously was deputy head of the EIJM/EISM.683 
During the post-Al-Turabi regime, the EIJM was aided significantly by the Sudan, 
which provided it with material support and safe haven.However, the Sudan in turn 
used the EIJM as proxy agents, for the dual purposes of regime survival and keeping 
Al-Bashir’s control over the factions in his government.Al-Bashir’s regime helped the 
radical Eritrean Islamist movement to form a political party very similar to the Egyptian 
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Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) to spread its radical ideology, and allowed the Eritrean 
Islamists to have its offices in the Sudan. 
As stated previously, several Eritrean oppositional groups were operating in the Sudan. 
Two of the more significant military groups were the EISM/EIRM and the 
AbudllahIdriss Marxist group of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).684 The Sudan 
provided both groups with support, which may have included landmines, since a 
number have been detonated in areas in which the EIRF/EIRM has been operating inthe 
past few years.685 The level of military activity along the eastern border is very low,686 
which makes the activities of the EIRM more of a clandestine movement than an 
insurgent movement. The Sudanese regime has also directed its attention towards a 
number of Eritrean Islamist political organizations that operated in eastern Sudan, in 
particular the Beni Amar, a group sometimes said to be part of the Beja tribe687 in an 
attempt to undermine the Beja congress. 688 According to the Eritrean Center for 
Strategic Studies, at the Sanaa summit in Yemenon October 15, 2002, the Sudanese 
minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Mustafa Osama Ismail, told Sudanese reporters that the 
mission of the Sudanese government is to rid Eritrea of the Afwerkigovernment.689In 
2003, EIRM was charged by the Eritrean government with the killing of a British 
geologist, which the EIRM denied.690 In March 2006, the EIRM claimed responsibility 
for a hotel bombing and ambush in Eritreathat killed 46 Eritrean military 
personnel.691Subsequently, according to an interview conducted by John Young of the 
Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) with a security analyst on March 15, 
2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, “the EIRM maintained an office in Khartoum, and has 
about 2000–3000 fighters but little influence inside Eritrea.” 692  Consequently, the 
Sudanese regime continued its support for the EIRM to maintain its project of spreading 
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radical Islam in Eritrea.After the Sudanese regime signed the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement on October 14, 2006 with the Eastern Front (EF), both the EIRM and the 
Abdullah Idris faction of the ELF were supposed to be dissolved.693 However, that did 
not happen, as the EISM/EIRM developed a political party to aid in its struggle to 
impose its radical religious ideology on Eritreans. 
At its August 2004 general conference in Khartoum, under the leadership of Khalil 
Mohammed Amer, the EISM/EIRM formed Al-Hizb Al-Islami Al-Eritree Lil 
AdalahWetenmiya (Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development, EIPJD,)694 and 
dropped the image of an automatic rifle on its official emblem.695However, it changed 
little in its strategic orientation.696The party established a50-member Shura leadership 
council, with a mandate for women to make up at least 10 percent of its 
membership.697One possible reason that the EIJM decided to develop this party has 
been stated in an interview given by Abul Bara Hassan Salman, the deputy head of the 
EISM, where he stated the agenda of the EISM. Among its many goals, those thatstood 
out were armed struggle and training of youth, the use of da’wa and education to fight 
against the fallacies of the Eritrean regime, and importantly, on the external front, to 
generate suitable resources to support their jihad through Islamic means.698 The party 
was formed to support this agenda. The EIPJD claims that they come as close as 
possible to being an Eritrean Muslim Brotherhood organization, but they could never 
be a proper brotherhood of that type because of the path of armed resistance chosen by 
its leadership and because they still had Wahhabi elements within their 
ranks.699Interestingly, it might be concluded that the party haslinks to Al-Qaeda, since 
the EIJM itself is known to have such links; however, it is doubtful that all members 
and factions of the fragmented EIJM knew about the Al-Qaeda connection.700After 
forming the party, the organization continued to use its radical struggle against the 
Eritrean regime to impose its radical religious ideology. For example, in 2007 the party, 
along with other opposition groups, laid new landmines along the Ethiopian–Eritrean 
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border.701 Thus, the movement and the party are both seen to be connected to the 
Sudanese post-Al-Turabi regime, the Egyptian MB, and Al-Qaeda. 
After signing the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2005, and theEastern Front 
Agreement in 2006, the Sudanese regime reduced its support for the radical Eritrean 
Islamists. After the signing of the CPA, the Eritrean regime approached the SPLM 
members of the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU), including the first 
vice president Silva Kiir702and foreign minister Lam Akol, to improve bilateral relations 
with the Sudan.703 Later in 2005, SilvaKiirled a delegation to Asmara to solidify the 
Sudan’s so-called neutrality in the Eritrean–Ethiopian border war.704 In January 2006, 
President Al-Bashir sent his advisor Ghazi Atabani to Asmara to personally invite 
President Isaias Afewerki to the African Union (AU) Summit held in Khartoum.By 
mid-2006 relations between the Sudan and Eritrea had improved; diplomatic missions 
were elevated to ambassadorial level and the Sudan allowed Eritrea to host and mediate 
the GNU–Eastern Front negotiations. 705  The leaders of the Eritrean Democratic 
Alliance (EDA), which included the EIPJD and the EPC, thereforereported that military 
training camps in the Sudan had been closed at the request of the Sudanese government 
and moved into northern Ethiopia, and the EDA was told by Salah Gosh, the head of 
the Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), to close their camps 
and keep a low profile in the Sudan.706The Sudanese regime allowed the EDA to keep 
their offices in the Sudan, andthe EDA groups were allowedto hold meetings inside 
those offices; however, the Sudanese regime told them they could not conduct any other 
outside activities,such as public meetings or rallies.707And while the Sudanese regime 
banned the activities of the EDA in June 2008, 708 it still allowed members of 
EISM/EIRM and EIPJD to operate in the Sudan;in fact, the EIPJD had an office in 
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Khartoum that was still functioning after the 2008 ban on EDA activities.709 Similarly, 
on June 8, 2013 Sudanese security forces raided the homes of EISM leaders and 
members in Kassala, in the Sudan.710 It is clear, therefore, that the regime allowed the 
presence of the EIPJD and EISM/EIRM after improving ties with the Eritrean regime. 
The post-Al-Turabi regime continued to aid the Eritrean Islamist Jihad Movement 
(EIJM) in its different forms and factions over the years after the palace coup of 1999. 
Importantly, those Eritrean Islamist factions were under the control of the Sudanese 
regime, as was evidenced by the Sudan’s troubled relations with Eritrea. Although 
relations between Asmara and Khartoum improved greatly after both the 2005 and the 
2006 agreements, the Sudan continued to support the EIJM by giving preference to the 
EJM,which had formedits own political party with an office in the Sudan. 
Consequently, it is possible that the Sudan’s support for the Eritrean Islamists will 
continue as a precautionary card by Al-Bashir against the possibility of a threat to his 
rule over the Sudanese state by the Islamist factions he heads. Its support for the EIJM 
provided the Sudanese regime with the security necessary to rule the country, as Eritrea 
had supported the National Democratic Alliance (NDA),which included every 
opposition group bent on removing the regime from power. The EIJM is being used by 
Al-Bashir as security for leadership, and to show the competing power centers within 
the regime that the expansionist agenda of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) 
continues and that Al-Bashir secured the SIM’s rule in the Sudan by using the EIJM.  
Somalia: The Multiplicity of the Radical Islamist Movement 
As explained in the previous chapter, Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) was founded by Al-
Turabi while he was controlling the National Islamic Front (NIF) government from 
June 30, 1989 until 1999. AIAI allowed the SIM to spread its influence and ideology 
widely into Somalia. The SIM under Al-Turabi financed, supported, and coordinated 
the AIAI activities in Somalia in the early 1990s. The SIM’s coordination of AIAI was 
evident in 1993, when the SIM carefully planned a massacre of US troops who 
attempted to kidnap one of Aidid’stop aides. Aidid was a powerful warlord in Somalia, 
an important ally to the Sudanese NIF regime. He had allowed radical Islamist groups 
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to attack the UN mission forces in areas in Mogadishu, Somalia that were controlled by 
his forces, and he was wanted by the UN.711 The massacre led US President Clinton to 
discontinue the activities of the US task force in Somalia and withdraw US forces from 
Somalia on March 1, 1994.712Consequently, the Islamic entities, the Somalis, and 
Osama Bin Ladentook the withdrawal of the US troops as proof of their ability to defeat 
the US—the global hegemonic power.713 
Religion is a unifying element in Somalia’s clan-based society, and AIAI turned to it 
as a unifying force.714 It worked independently of clans and sought to cut across clan 
divisions through its military and political organizing by working with local clan 
leaders.715AIAI had tried to impose its ideology in occupied areas of Somalia by setting 
up state-like structures, including Quranic schools and courts to enforce Islamic law in 
a country with rampant lawlessness and random violence.716AIAI represented a more 
radical religious ideology than that of Somali Sufism. 717 Moral rectitude, military 
aggressiveness, and ideological indoctrination emerged as hallmarks of its 
organizational ethos.718 
After the withdrawal of the US forces from Somalia, AIAI turned its ambitions against 
Ethiopia and entered into an alliance with Ethiopian rebel groups, Somali militia 
factions, the Sudan, Al-Qaeda, and eventually Eritrea in its struggle.719The strategic 
objective of the Sudan’s NIF regime coincided with the AIAI’s goal of establishing a 
strong Islamic state in the horn of Africa.720AIAI’sideology also included pan-Somali 
nationalism. AIAI had started its political activities on the basis of a Greater Somali 
Nation, seeking to unite territories in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti inhabited by Somali 
populations into greater Somalia. 721 Near the Ethiopian border, three groups—the 
Beledweyne in the Hiraan region, AIAI with the support of the Sudanese regime, and 
Al-Qaeda—carried out small-scale actions in Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia: the 
Ogaden region by the end of 1993 and the Somali region a year later.722The Ethiopian 
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People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) responded to the AIAI attacks 
invarious ways. One of the approaches was peace talks in 1994 between the Ethiopian 
government, AIAI, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).723 Hostilities 
resumed with the failure of the talks.724 AIAI carried out terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. 
In January 1995 itbombed a hotel in Addis Ababa;in May 1995 it exploded a bomb in 
a busy marketplace in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia’s second largest city, killing 18 people; it 
also bombed hotels in Addis Ababa in January 1996 and in Dire Dawa in February 
1996.725AIAI also carried out assassination attempts against the Ethiopian military-
government officials, such as the head of military operations in the Ethiopian ministry 
of defense and the minister of transport and communication.726 It said it would continue 
targeting senior Ethiopian officials and carrying out guerrilla activities in the Ogaden 
until it became independent from Ethiopia. 727 Consequently, Somalis saw AIAI’s 
military and terrorist actions inside Ethiopia as evidence that AIAI was playing 
Khartoum’s hand and had become a foreign puppet.728 
AIAI suffered losses that resulted in its transformation into the Supreme Council of 
Islamic Courts (SCIC). In August 1996, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in order to destroy 
the military and terrorist capabilities of AIAI.The losses that AIAI forces suffered at 
the hands of the Ethiopian military provoked a strategic shift, whereAIAI executive 
committee member Sheikh Aweys announced in Mogadishu at the beginning of 1997 
that his organization would become an Islamic political party.Aweys asserted that AIAI 
had abandoned its military actions and was seeking to assume power through political 
means, and that it would support any Islamic leader who might undertake to declare 
Somalia an Islamic republic.729 Aweys was a central figure in the establishment of the 
Ifka Halane court, located in western Mogadishu, and another in Merka, the principal 
town in the Lower Shebelle region.730These courts usually resembled less a court than 
an armed camp, brisling with gun-mounted vehicles knows as “technicals”.731In the 
absence of a police force, each court has its own militia, paid by the contributions of 
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the clan’s businessmen.732These courts would later combinewith other similar courtsto 
form the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), which would be used not just to 
govern the country but also to spread radical religious ideology. 
The radical elements within the SCIC caused the intervention inEthiopia. In October 
2000, courts in north and southern Mogadishu banded together to create the Joint 
Islamic Court Council (JICC), with Aweys as secretary general and Sheikh Ali Dhere 
as chairman.733Because of its united command structure, the JICC had the largest 
military force in Somalia, leading many to fear that it intended to impose Islamic rule 
in the country.734 The JICC’s influence extended to the Lower Shabelle region, where 
Aweys and his militia from Ifka Halane court established another court in the town of 
Merka.735 On the contrary, rather than imposing AIAI’s ideology, the court removed 
road blocks, established a central tax system, and made no attempt to impose an AIAI 
mayor for the town or a regional governor for Lower Shebelle.736 Importantly, the 
Islamic laws that were applied in the courts were not overly strict, and the courts 
usuallyguaranteed the security of humanitarian workersand aid personnel from the UN 
and Western NGOs. This cooperative behavior stemmed from the fact that the courts 
were financed by the same Mogadishu business traders who were trying to reduce the 
risk to their trading activities and investments by incarcerating a large number of 
uncontrolled militia and pacifying the region.737Those traders also funded the Atra-
based Somali Transitional National Government (STNG) that appeared in 2000, which 
explained why the JICC was willing to work with the secular STNG.738 Specifically, 
the JICC cooperated with the STNG when their demand to be given the Ministry of 
Justice portfolio of the STNG was declined, and their militias were integrated into the 
STNG’s police force;739when the court qadis were working under the Ministry of 
Justice, only a few courts did not integrate with the STNG.740With the STNG not able 
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to establish a functioning administration (and its mandate expiring in 2003), and not 
being relevant in southern Somalia, the Islamic courts experienced a revival, and 
formed the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) in 2004.741Aweys was the vice 
chairman of the grouping, while Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a Sufi adherent who had 
helpedestablish a court in Jowharwas the chairman. 742 In 2005, 11 courts were 
established in Mogadishu.743Some of them were closely linked to Aweys’ brand of 
radicalism while others had a more traditional character.744 
The SCIC had a militia of 400 at its disposal, and its units differed greatly from other 
militias in terms of clan diversity and militaryprofessionalism.Theydelivered 
impressive military results.745Although the SCIC were well received by the population, 
other Islamists movements such as the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) 
rejected them, and the general mood in Mogadishu was not supportive of the movement 
and its activities,746 especially those in the STNG and US allies who cooperated with 
the US in anti-terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa, who perceived the SCIC as a 
platform for radical Islamists to take power in Somalia.747By 2004, the SCIC started 
impose its ideology, allying itself with enemy factions and other Islamists against 
STNG president Yousef, who wanted to get Ethiopian troops into Somalia. In 
December 2004, they led a mass protest against the president in Mogadishu.748 One 
faction within the SCIC began to adopt radical views, which cannot be attributed to 
Aweys’s influence alone.For example, the SCIC’s judgment concerning theNew Year’s 
celebration was that it was punishable by death, and one year later militias from several 
courts shut down cinemas, accusing them of showing immoral Western and Indian 
movies.749 In 2004 and 2005, the radical Salafist militia of Al-Shabab, led by Adan 
Hashi Ayro of the SCIC, was engaged in a dirty war against Somalis suspected of 
collaborating with the STNG, Ethiopia, and/or the US in counterterrorism 
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operations.For example, Al-Shabab was responsible for three or four assassination 
attempts on Prime Minister Ghedi and President Yousef.750 
The SCIC’s power started to increase tremendously, especially after it defeated the US 
Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in June 2006.751 
With their victory over the alliance, the SCIC started to adopt state-like structures by 
removing road blocks, clearing the streets in Mogadishu, reopening the airport and 
seaport in Mogadishu, and establishing special courts to deal with the restitution of 
property.752Similarly, they declared their goal was to install a new government, through 
the application of sharia law, and their rhetoric became more militant, including attacks 
on the STNG, which was based in Baidoa, Somalia.753The SCIC’s expanding influence 
was not without external support. A UN monitoring group reported in 2006 that the 
Sudan was one of the countries that provided the SCIC with arms, funds, and technical 
support.754 
As a result of Aweyss’ leadership within the SCIC, its expanding influence over 
Somalia was subdued by the Ethiopian intervention in that country in July2006. After 
the SCIC captured Mogadishu and while it was expanding its influence in the rest of 
the country, it formed institutions to govern the country and their own movements. In 
June 2006, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was the chairman of the executive council.755 The 93-
member Shura body that approved the decisions of the executive council was chaired 
by Aweys.756The radical’ssource of power within the SCIC was Al-Shabab, which was 
a militia of young Somalis trained and indoctrinated by Ayro with the help of foreign 
fighters.757 Aweys had been a mentor to Ayro and other radicals.758Aweys was very 
militant in his criticism of Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, especially after capturing 
Mogadishu.759 
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Fearing the implications of the SCIC expanding influence in Somalia, and possibly 
outside the Somalia, in 2006 Ethopia sent forces in to Somalia and defeated the SCIC.760 
Ethiopia allowed members of the defeated SCIC to head the new Somali government 
because of strategic considerations. The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was 
economically costly, beyond Ethiopia’s means. It was also politically costly, since 
Ethiopia is equally divided along religious lines between Muslims and Christians. The 
regime also faced many challenges from the civil society, especially from the Ogaden 
region, where the ONLF attacked Ethiopian targets.761 The United Nations, the Arab 
League, and the African Union all called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces.762By 
the end of December 2006, the SCIC was defeated by STNG–Ethiopian forces. This 
defeat caused internal splits within the SCIC, where the Al-Shabab group, already a 
radical militia,became an independent radical Islamist movement. Also the defeat of 
the SCIC forced its leadership into exile. 
In September 2007, Somalis from the diaspora, civil society, oppositional groups, and 
former members of parliament met in Eritrea and formed the Alliance for the Re-
liberation of Somalia (ARS). Although it was inclusive of people from different regions 
and clans,763  it also included Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as its chairman.In 
January 2008 the ARS, under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, informed a US 
congressional delegation that it would accept a humanitarian cease-fire, zones of 
tranquility, and negotiations with the SNTG and other stakeholders once Ethiopian 
forces were replaced by a neutral force.The proposal was not accepted by Aweys and 
other radicals within the ARS, which split the ARS into two competing factions.764 
Sharif Ahmed led his ARS faction to Djibouti's reconciliation process between the May 
31 and June 9, 2008. The Djibouti Agreement was signed by both ARS and STNG 
leaderships. Months afterwards, the more inclusive Somali parliament elected Sharif 
Ahmed as the president of Somalia. This was coupled with the parliament allocating 
200 seats for ARS members in order to address the religious dimension of the 
conflict.765The inclusion of Sherif Ahmed as president seemed a way to delegitimize 
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Al-Shabab.766Ethiopia began its phased withdrawal in December 2008 and completed 
it by early February 2009.767Ethiopia had accepted the new government headed by 
Sherif Ahmed, because it felt that it had fractured theSCIC and allowed what is believed 
to be its moderate faction to be part of the Somali governing system, thereby 
neutralizing the influence of Aweys and his radicals from having power-capacity 
influence in Somalia and in the Ethiopian regions inhabited by people of Somali decent.  
As a by-product of power relations within the post-Turabi regime, Al-Bashir supported 
radical Somali Islamists from the SCIC who became part of the Somali government. 
Also, Al-Bashir had supported a radical wing of the Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) 
that gained power in the subsequent Somali government.The Sudan had tried to support 
the SCIC before the Ethiopian intervention. At a press conference on December 8, 
2005, at a press conference, Al-Bashir said he was against any intervention in Somalia, 
and he considered any plots against the SCIC as an attack against Islam and Islamic 
countries in the region.768Likewise, the Sudan tried to aid the SCIC in maintaining their 
influence in Somalia by mediating between them and STNG. After the SCIC victory 
over the US-allied warlords of the ARPCT in June 2006, the Sudan intervened to 
provide mediation to ensure that the SCIC would remain in control over Somalia. On 
June 22, 2006, shortly after the SCIC defeated the APRCT, the Sudan invited both the 
SCIC and the STNG for mediation talks to prevent a confrontation between them.769The 
Sudan’s Islamist credentials and its warm relations with Ethiopia gave it credibility as 
a mediator.Importantly, the Sudan had relations with AIAI in the 1990s, and that gave 
the Sudan a degree of access to the radical Islamists within the SCIC.770 Before the 
SCIC victory in June 2006, the African Union authorized the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) to send a 7,500-man mission to Somalia to helpthe 
STNG to gain a foothold when it relocated from Nairobi to Somalia.771The mission was 
composed of troops from Uganda, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
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Djibouti.However, in January 2007, after the Ethiopian intervention defeated the SCIC, 
the Sudan declined to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and Ali Karti, 
the Sudanese foreign minister, asserted that any foreign forces deployed in Somalia 
would be targeted by the Somali Islamist militia.772 Previously theSudan had supported 
the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia after Ethiopia defeated the SCIC. The Sudan’s 
reluctance to physically intervene in Somalia showed that it did not want to fight against 
the radical Islamists there. 
The Sudan tried to reconcile the Somali Islamist factions. In April 2009, the Sudan tried 
to use its good relations with Somali hard-liner groups, such as Aweys’s group, to 
convince them to end the war against the new Somali government headed bySheikh 
Sharif Ahmed.773In mid-August 2010, the Sudan reactivated its efforts to reconcile the 
factions. The Somali president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, thanked the Sudan for its 
supportive stance and asserted his government's determination to end the Somali crisis 
through peaceful meansand to restore the authority of the state.774Both reconciliation 
efforts failed to reunite the two Islamists factions.775Nevertheless, in April 2009, the 
Somali Parliament endorsed the implementation of sharia law in the 
country.776Although the Sudan failed to unify the two groups, the Sudanese government 
was satisfied with the inclusion of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as head of the Somali 
government and the Somali parliament’s endorsement of the sharia law in Somalia. 
These two developments were good for Al-Bashir, who was continuing to support the 
“civilization project” in Somalia as a by-product of power relations within the post-Al-
Turabi regime. 777 Therefore, the Sudan started to provide support for the Somali 
government.In early august 2011, Al-Bashir told his Somali counterpart that the Sudan 
would provide substantial aid to Somalia as it suffered from droughts and 
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famine.778Hence, the Sudan pledged three million US dollars in aid.779This came at a 
time when the Sudan was experiencing internal strife in the regions of Blue Nile, 
Darfur, and Southern Kordofan that had caused mass displacements and a great need 
for humanitarian aid in those regions. 
Another Islamist movement that had been imposing its influence in Somalia is the 
Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB). Like other Islamist movements, it appeared 
and expanded in Somalia as a result of radicalization that was attributed to Siad Barre’s 
secular policies, the defeat of Somalia in the Somali–Ethiopian war, and the mass 
emigration of Somalis. The SIMB was founded in 1978 by diaspora university students 
in Saudi Arabia. Its founders were members of the non-Somali student Muslim 
brotherhoods. One leader was a member of the student Muslim brotherhood in Saudi 
Arabia while he was studying there; three others were members of student organizations 
affiliated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM).780The SIMB’s uniqueness is that 
it has a direct connection with the parent Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB).781 This 
might be why it refused to join Al-Turabi’s attempt to create a pan-Islamic organization 
in Africa.782As the Siad Barre regime focused on the emerging armed oppositions, it 
reduced its targeting and surveillance against the SIMB, allowing it to expand its 
influence between 1987 and 1991.783After the collapse of the state the SIMB was 
engaged in charity works and reconciliation within Somali communities, and it 
organized and took part in regional and international reconciliation efforts to aid in 
rebuilding the Somali state. 784 Research has shown that the group takes a pacifist 
approach in presenting its ideology to Somali society.785Nevertheless, defectors 
from the SIMB had joined radical Islamist movements to impose the 
ideology. First, defectors from the SIMB joined radical Islamist movements to impose 
their ideology. These includedSheikh Ali Warsame, who joined AIAI,786 and Muhamed 
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Ali Ibrahim, who was the head of the SIMB until 1999. (He was removed from this 
position in favor of Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, but the change was made public after he 
appeared as head of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) delegation during 
the 2006 Khartoum negotiations between the SCIC and the STNG.787 Second, while the 
SIMB leadership condemned the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 and advocated 
pacifism and reconciliation, its radical members wanted to sanction an insurgency 
against Ethiopian forces.788 Furthermore, with SCIC’s rising influence in Somalia, the 
SIMB had distanced itself from the SCIC and prohibited members from joining it, 
because it used violence against Somalis. Still, some members of the SIMB had joined 
the SCIC, causing their membership in the SIMB to be revoked.789 Third, as leaders 
and members of the SIMBjoined the SCIC, they were also part of Sherif Ahmed’s 
faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), whichlater became part 
of the new Somali government.790The former members of the SIMB who became part 
of the SCIC and later the ARS played a crucial role in the legislation to make the sharia 
the basis for Somali law, which previously had been the aim of the SIMB.791Fourth, 
oddly, during the factional struggle within the SIMB,its radical wing managed to 
become part of a recognized government. On September 10, 2012, Hassan Sheikh 
Mahmoud, the chairman of the Somali Peace and Development Party (PDP), was 
elected as the new president of Somalia. The PDP’s membership consists for the most 
part of past and present SIMB members.792Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud seems to be 
influenced by advisers from the DamulJadid (New Blood), a group who defected from 
the SIMB because of its pacifism and joined the SCIC in 2006.793 BothAbdikarim 
Hussein Guledand Omar Sheikh Ali of that group were members of Sherif Ahmed’s 
faction of the ARS.794Importantly, DamulJadid’s ideological base is not far removed 
from Al-Shabab, but they consider themselves moderates because they refuse armed 
 
787لاموصلا يف حلاصلإا ةكرح, “Press Release,” last modified June 21, 2006, http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan21-6-06.htm 
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action. 795  Although SIMB advocated and still advocates pacifism in spreading its 
ideology, its leadership and membership defections to radical Islamist movements and 
its factionalismallowed it to continue to have the capacity to impose its religious 
ideology. 
The Sudan provided support to the Somali government of Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud 
and his allies in the SIMB because both regimes came out of movements who that 
imposed their ideology on their respective societies. Like previous Sudanese support 
for radical Islamist movements in Somalia, the support for the SIMB faction in power 
accommodated the power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime.  
After the elections of the new Somali government, the role of the Sudanese 
International University of Africa in radicalizing its Muslim students became clear. The 
university provided scholarships to Somali students to help Al-Bashir maintain his hold 
on the post-Turabi regime. According to an article published online on October 22, 
2012, the university provided for 325 Somalis coming from all regions of Somalia,as 
well as from regions in neighboring countries inhabited by ethnic Somalis, such as 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.796The same article states that more than 2,000 Somali 
students pursued studies at that university and that most of them had scholarships.797  
When the National Islamic Front(NIF)regime took power as a part of Al-Turabi’s 
agenda, it was used to help spread his influence in Africa. The university continued to 
be used in this way after the palace coup of 1999. In January 2014,in the presence of a 
large group of scholars from the Sudan and abroad, Al-Bashir asserted that western 
colonization had sought to eliminate Islam in Africa and to limit education to Christian 
missions.798In a meeting with its board of trustees, Al-Bashir pointed out the role of the 
institution in educating Muslims in Africa, saying that education is a main tool for 
advancing Islam and empowering Muslims, and he praised the roles played by its 
students all over the world. 799  Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, the chairman of the 
institution’s board of trustees,stated that the board wished to enhance the role of the 
 
795 Ibid. Their reason for refusing armed action seems to be either from experience, after they joined the SCIC and lost against the 
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university domestically and regionally, announcing that several new facilities would be 
opened.He also expressed a commitment to modernize the university, to provide 
funding for its projects, and to provide sponsorship for needy students.800 
The Sudan provided support for the SIMB faction in power to rule Somalia. On May 9, 
2013, in a London conference on Somalia, Ali Karti, the Sudanese foreign affairs 
minister, pledged that the Sudan would send one million euros in support of Somalia.801 
The offer came at a time when theSudan was facing internal civil wars and strife in both 
Darfur and its new southern frontiers, including mass displacements, hunger, and other 
atrocities.Karti also stated that the Sudan would continue to extend support to Somali 
by providing more than 10,000 scholarships for Somalis.802 Furthermore,the Sudan 
would continue to provide training opportunities for the Somali police and the Somali 
National Armed Forces (SNAF),as well as assistance in health and other fields.803 
It seems clear that the Sudan took an active role in building the Somali military capacity. 
On May 23, 2013, Al-Bashir held talks with a Somali delegation headed by the Somali 
defense minister Abdihakin Hajji Mahmud Fiqi, in which Al-Bashir pledged to support 
the Somali government. 804  During the meeting, an agreement was signed in the 
presence of Abdihakim Fiqi and the Sudanese minister of defense, Abdel Rahim, stating 
that the Sudan would help to strengthen the SNAF.805 This agreement followed an 
earlier initiative by the Sudan to help Somalia’s radical Islamists develop a strong 
SNAF to secure their governance of Somalia. In November 2011, when PresidentSharif 
Sheikh Ahmed met with Al-Bashir, Al-Bashir called for the building of a strong SNAF 
capable of protecting the security and sovereignty of the state and expanding stability 
in the country.806 A strong army will help the radical Islamists and the SIMB faction to 
maintain their hold on power and to impose their religious ideology on the Somali state. 
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All of this support for the radical faction of the SIMB was mentioned in Al-Bashir’s 
Independence Day inauguration speech for the celebration of the new Ed-Dmazin dam. 
Al-Bashir used the occasion to highlight the achievement of the regime in building the 
dam, and outlined the positive country’s relations with neighboring countries such as 
Chad, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya.807He also stressed that the 
regime wanted peace.808Attending these celebrations was the Somali president Hassan 
Sheikh Mahmoud in his first visit to the Sudan. Al-Bashir’s speech confirmed to 
HassanMahmoud, in front of a large audience, that the Sudan was willing to help him 
make Somalia strong and united again.809 
All Roads Lead to Khartoum: The Clash of Islamists 
The post-Al-Turabi government’s continued support for radical Islamist movements in 
both Eritrea and Somalia was a by-product of power relations within theSudanese 
regime.The clash of the Islamist power centers within theregime was a result of the 
competing interests of Islamist individuals. However, their expansionist “civilization 
project,” inherited from Al-Turabi’s regime, had important value to their self-
legitimation. Therefore, Al-Bashir and his allies used the Sudan’s support for the radical 
Islamists in East Africa to maintain his hold on the regime. They did, however, remove 
certain competing personalities when the internal factionalism got out in the open and 
began to threaten Al-Bashir’s power. At that point it was clear that the Sudan’s support 
for the radical Islamist movements had exhausted its purpose in securing Al-Bashir’s 
authority over the competing factions within the regime and the country. 
With the removal of Al-Turabi ashead of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) and 
from its governing organ,the National Congress Party (NCP), his old associates who 
became the elites of the state competed for power to head the SIM,which became 
subordinated to the NCP. That is because a leading position, such as secretary general, 
within the SIM constituted an opportunity for ideological influence for the leaders and 
followers of the different Islamist factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime. Ghazi Atabani, 
one of the signatories of the “memorandum of ten” document, realized later how that 
document had replaced Al-Turabi’s totalitarianism with a military one. Therefore, he 
 
807لماك ليجست صريصورلا نازخ ةيلعت حاتتفا," Web, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmXzLRWkERw. 
808"لماك ليجست صريصورلا نازخ ةيلعت حاتتفا," Web, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmXzLRWkERw. 
809 Ibid. 
118 
 
wanted to reunite the SIM.810 Along with him, there were others who shared the same 
view of needing to unite the SIM; consequently, they formeda reform movement within 
the NCP.811Atabani was not comfortable with the military controlling the NCP, or with 
the factionalism within the NCP.812  And he was especially not pleased with Vice 
President Ali Osman Taha, who was running things as he saw fit.813Atabani wanted to 
head the NCP instead of Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir, who Atabani believed was not fit 
for the job, and because his ambition to obtain that post was supported by individuals 
within the movement.814In April 2004, there was a conference in Khartoum for the SIM 
to elect a new sectary general to replace Al-Tahir. Both Atabani and Taha were 
candidates.815Taha, who had conspired with Al-Bashir inthe palace coup; wanted to 
subordinate the SIM to the NCP. On the other hand, Atabani, who was removed from 
his job as presidential advisor for communicating with Al-Turabi in an effort to 
reconcile the two SIM factions, was supported by his reformist movement to strengthen 
the SIM if he was elected secretary general.816Nevertheless, Taha was elected as the 
new secretary general of the SIM, as he had more powerful support.817When Atabani 
applied again for the position during the SIM’s eighth conference, held November 14–
17, 2012, he failed again to win it.Before leaving his position of secretary general of 
the SIM, Taha outmaneuvered Atabani by changing and passing amendments before 
the conference, and establishing a supreme council within the SIM that was chaired by 
Al-Bashir and consisted of his deputies. 818 Atabani was disappointed that these 
unelected members of the SIM had direct power over it.819The secretary general of the 
SIM would be subordinated to the supreme council and the regime, unable to take any 
initiative without the approval of the higher leadership barred from the Shura council.820 
Dismayed, Atabani, who was the head of the NCP parliamentary block in the Sudan at 
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the time, withdrew his candidacy for secretary general of the SIM.821Al-Zubair Ahmad 
Al-Hassan, former finance and economy minister, was elected to the position,822 and 
Mahdi Ibrahim was made chairman of its Shura council.823 Atabani was blocked by 
civilian Islamists for the position of head of the SIM,and consequently was unable to 
pass the reforms he had planned.  
There was a power struggle between the civilian and security leaders of the regime, in 
which the security faction, which was connected to the president, got the upper hand 
but was removed later. Taha and his allies, Awad Al-Jaz, the minister of petroleum 
production, and Ali Karti, the minister of foreign affairs, constituted the core group of 
a new class that held power in the Sudan through their control of finance, the security 
apparatus, the army, and the militia.824The other group consisted of Al-Bashir, his 
relatives, and the auxiliary team that included Nafie Ali Nafie, Qutbi Al-Mahdi, Amin 
Hassan Omar, and other members of the deep state.825 Previously, Al-Bashir and Al-
Turabi never met without the presenceof Taha and his team, whoalways filtered the 
reports that would reach the two leaders.826When Taha returned to the Sudan after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), he found a new team of 
Islamists, including Salah Gosh, who was the head of the National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS), Osama, Abdallah and Kamal Abdullatif.These men became 
closer to the president, who in turn began to appreciate their views.827Nafie took 
advantage of the 16-month absence of Taha to establish direct communication and a 
closer relationship with Al-Bashir.828With the death of John Garang, the leader of the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), who was Taha’sCPA 
negotiation partner in 2005, Taha lost considerable authority and his policies of 
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concessions in the peace process to normalize relations with the US did not bear fruit.829 
He was therefore attackedby the regime hardliners led by Nafie, who asserted that Vice 
President Taha had given many concessions to the SPLM/A when finalizing the CPA 
at Naivashaand was naïve enoughto believe US promises.830 There were many rumors 
surrounding Taha, casting suspicions on his ambitions behind the Naivasha agreement, 
and they led to the deterioration of his relationship with Al-Bashir.831In 2009 Salah 
Gosh was removed as head of the NISS and replaced by his vice-head Mohammed Atta 
Al-Moua.832 There were speculations that Gosh was suspected of plotting against Al-
Bashir.833 He was appointed as presidential adviser on security affairs, but in 2011 he 
was removed from that position,834because he clashed with Nafie, who was the vice 
chairman of the NCP and a senior aid to Al-Bashir.835 Nafie accused Gosh of plotting 
behind the president’s back and bypassing the NCP by approaching two large 
opposition parties without the knowledge of Al-Bashir and the party; Gosh claimed he 
had informed the president.836 Al-Bashir decided to side with Nafie and sacked Gosh, 
weakening the position of Taha, who was a rival to Nafie and his followers in the 
regime.837 Subsequently, the influence of Taha and his group inside the regime was 
reduced by the rising influence of Nafie and his group. 
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) faced 
internal divisions because of the leadership of the defense minister and because of 
regime involvement inside the military. On January 29, 2012, an article appeared in the 
Sudan Tribune,reporting that a group of 700 military officers from the SAF hadsent 
both Al-Bashir and Minister of Defense Abdel Rahim Hussein a memo listing demands 
for political and military reforms.838In the memo, the officers called on both Al-Bashir 
and Hussein to urgently address the challenges faced by the SAF, emphasizing that the 
SAF had been unable to defeat the rebels in the border regions of the Blue Nile and 
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southern Kordofan states.839Likewise, the officers underlined the urgent need to combat 
rampant corruption within the SAF. As an example of the corruption, they mentioned 
a purchase of 200 tanks from the Ukraine in 2010, most of which were defective.840The 
officers claimed that most of the military officials who objected to buying the tanks 
were sacked by the minister of defense. 841They called urgently for the separation 
between the SAF and the NCP, stressing that the army should not protect the regime 
from its mistakes and become involved in Sudanese politics. They demanded 
governmental reform, as the status quo was a risk to the security of the country.842This 
occurred in the same month when Ghazi Atabani, in his capacity as leader of the NCP 
parliamentary block, was also calling for reforms.843The group of military reformers 
was named Al-Saihun, led by Brigadier General MohammedIbrahim Abdel Galil, also 
known as “Wad Ibrahim.”844 The group is afaction within the military associated with 
the NCP, based on a core of military officers and paramilitary jihadists embittered by 
the loss of South Sudan after a long and difficult civil war.845 This group, along with 
Al-Turabi’s party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), had supported Atabani’s bid 
for secretary general of the SIM in the eighth conference, and were disappointed that 
the SIM fell under the control of the regime leaders.846 After the conference the group 
called for the dismissal of Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Hussein, citing his disputes 
with senior officers (some ending with dismissals), his failure to respond to attacks 
from Israel, and the inability to provide Sudanese forces and its paramilitaries with 
means to end the rebellions in the Sudan.847Later, in November 2012, the group was 
implicated in a coup attempt and its leaders were arrested. A memofrom its members 
who were not arrested asked Al-Bashir to release them and stated the reasons for their 
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involvement, pointing that Abdel Rahim Hussein’s leadership in the SAF had pushed 
them to that course of action.848 
These factional struggles came out in the open during the 2012 revolts in the Sudan that 
were led by youth movements. The regime claimed it had discovered a military coup 
attempt on November 23, 2012 and had foiled it. On that day, the authorities arrested a 
number of individuals from the SAF, the PDF, the NISS, and the NCP.849 Those who 
were arrested and suspected of involvement included Salah Gosh, Wad Ibrahim, Major 
General Adil Al-Tayeb from the NISS, and Ghazi Atabani.850 Apparently, both Taha 
and Nafie have benefited from this situation. Taha claimed that the plotters should face 
prosecution and there should be no special treatment.851Nafie was firm in stating that 
the suspects should face trial, asserting that some of them had been detained in the past 
on similar charges.852In September 2013, there was a mass riot in the Sudan as a result 
of the government decision to lift subsidies. The regime responded to these riots by 
using its security forces to detain, attack, and kill rioters.853 In response, a memo signed 
by 31 NCP officials and their supporters, including Ghazi Atabani,Wad Ibrahim, and 
Hassan Osman Rizk, was sent to Al-Bashir,indicating the need for reform, stressing the 
need to reinstitute the subsidies, and stating that the legitimacy of his rule had never 
been so strongly questioned before.854 As a result, the NCP dismissed Ghazi Atabani 
and those with him from the party. They formed a new Islamist party called the Reform 
Now Party (RNP).855 
Because Al-Bashir could no longer manage the factionalism within the regime, and 
because the revolts in the Sudanwere challenging his rule, he carried out a reshuffle in 
both the government and the regime. The changes gave Al-Bashir and his military allies 
the opportunity they needed to gain more power in the regime, by reducing the influence 
of the security and civilian Islamist factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime. Bakri Hassan 
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Salah,Al-Bashir’s long-time ally, was made vice president. Abdel Rahim Hussein was 
kept as minister of defense even though he was not well liked within the party or the 
SAF. Anew position of state minister of the Ministry of Defense was created and given 
to a popular military officer, Yahya Mohamed Kheir, whose family has close ties to Al-
Bashir’s late friend, vice president Al-Zubair Muhammed Salih. Salah Wansi, who hails 
from the state security sector and is an ally of Al-Bashir, became minister of presidential 
affairs.856 Ali Karti kept his position as minister of foreign affairs. Nafie was replaced 
by Ibrahim Ghandour as adviser and vice chairman of the party. Awad Al-Jaz, who has 
served in many government posts since 1989, had stepped down.857 Subsequently, Al-
Bashir increased his power even further by giving more power to the military in the 
government, as he appointed a military figure to head the Ministry of Interior. In late 
June 2014, Al-Bashir made another, smaller reshuffle in the government.858 The most 
important appointment was the selection of former SAF chief of staff Colonel General 
Esmat Abdel-Rahman as minister of interior.859 Al-Bashir’s rule was now more secure 
than ever, as he had given himself and his military allies more power than ever before. 
Conclusion 
With the removal of Al-Turabi from state power, power relations became more 
important in governing the Sudan, because the people who sided with Al-Bashir’s 
military faction in the palace coup of 1999, took up important and sensitive positions 
in the post-Al-Turabi regime. The competing elites had formed their own factions, in 
the hope of expanding their influence and power at the expense of each other. As this 
chapter has shown, this competition was threatening to Al-Bashir’s power and would 
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have endedwith his removalas had happened to Al-Turabi before. However, realizing 
that those competing factions were still attached to their radical expansionist ideology, 
Al-Bashir continued the Sudan’s support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea 
and Somalia, where Al-Turabi had initiated the expansionist project. Interestingly, the 
Sudan continued to support the same radical Islamist movements that Al-Turabi had 
previously supported even when those movements were fractured or transformed into 
other movements. In the case of the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB), the 
Sudan supported its radical wing, which managed to attain regional and international 
state power as it infiltrated the executive office of the government to impose its radical 
Islamist ideology. That infiltration into the recognized government guaranteed that no 
regional power in Africa,such as Ethiopia, would ever intervene in Somalia to remove 
it,as it did with the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) in 2006. It is clear that 
many members of the post-Al-Turabi regime were involved in recycling radical 
Islamism in East Africa,just as they had previously been involved with Al-Turabi in 
expanding the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) ideology into East Africa. 
The factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime had been brewing since the 1999 
palace coup. It eventually came out into the open.Dissidents within the regime formed 
a competing radical Islamist party, senior leaders clashed with each other for influence 
over Al-Bashir, and military and militant Islamists within the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) allied with the dissident party were implicated in a coup attempt in 2012. The 
revolts in the Sudan, led by the youth calling for regime change, put additional pressure 
on Al-Bashir, as the revolts indicated that there were competing powers within the 
regime who could remove him. Since the recycling of radical Islamism was no longer 
enough to assure Al-Bashir’s control over the competing factions, he did a government 
and regime reshuffle, giving more power to himself by placing his military allies in 
sensitive positions, thereby reducing the powers of both the civilian and security 
Islamist factions. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This study has attempted to analyze the Sudan’s role in security in East Africa, using 
Michel Foucault’s conception of power to describe how the Sudan’s continued support 
for radical Islamist movements is a by-product of internal power relations within the 
post-Al-Turabi regime.  
The conceptual framework clarifies and illustrates the significance of this study. The 
study examines the internal dynamics of the factional politics that have influenced the 
post-Al-Turabi regime and its foreign policy in East Africa. Previous researchers seem 
to have disregarded the importance of this factionalism in understanding the regime’s 
continued support for radical Islamist movements after the palace coup of 1999, after 
ending the Sudanese second civil war, and while aiding the US in counterterrorism 
operations. The study gives considerable attention to ideology of a regime that supports 
like-minded radical religious movements in East Africa, compared to the usual studies 
on proxy wars in Africa that disregard the role of ideology in a state supporting non-
state actors and that rationalize proxy agent–state relationships through cost-benefit 
analysis. Foucault’s approach allows this study to analyze the historical context that 
caused the development of the SIM and similar radical movements in Somalia and 
Eritrea. 
While researching the Sudan’s role in African regional security, this study unearthed 
some interesting details. First, like the Sudan, colonial powers had used local elites to 
maintain their rule in Somalia and Eritrea (before Eritrea became part of Ethiopia). 
However, there are some differences between the two countries. In both Eritrea,and 
Somalia Sufi orders were used by the colonial powers to maintain their rule. In Somalia, 
although Sufism was influential, the colonial powers relied on tribal and clan elites to 
maintain their hegemony. Second, while Sufism was predominant in all three countries, 
radical religious flourished greatly in those countries since in the 1970s. In the Sudan, 
Al-Nimeiry’s regime sought to legitimize itself by imposing Islam as a state ideology. 
In Somalia, after the Siad Barre regime lost the Somali–Ethiopian war, it became very 
repressive, which allowed religious radicalism to spread further. In Eritrea, religion and 
ethnicity played a large role; after its annexation by Ethiopia, resistance became 
radicalized through religion. Third, a common trend that was found during this study 
was that the radical religious groups such as the SIM, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad 
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Movement (EIJM), Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), and the Somali Islax Muslim 
Brotherhood (SIMB) fractured into competing groups, renaming themselves or forming 
political parties and civil societies connected to them while still retaining the main 
ideology. Therefore, on the basis of this study it could be asserted that factionalism 
appeared within those movements not because of minor ideological differences, but 
because of factions competing for power to rule within those movements. 
Sufism has had great influence in the Sudan, especially after it became centralized 
around Sufi orders and the families of the leaders of those orders. The Turkish–Ottoman 
invasion into Bilad Al-Sudan created the modern Sudan as a geographic expression. 
The new rulers wanted to impose an orthodox version of Islam. This led to the rise of 
Mahdism, which was supported by a number of Sufi orders, except Al- Khatmiyya and 
a few others. After the defeat of Mahdism in the Sudan by the British forces, the British 
colonial authorities finally understood the importance of Sufism, and managed to use 
the two Sufi orders of Al-Mahdiyya and Al-Khatmiyya as their agents to rule the Sudan. 
With British support for those two Sufi orders, Sufism in the Sudan became politicized, 
and that politicization of religion was used as a capacity of political domination over 
the entire society. It became clear that any nationalist leader who wanted to push his 
own agenda had to have the support of one of the Sufi orders to attain political power 
in the Sudan.  
With religion being politicized and the Sudan being so close to Egypt, another group 
developed in the Sudan, wanting to impose its radical non-Sufi religious ideology on 
the Sudanese society. That group was the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM), a branch 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. At first the SIM sought to attain its goal by 
pressuring the Sufi establishment to work with it. It eventually formed its own political 
party, the Islamic Charter Front. In the late 1960s, the SIM had the capacity to impose 
its radical ideology on Sudanese society, as it was supported by its ally Al-Sadiq Al-
Mahdi, a leader of the Umma party and the Mahdiyya order, who became the Sudanese 
prime minister in the mid- 1960s. Al-Nimeiry’s coup in 1969 halted their progress 
temporarily. However, after the reconciliation agreement among the religious orders, 
the SIM, and Al-Nimeiry, the SIM infiltrated every state institution, increased their 
numbers within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), created satellite organizations, and 
used Al-Nimeiry’s wave of politicized Islam as a state ideology, all of which them 
power as a capacity to impose their religious ideology. The Sudanese intifada of 1985 
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stopped them short of a total victory, so they began working again with Al-Mahdi. 
However, once they were forced out of state power by the factionalized Sufi 
establishment and other political elites, the SIM decided not to share power any more. 
Instead, it used its military members within the SAF to carry out the military coup of 
June 30, 1989. 
After capturing state power, the SIM was imposing its religious ideology from above 
on the entire Sudanese society. They used the state to remove the influence of the old 
Sufi establishment and the leftist movements; the latter were among the SIM’s main 
concerns, as they were well organized. The SIM purged from the state institutions, the 
SAF, law enforcement, and civil societies everyone who was not a member of the SIM 
or who disliked the SIM. It used its NGOs and its Islamic banks, and set up its own 
paramilitary organizations, such as the Popular Defense Forces, to protect the regime 
from any future coups and to impose jihadism in south Sudan. 
Secure in the Sudan, the SIM went on to impose its ideology in other countries such as 
Somalia and Eritrea. Both of these countries had radical Islamists similar to the SIM, 
who needed support in order to succeed. Both countries faced peculiar situations that 
the SIM wanted to capitalize on: in Somalia, the collapse of the state, and in Eritrea, 
competing factions who wanted to form a new state shaped by their own ideologies. 
The SIM had supported those likeminded radical Islamists by coordinating with them, 
by using its own NGOs and civil society organizations to aid them, and by allowing the 
Sudan to shelter them and send them weapons and other types of material support. 
Eventually, however, the SIM became factionalized, and Al-Bashir, backed by the 
power of the military, removed Al-Turabi from state power. Al-Bashir’s power within 
the military signifant that made most of the SIM members abandoned their leader Al-
Turabi to join in the palace coup of 1999.  
After the coup, the second Islamist republic was formed by the SIM members who had 
taken part in the coup, and who had attained sensitive civilian, military, and security 
positions. Nonetheless, even though Al-Bashir had the military power as a capacity to 
removal Al-Turabi from power, he still needed the SIM members to govern the Sudan. 
This is where power relations necessarily played a role in guiding Al-Bashir’s hand in 
the Sudan’s foreign policy. Radical Islamism in neighboring countries continued to be 
supported because the post-Al-Turabi regime is composed of competing factions who 
128 
 
are still interested in supporting radical Islamism, and who have the ability to remove 
Al-Bashir from power just as he removed Al-Turabi. In order to control those factions 
and continue to rule the Sudan, Al-Bashir continued the Sudan’s support for radical 
Islamists in East Africa, to show that he had not abandoned their “civilization project.” 
That tactic is based on understanding the value of the radical expansionist project to 
each of those factions: all of them were involved in that project with Al-Turabi, and it 
is important to their self-legitimization as part of the regime. Interestingly, Al-Bashir 
had provided support for the same radical Islamists Al-Turabi had provided before. 
Furthermore, the Sudan’s support for the SIMB could be viewed as a winning situation 
for Al-Bashir: since one of the SIMB factions had found a place within recognized state 
power, he will not be attacked by outside powers for supporting them. At the same time, 
he can use that support to control the factions within his own regime by showing that 
the project is still continuing without Al-Turabi. As has always been true historically in 
the Sudan, religion as an ideology is important for the existence of Al-Bashir’s 
leadership. 
It seems that Al-Bashir was working with the regimes’security faction, composed of 
security members and a few senior party bureaucrats in guiding the Sudan’s foreign 
policy.  
The last chapter of the study describes the way where one faction left the regime and 
formed its own party with the same politicized religious ideology as the SIM, when 
powerful competing leaders within the regime were close to removing Al-Bashir power. 
Therefore, Al-Bashir took advantage of the revolts within the country and within the 
regime to secure his power by appointing a cabinet composed of military men and a 
few security men, the only ones whom he trusts to secure his rule over the Sudan. This 
situation showed that the recycling of the “civilization project” of radical Islamism had 
outgrown its usefulness, and that Al-Bashir and his allies within the post-Al-Turabi 
regime would need a different policy to retain control of the remaining factions within 
the regime.  
Studying the Sudan’s support for radical Islamists movements in East Africa as a by-
product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime leads to the conclusion 
that unless there is internal stability within the regime, the Sudan’s support for radical 
Islamist movements will continue. The corollary is that if regional and international 
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powers want to achieve stability in East Africa by supporting the stability of the current 
Sudanese regime, it would sadly be at the expense of the Sudanese people’s interest. 
A possible area for future research is the question of why the SIM, which appreciated 
the Iranian theocratic regime and tried to model itself after it, became fractured after 
taking state power, while the Iranian theocratic regime remains coherent until this very 
day. 
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